

THE ETHICS OF SOCRATES

*A Compilation of the Teachings of the Father of
Greek and Roman Philosophy, as reported by
his disciples, Plato and Xenophon, and
developed and commented upon by
Aristotle, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius,
Epictetus and others*

ARRANGED TOPICALLY, AND WITH RUNNING
COMMENTARY BY THE AUTHOR

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To

MISS EDITH M. THOMAS
MRS. MAY RILEY SMITH
MISS INA COOLBRITH

By reason of the encouragement of these three great poets this book was considered and accordingly is gratefully inscribed.

Miles Menander Dawson.

INTRODUCTION

"Socrates is celebrated as a teacher of morality, but we should rather call him the inventor of morality."—HEGEL.

No other human mind, as such, claiming to be no more, and accepted only for what it claimed, has so profoundly influenced mankind, as that of Socrates. The great thinking and, in great part, the right thinking of men for nearly twenty-five hundred years have been distinctly traceable to his mental initiative. Its subjects, its canons, its very processes he outlined so cogently and clearly that sound reasoning may also be said to be the progeny of his soul.

Though he was the originator of dialectics, a process of ascertaining the truth of the matter by inquiry, and though his methods have affected the progress of man beyond the possibility of justly estimating the degree of his influence, it was apparently his own view, as also the opinion of those who have most revered and loved him in every generation, that his greatest gift to humanity is his clear enunciation that human reason, informed by love of truth and of wisdom, is man's never-failing guide regarding conduct.

* This is but a repetition of what Diogenes Laërtius said much earlier; but it is also important as the opinion of a modern authority.

Socrates, like Jesus, Epictetus and, for the most part, Confucius, left no scripture of his own. What fell from his lips was later, in some part, recorded, chiefly by two of his disciples, Xenophon and Plato; but, while Xenophon most reflected the wit, the clarity of thought and of expression, and the worldly wisdom of Socrates, whose sayings he sought faithfully to report and not merely under that guise to bolster up opinions of his own, Plato who lived to a great age and was himself an instructor of youth, reported the Master's teachings but undoubtedly employed dialogues in which Socrates was assigned a part as a means of establishing Plato's own propositions, some of which his Master may never have dreamed of. It would be easy, however, to exaggerate the extent of this; for, save as regards a very few things, all that Plato represents Socrates as saying concerning conduct, is either confirmed by something recorded by Xenophon, or is so consonant with other things, the authenticity of which is thus independently attested, that its genuineness is virtually beyond question.

One unfortunate consequence, however, of this secondary presentation of the sayings of Socrates by Plato who was so well able to pronounce upon these matters himself, is that many have lost sight of the Master in viewing his brilliant disciple, and thereby also have caused the subtle but inspiring relation of Socrates to every school of ethics in Greece or Rome after his time, to be ignored. Yet many, indeed most, of the brilliant contributions to human wisdom of the ablest exponents of these

schools are but commentaries upon the original conceptions of Socrates.

The author of this volume seeks to collect from the writings of Xenophon and Plato the important statements concerning human conduct, attributed to Socrates or approved by him by adoption or by silent assent, and to gather from Aristotle, Cicero, Epictetus, Lucretius, Longinus, Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch, Plotinus and Seneca, passages which aptly complement the Socratic sayings or even mark significant departures from them in principle, thus exhibiting in its most important features the ethics which are traceable to Socrates.

This material has been arranged under heads which, after much consideration, are considered best to follow the order and methods of presentation adopted by the Sage himself, for the most part, and otherwise suggested by the natural sequence of the topics; starting from the foundation laid by Socrates in the following passage in Plato's "Meno":

"Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident; but that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to inquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking after what we know not, that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight in word and deed to the utmost of my power."

To give smoothness of continuity which will best sustain the interest and not with the purpose of

bringing forward his own opinions, the author of this book has supplied a running commentary as a mere connective, which will, it is hoped, relieve what otherwise might be the intolerable tedium of disassociated statements, however interesting each of these might be by itself. This is also intended suitably to replace the context of the various quotations.

This book has been prepared, with a real love for the task, in order to enable the modern reader to gather, without extensive research and without sifting the vast resultant material, the substance of the principles, fidelity to which caused the illustrious ancient exponents of the life of philosophy to be preëminent for precept and conduct even to this day.

May my labors have that end!

MILES MENANDER DAWSON.

NEW YORK, July 1, 1922.

SOCRATES, HIS DISCIPLES AND GREATEST FOLLOWERS

SOCRATES. The birth of Socrates is placed between 471 B.C., and 469 B.C. His father was an Athenian statuary, his mother a midwife. He was himself a sculptor; and, more than 500 years after his death, a group of the Graces, ascribed to him, yet stood along the road to the Acropolis.

He was also a poet; his hymn to Zeus was highly regarded and he produced a metrical version of Hesiod's fables. He served also in defense of his country upon three separate battlefields, always with conspicuous bravery and disregard of personal safety; upon one occasion he saved the life of Alcibiades, at Delium.

In the political life of Athens he did not seek a prominent part; yet he withstood demands upon him to serve the state in a way which his conscience did not approve, in 406 B.C. by opposing the unconstitutional proposal to decide the fate of eight generals by a single vote of the assembly and in 404 B.C. by refusing to go as one of five citizens, deputed by the Thirty Tyrants, to bring from Salamis Leon whom they wished to destroy.

It is not, however, as sculptor, poet, soldier or

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upright citizen that Socrates is known to all generations since his time, but preëminently as a reasoner.

He must have been a strange figure in a city where beauty of face and form was so much esteemed. Short, thick-necked, fat, pop-eyed, snubnosed, big-mouthed, coarse-lipped, he would have provoked derision, had not his mental powers been so prodigious and his character so transcendent.

The Delphic oracle proclaimed him wisest of men. This he always modestly ascribed to his being wise enough to know that he did not know, while others thought they knew though they did not. To test this, he questioned upon the streets of Athens all who laid claim to knowledge. This method of inquiry, perfected by him, came to be known as "dialectics."

This course soon collected about him the keenest youths of Athens, in that age of Pericles, of Pheidias and of Aristophanes. He neglected his private affairs, lived on the plainest food and went about barefooted, without change of raiment. To his followers his conversation was a perpetual delight and inspiration; to distinguished citizens who occasionally deigned to engage in discussion with him, the result of which was never doubtful, he was offensive; and to those of high or low degree who would for selfish ends buttress old wrongs or impose new injustices, he became with certain groups the object of intense hatred.

This hatred was so widespread that "The Clouds," a drama by Aristophanes, in which Socrates was satirized, was acceptable to Athenians, rich and poor, who wished "to be let alone," to borrow a

modern phrase for an attitude ancient as well as modern. It also brought about in 399 B.C., his trial upon accusations "of denying the gods recognized by the state" and "of corrupting the young." Upon these charges he was convicted and, having declared after his conviction that he deserved instead special honour for his services, was sentenced to death. Refusing to avail himself of an opportunity to escape, he bade farewell to his disciples, embraced his children and drank the hemlock, at the age of 70.

The words of Glaucon, opening the discussion of justice in Plato's "Republic" (Bk. ii.) and purporting to give the view of those who urge that it is wisest to seem just, but to be unjust, involuntarily come to the mind when the fate of Socrates, as that of Jesus, is contemplated: "They will say that in such a situation the just man will be scourged, racked, fettered, will have his eyes burned out and at last, after suffering every kind of torture, will be crucified."

Socrates founded no school. By applying reason to ethics and other subjects, his followers founded a number of schools, as Plato, the "Academicians"; Aristotle, the "Peripatetics"; Zeno, the "Stoics"; and Epicurus, the "Epicureans." The two former became schools of philosophy and logic chiefly, although Socrates' most important ethical teachings are in Plato's works, and although the first volumes wholly devoted to ethics were penned by Aristotle. The Stoics and the Epicureans taught ethics chiefly; but, while Stoicism can be traced to Socrates through the Cynics, founded by Antisthenes, his pupil, and Epicureanism through the Cyrenaics, founded by

Aristippus, also his pupil, neither strictly conforms with what Socrates taught. Epicureanism is, indeed, so far afield that from its records scarcely anything could be quoted as illustrating the ethical instruction of Socrates, except intolerance of silly, vicious fables about the gods and recognition of the value of sexual selection, if well-directed or at least not ill-directed by human customs. The noblest features of Stoicism are all found in Socrates' own sayings, but not its imperviousness to emotion or its doctrine of the right to quit life of one's own free will.

XENOPHON, a celebrated disciple of Socrates, was born at Athens 445 B.C. He was distinguished as a general, having successfully led the retreat of the Greek forces after the treacherous massacre of their commanders and having otherwise served with distinction; as a historian, being the author of "The Anabasis," an account of some of the more important military movements in which he had taken part; and as a philosopher, being the author of "Memorabilia," reminiscences of the conversations of Socrates, and of other works. He died in 359 B.C. at the age of eighty-six.

PLATO, the most distinguished philosopher among the immediate disciples of Socrates, was born at Athens 427 B.C. After the death of Socrates, he retired from Athens for a time and, upon his return, lived secluded for several years; but, at about the age of forty, commenced his career as an instructor of youth at the garden, Academeia, in the suburbs of Athens, from which garden his followers came to be called Academicians. He was the author of many

books, all in the form of dialogues and all except one, "The Laws," which was completed in his old age, purporting to relate what had been said in conversation by Socrates and his disciples. In "The Laws," the conversation centers upon an unnamed personage, called "The Athenian Stranger." As much the greater portion of the teachings of Socrates has been handed down in these dialogues, it is but natural that the origin of many of his doctrines has been ascribed to Plato—with what degree of propriety, higher criticism has busied itself to determine. Plato died in 347 B.C. at the age of eighty.

ARISTOTLE, the most celebrated pupil of Plato and the founder of the "Peripatetic" school—so called because instruction was given by conversation while walking—was born at Stagira (from which he was often called a Stagirite) in 384 B.C. At about the age of 18, he became a disciple of Plato in Athens, continuing with him and in the instruction of youths in rhetoric for twenty years. Upon the death of Plato in 347 B.C. he retired from Athens. In 342 B.C. at the age of forty-two he was invited by Philip, King of Macedon, to become the instructor of his son, Alexander, then in his fourteenth year. At the age of fifty, he returned to Athens and commenced lecturing in the Lyceum, during which period most of his great works of learning were produced. He died in 322 B.C. at the age of sixty-two. He influenced the thought and culture of the ancient world and, perhaps, even the modern world to this day more than any other of the great followers of Socrates.

CICERO, illustrious as an orator, statesman and

philosopher, was born at Arpinum, near Rome, 106 B.C. He studied, in succession, the Epicurean, the Academician and the Stoic philosophies and his works, entitled "Oratory," "The Republic," "The Laws," "The Orator," "Hortensius," "Limits," "Tusculan Debates," "The Nature of the Gods," and, particularly, "On Old Age," "On Friendship" and "On Duties" brought him a deservedly high reputation as a philosopher and an author. His orations and his services to his country greatly enhanced his fame. He was executed, by the order of Antony, whose cause he had opposed, in 43 B.C., at the age of sixty-three.

Lucretius, a Latin poet, born about 95 B.C., was the author of the great narrative poem, "De Natura Rerum" ("On the Nature of Things") which contains much the best and most thorough account of the teachings of Epicurus and his followers, that has come down to us. Lucretius is said to have taken his own life at the age of forty-four.

Seneca, a Roman philosopher and the instructor of Nero, was born at Cordoba, Spain, a few years B.C.; the exact year is not known. He studied, first, the Academician philosophy but, afterward, the Stoic, of which he became the most famous instructor of his time. Nero showered honours and riches upon him but, after departing widely from his ethical teachings, turned upon him and required him to take his own life in 65 A.D. He was the author of a large number of philosophical works, of which treatises on the following subjects are extant: Anger, Consolation, Providence, Tranquillity of Mind, Philo-

sophical Constancy, Clemency, The Shortness of Life, A Happy Life, Philosophical Retirement and Benefits.

PLUTARCH, eminent as a biographer, essayist and chronicler, was born at Chacroneia in Bœotia, about 45 A.D., and died at some time after 106 A.D. He lectured upon philosophy in Rome but retired to his native town before his death. His fame rests chiefly upon a remarkable series of parallel biographies, known as "Plutarch's Lives"; but he was also the author of upward of sixty essays upon ethical and philosophical topics which have been collected under the title, "Plutarch's Morals."

EPICETUS, one of the most celebrated of the Stoics, was born at Hierapolis, in Phrygia, about 50 A.D. He was a slave at Rome, belonging to one of Nero's freedmen, but was afterward manumitted. He became so famous as a philosopher that he was honoured by the emperor, Domitian, with banishment and settled at Nicopolis in Epirus. He wrote nothing; but his pupil, Arrianus, collected his maxims in the "Encheiridion" and in eight books of "Dissertations," of which only four are extant, complete, and certain fragments of the others.

MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS, Roman emperor and distinguished philosopher, was born at Rome in 121 A.D. As a child and youth he was a favourite of the emperor, Hadrian, and was adopted by his successor, Antoninus Pius, whom he in turn succeeded. He died in 180 A.D. He was a Stoic, but his breadth was such that he endowed chairs at Athens in the Academician, the Stoic, the Peripatetic and the

Epicurean schools. His "Meditations," which have come down to us, are among the most prized texts of the ethical teachings of the followers of Socrates.

PLOTINUS, the most important philosopher of the Neo-Platonic school, was born at Lycopholis in Egypt, 205 A.D. He commenced his study of philosophy at Alexandria at the age of twenty-eight. At the age of thirty-nine he repaired to Rome where he lectured with great success. He was the author of works that were edited by his distinguished pupil, Porphyry, and divided into six books which were given the collective title, "Enneads." He died in 270 A.D. at the age of sixty-six.

LONGINUS, a Platonic philosopher, was born about 213 A.D., whether at Emesa in Syria or at Athens is uncertain. He strenuously opposed the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, his contemporary. Becoming the preceptor of the children of Zenobia, he also acted as her political adviser and, in consequence, was executed as a traitor by order of the Emperor, Aurelian, in 273 A.D. at the age of sixty. He was the author of several philosophical works, of which only one, "On the Sublime," is quoted from—he is not given this work by authority.

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PLOTINUS,

On the Immortality of the Soul.

Translated by Thomas Taylor.

LONGINUS,

On the Sublime

Translated by Wm. Smith.

The other books ascribed to Plato, the other essays of Cicero and Seneca and several of the other works of Aristotle have been consulted, as well as the books of several minor authors and various English and other modern text-books upon the general subject.

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CHAPTER I

VIRTUE IS OBEDIENCE TO REASON

THE fundamental postulate of all that Socrates and his followers, the Greek and Roman philosophers of whatever school, taught concerning human conduct is that man is a reasoning being. This alone gives to what he does, ethical signification; otherwise it would neither be moral nor immoral, but merely unmoral.

It is, therefore, ethical for him to do what his reason, fully and freely exercised, approves as best; which statement comprises two things: first, that he can discover what is best by reasoning and, second, that he should be controlled, and should wish to be controlled, by reason.

Reason is Man's Guide. In the "Republic" (bk. iv.), Plato reports Socrates as saying:

"We call an individual brave, in virtue of the spirited element of his nature, when this part of him holds fast, through pain and pleasure, the instructions

of the reason as to what is to be feared, and what is not. . . . We call him wise, in virtue of that small part which reigns within him, and issues these instructions. . . . Again, do we not call a man temperate, in virtue of the friendship and harmony of these same principles, that is to say, when the two that are governed agree with that which governs in regarding the rational principle as the rightful sovereign, and set up no opposition to its authority?"

The two that are governed are by him defined as the animal or passion nature and the ambitious or self-assertive nature.

In "Protagoras," Plato represents his Master as inquiring if it be not true that "no one enters willingly into evil, or into that which he considers evil; that it is not, in fact, in the nature of man to engage with deliberate purpose in what he believes to be evil instead of in good."

Plato himself thus expresses it in "The Laws," (bk. v., pt. ii.), "Let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will; for no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of all evils."

Again in "Philebus," Socrates says of what constitutes a happy life, "You then assert it is that of rejoicing; we, that of thinking rightly"; and in "Euthydemus," demands, "Is not this the result, that other things are indifferent, that wisdom is the only good and ignorance the only evil?"

Aristotle in his "Ethics" (bk. vii., c. ii), takes issue with the great teacher, as follows:

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“Socrates contended that no one acts contrary to what is best, conceiving it to be best, but by reason of ignorance of what is best. . . . With all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is at variance with plain facts; for that the man so failing does not suppose his acts to be right before he is under the influence of passion is quite plain.”

That Socrates would have retorted that reason should have shown the wrong of submitting to the influence of passion which could so distort one's reasoning, is clear from this passage from the “Republic” (bk. iv.):

“‘The soul of a thirsty man, insofar as he is thirsty, has no other wish than to drink; but this it desires, and towards this it is impelled.’ ‘Clearly so.’ ‘Therefore, whenever anything pulls back a soul that is under the influence of thirst, it will be something in the soul distinct from the principle which thirsts, and which drives it like a beast to drink. . . . Whenever the authority which forbids such indulgences grows up in the soul, is it not engendered there by reasoning, while the powers which lead and draw the mind towards them, owe their presence to passive and morbid states?’”

This view of Socrates is also neatly expressed in this colloquy:

“‘Do you think that any persons yield obedience to the law who do not know what the laws sanction?’

‘I do not.’ ‘And do you think that any who know what they ought to do, think that they ought not to do it?’ ‘I do not think so.’ ‘And do you know any persons that do other things than those which they think they ought to do?’” (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 6.)

He considered that the intellect, the will and the body has each its appointed work, saying of this (Republic, bk. iv.):

“What makes the state just, is the fact that each of the three classes there is doing its own work. . . . Each of us also, if his inward faculties do severally their proper work, will, in virtue of that, be a just man, and a doer of his proper work.”

Of this harmony he draws this enticing picture elsewhere in the same book (Republic, bk. iv.): “The just man will not permit the several principles within him to do any work but their own, nor allow the distinct portions of his soul to interfere with each other.”

The following account of the blessings flowing from the dominion of reason is part of the same colloquy:

“And so these two, [*i.e.*, the reason and the will] having been thus trained, and having truly learnt their parts and received a real education, will exercise control over the concupiscent principle, which

in every man forms the largest portion of the soul, and is by nature most insatiably covetous."

In "The Laws," Plato thus adopts his Master's view:

"But this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings which pull us in different and opposite ways and to opposite actions and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. The argument tells me that every man ought to follow one of these cords and not let go but pull that against all the rest and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason." (Bk. i., pt. ii.)

Aristotle, in his "Ethics," (bk. iii., c. xiv.), points out that the dominance of reason means not merely the subjection of desire but its transformation, saying, "In the man of perfected self-mastery the appetitive principle must be accordant with reason."

Plato causes Socrates to return to this in the "Republic" (bk. iv.), saying:

"And now to the person who asserts that it is profitable for this creature, man, to be unrighteous, and that it is not for his interest to do justice, let us reply that his assertion amounts to this, that it is profitable for him to feast and strengthen the multifarious monster and the lion and its members, and to starve and enfeeble the man to such an extent as to leave him at the mercy of the guidance of either of the other two, without making any attempt to habituate or reconcile them to one

another, but leaving them together to bite and struggle and devour each other."

That the vicious cannot see the right, while the virtuous can see both the facts which determine the right and the delusion which misleads the vicious, follows from the very premises of the Sage; but he does not fail also to put it into words, saying, "Vice can never know both itself and virtue; but virtue, in a well-instructed nature, will in time acquire a knowledge at once of itself and of vice." (Republic, bk. iii.)

Reason, the Right Use of the Mind. "I see that as those who do not exercise the body cannot perform what is proper to the body, so those who cannot exercise the mind, cannot perform what is proper to the mind; for they can neither do that which they ought to do, nor refrain from that from which they ought to refrain." (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 3.)

Xenophon so epitomizes his Master's doctrine. This, in even more unmistakable language, Plato puts upon the lips of the Sage himself in "Protagoras," thus: "Whoever commits error in the choice of pleasure and pain—that is, of good and evil—commits it through defect of knowledge."

No follower of Socrates has restated this more fitly than Epictetus in this passage (Dissertations, iii., 3): "When the good appears, straightway the soul is moved towards it, and from the evil. And never doth the soul reject any clear appearance of the good."

Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, c. v.) gives expres-

sion to it in a more hackneyed form, but quite as emphatically, when he says:

“Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the dæmon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man’s understanding and reason;”

and Aristotle sententiously, in this, “It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a sensible, without being a good, man” (bk. vi., c. xii.), and again this, “The good man puts himself under the direction of intellect” (bk. ix., c. viii).

In “Lysis,” also, Socrates is reported by Plato as saying, “With regard to matters, into which we have acquired no insight, no one will ever allow us to act as we think proper, but all persons, to the best of their power, will hinder us from meddling with them”; of which matter Epictetus says (Dissertations, i., 28), “If anything, will you not rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, those that are blinded and lamed in the chiefest of their faculties?”, and again (Encheiridion, xlii.), “For also if any one should take a true consequence to be false, it is not the consequence that is injured, but he who is deceived.”

Marcus Aurelius illustrates this idea (Meditations, c. viii) thus:

“Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: ‘What opinions has this man about

good and bad?' For if with respect to fame and ignominy, death and life he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing wonderful or strange to me, if he does such and such things; and I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so "

Aristotle demonstrates this in his "Ethics" (bk. vi., c. ii.) in this way, "Since moral virtue is a disposition exercising choice, and choice is will consequent on deliberation, the reason must be true and the will right to constitute good choice."

In the "Republic" (bk. iv.), Socrates says, "Is it not, then, essentially the province of the rational principle to command, inasmuch as it is wise and has to exercise forethought in behalf of the entire soul, and the province of the spirited principle to be its subject and ally?"

He means by "the spirited principle" what Aristotle calls "will" and Epictetus, in the following (Dissertations, ii., 22), speaks of as "love":

"Whereinsoever a man is zealous, this, it is fair to suppose, he loveth. Are men, then, zealous for evil things? Never. Or, perchance, for things which do not concern them? Nor for them, either. It remaineth, then, that they are zealous about good things only; and that if they are zealous about them, they also love them. Whosoever, then, hath understanding of good things, the same would know how to love. But he who is not able to distinguish good things from evil, and things that are neither from both, how could this man yet be capable of loving?"

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In this passage (*Meditations*, c. ix.), Marcus Aurelius from different angles casts light upon this postulate: "Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it, then, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty"; and Epictetus in this: "Of all our faculties ye shall find but one that can contemplate itself, or, therefore, approve or disapprove itself" (*Dissertations*, i., 1).

It is the great Sage himself, however, who in "Phædo" asked his disciples, "When the soul and the body are united, nature ordains the one to be a slave and to be ruled, and the other to be master and to rule. Tell me once again, which do you think is like the divine, and which is like the mortal?"

Pure Reason, Man's Highest Faculty. "Yet indeed it is no easy matter, but on the contrary a very difficult one, to believe that in the midst of these studies an organ of our souls is being purged from the blindness, and quickened from the deadness, occasioned by other pursuits,—an organ whose preservation is one of more importance than a thousand eyes, because only by it can truth be seen " (*Republic*, bk. vii)

Socrates thus urged at every opportunity that, while perception apprehends the changing appearances of things, the mind alone perceives the unchanging, invisible truth about anything whatsoever. Accordingly upon one occasion he said of phenomena, "You can touch them, and see them, and perceive them with the other senses, while you can grasp the

unchanging only by the reasoning of the intellect." (Phædo.)

Aristotle here puts this in another fashion, which carries the idea further and distinguishes clearly between induction from observed facts and deduction from hypotheses: "Induction is the source of universal propositions, and deduction reasons from these universals." (Ethics, bk. vi., c. iii.)

That it is abstract reasoning which Socrates lauds is shown by him in "Phædo":

"Have we not also said that, when the soul employs the body in any inquiry, and makes use of sight, or hearing, or any other sense,—for inquiry with the body means inquiry with the senses,—she is dragged away by it to the things which never remain the same, and wanders about blindly, and becomes confused and dizzy, like a drunken man, from dealing with things that are ever changing?' 'Certainly.' 'But when she investigates any question by herself, she goes away to the pure, and eternal, and immortal, and unchangeable, to which she is akin; so she comes to be ever with it, as soon as she is by herself, and can be so; and then she rests from her wanderings, and dwells with it unchangingly, for she is dealing with what is unchanging.' "

Elsewhere in the same book, Socrates is made to say,

"And she reasons best, I suppose, when none of the senses, whether hearing or sight or pain or pleas-

ure, harasses her; when she has dismissed the body and released herself as far as she can from all intercourse or contact with it, and so, coming to be as much alone with herself as is possible, strives after real truth." (Phædo.)

Aristotle declares in his "Ethics" (bk. x., c. vii.) that the faculty of pure reason is the most godlike of all things human, observing,

"He that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, pure intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of mind, and dearest to the gods; because if, as is thought, any care is bestowed on human things by the gods, then it must be reasonable to think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to themselves (and this must be the pure intellect)."

And of this intellectual life, Aristotle again remarks in his "Ethics" (bk. x., c. vi.), "But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live thus, not in so far as he is man, but in so far as there is in him a divine principle."

In "Phædrus," Plato represents his great teacher as saying of this field of pure reason, "Real existence, colourless, formless, and intangible, visible only to the intelligence which sits at the helm of the soul, and with which the family of true science is concerned, has its abode in this region"; and he also speaks of the explorations of the soul, by means of pure reason in these words,

"And during the circuit it seems distinctly absolute justice, and absolute temperance, and absolute science, not such as they appear in creation, nor under the variety of forms to which we nowadays give the name of realities, but the justice, the temperance, the science, which exist in that which is real and essential being."

In "Phædo," Plato recounts a brief dialogue in which his Master elucidated the process of pure reason by which the conception of absolute justice, beauty and good may be attained, as follows:

"And will not a man attain to this pure thought most completely, if he goes to each thing, as far as he can, with his mind alone, taking neither sight nor any other sense along with his reason in the process of thought, to be an encumbrance?"

It is this power of the intellect he again urges, as Plato reports in "Philebus," which makes life truly worth living; of this he said:

"I would still more earnestly contend against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever is the thing, by possessing which that life becomes eligible and good, it is not pleasure, but intellect, which is more allied and similar to it."

That this process is at every stage complete, so that death is never untimely, Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, c. ii.) declares in the following:

“These are the properties of the rational soul; it sees itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses. . . . It obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete, if anything cuts it short; but in every part and wherever it may be stopped it makes what has been set before it full and complete.”

That it can be aught more than accident, should one who does not live by the light of pure reason, notwithstanding, live rightly, Socrates asserts in the “Republic” (bk. vi.) and in this striking comparison, “Do you conceive that those who, unaided by the pure reason, entertain a correct opinion, are at all superior to blind men, who manage to keep the straight path?”

Immorality of Opinion. “Indeed I am content, I proceeded, to call as before, the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth conjecture,—the two latter jointly constituting opinion, and the two former intelligence. Opinion deals with the changing, intelligence with the real; and as the real is to the changing, so is intelligence to opinion; and as intelligence is to opinion, so is science to belief and understanding to conjecture.”

Thus Socrates, in Plato’s “Republic” (bk. vii.), ranked the different notions which men form about phenomena and their causes or about themselves and the purpose of their lives, with the intent to commend knowledge and understanding and to condemn mere

credulity and conjecture, as a basis for thought and conduct.

Epictetus appears to have had the same distinction in mind when he remarked:

“For use is one thing, and observation and study another. God had need of the other animals to use appearances, but of us to observe and study appearances. Wherefore it is enough for them to eat and drink and rest and breed and do whatever else each of them performs; but to us, to whom the faculty of observing and studying hath also been given, these things are not enough.” (Dissertations, i., 6.)

Nothing could be more evident than that in nature “ignorance of the law excuses no man” and every man incurs the same consequence for the same infraction. In other words, his false view avails him not. He has no right to have a false view; at his peril he must know. Therefore Socrates condemned sophistry in every phase and in none more severely than in inaccurate use of words. Of this, he says in “Phædo,” “To use words wrongly is not only a fault in itself; it also creates evil in the soul.”

In “Phædrus” he thus depicts the demoralizing consequences of oratorical persuasion that the false is the true:

“Whenever, then, an orator, who is ignorant of good and evil, finds a people in a state of similar ignorance, and takes upon himself to persuade them by passing an eulogium, not upon a poor ass as

though it were a horse, but upon evil as though it were good; and when, by having studied and learned the popular opinions, he has succeeded in persuading them to do that which is evil instead of that which is good, what kind of fruit do you imagine his oratory will hereafter reap as the harvest of the seed he has sown?"

And in "Phædo," this picture is given of the pernicious activities of men given to idle disputation:

•
"Persons who spend their time in disputation, come at last to think themselves the wisest of men, and to imagine that they alone have discovered that there is no soundness or certainty anywhere, either in reasoning or in things, and that all existence is in a state of perpetual flux, like the currents of the Euripus, and never remains still for a moment."

In the "Republic" (bk. v.) Socrates again distinguishes controversy from discussion and identifies it with clever misuse of words, in this colloquy:

"'Truly, Glaucon, the power of the art of controversy is a very extraordinary one.' 'Why so?' 'Because it seems to me that many fall into it even against their will, and fancy they are discussing, when they are merely debating, because they cannot distinguish the meanings of a term in their investigation of any question, but carry on their opposition to what is stated, by attacking the mere words,

employing the art of debate, and not that of philosophical discussion ””

That he does not mean by this that every evil-doer, brought before the bar of justice, may not have his advocate or that he, who acts for him, may not present his case, is shown by the following from “Phædrus”: “It is fair to state even the wolf’s cause.”

The duty with regard to it Marcus Aurelius puts thus:

“Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art a part, and of what administrator of the universe the existence is an efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never return.” (Meditations, c. ii.)

Seneca obviously has the same matter in mind when he says in his essay “On Benefits” (bk. ii., c. xviii.), “For we ought not only to act virtuously but to do so upon principle”; that is, we should do right because we know it to be right. That this is peculiarly the office of a human being, Marcus Aurelius observes (Meditations c. x.) thus: “And consider that only to the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all.”

The irrationality of fixing upon something contrary

to the plain dictates of nature, something unattainable, as the right, Aristotle's "Ethics" (bk. iii., c. iv.) condemns in this passage, "Moral choice has not for its objects impossibilities"; and Marcus Aurelius yet more severely in this, "To seek what is impossible is madness" (Meditations, c. v.).

Concerning the duty of a man to acquaint himself with nature's requirements, Epictetus asked,

"Are not these the things it behooves thee to prove:—what it is that makes men happy, what makes things proceed as we would have them, how one should blame no man, accuse no man, and fit one's self to the ordering of the all?" (Dissertations, iii., 26.)

None of the great followers of Socrates gave more thought and attention to the evils of delusion than the wisest and noblest of the Roman emperors, who thus declared his full confidence in the righteousness of nature's laws: "Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in truth." (Meditations, c. iv.)

He speaks also concerning the care which men should exercise in judging things which appeal to them as wise or worthy, in the following (Meditations, c. vi.): "Where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted."

The peculiar manner in which desire deludes the

mind, Socrates thus elucidates in the "Republic" (bk. iv.).

"Would you not say that the mind of a man under the influence of desire always either seeks after the object of desire, or attracts to itself that which it wishes to have; or again, so far as it wills the possession of anything, it assents inwardly thereto, as though it were asked a question, longing for the accomplishment of its wish?"

The weakness which a sense that one is in the wrong imposes upon him, Socrates, also in the "Republic" (bk. iv.), thus depicts:

"Do we not often observe in other cases that, when a man is overpowered by desires against the dictates of his reason, he reviles himself, and resents the violence thus exerted within him, and that, in this struggle of contending parties, the spirit sides with the reason?"

Marcus Aurelius, however, reproves such conduct in this (*Meditations*, c. xi.), "When thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, this is an evidence of the diviner part within thee being overpowered."

Epictetus is of the opinion that it must be allowed even the philosopher to be moved by the sudden and unexpected, though through his philosophy he should soon recover himself; of this he says:

"At a sound from the heavens, or from the downfall of something, or some signal of danger, or any-

thing else of this kind, it must needs be that the soul of the philosopher too shall be somewhat moved, and he shall shrink and grow pale—not through any opinion of evil that he has formed, but through certain rapid and unconsidered motions that forestall the office of the mind and reason. Soon, however, that philosopher doth not approve the appearances to be truly objects of terror to his soul—that is to say, he assents not to them nor ratifies them; but he rejects them, and casts them out, nor doth there seem to be in them anything that he should fear.” (Fragment, c. lxxx.)

In Xenophon’s “Memorabilia” (bk. iii., 9), Socrates is described as identifying all virtues with prudence, *i.e.*, enlightened self-interest, thus implying that vice is the direct consequence of delusion and that men choose it because they mistakenly judge it to be beneficial; “Prudence and temperance he did not distinguish, for he deemed that he who knew what was honourable and good, and how to practice it, and who knew what was dishonourable, and how to avoid it, was both prudent and temperate.”

Wickedness is Unreason. “To hate reasoning is the greatest evil that can happen to us.” Thus Socrates is recorded in “Phædo.”

Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, c. iv.) puts it,

“What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of another; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where is

it, then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the power of forming opinions about evils”;

and also in another passage: “If they do not do right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and in ignorance.” (Meditations, c. xi.).

Aristotle in his “Ethics” (bk. iii., c. ii.) speaks of it as a kind of ignorance, two significant sayings to this effect being as follows: “Ignorance which affects moral choice constitutes depravity.” “Every bad man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what to leave undone, and by reason of such error men become unjust and wholly evil.”

Socrates is reported in the “Republic” (bk. iii.) to have spoken of wickedness as the result of a sort of obsession by a false estimate of the relative value of things: “And those who are bewitched, you would yourself, I believe, assert to be those who change their opinion either through the seductions of pleasure or under the pressure of fear.”

Something like this Marcus Aurelius must also have had in his mind when he penned,

“With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought to blame neither goods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily” (Meditations, c. xii.).

The inevitability that wrong deeds will sooner or later result from wrong views, he argues in these words:

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“And what harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way.” (Meditations, c. ix.)

Aristotle in the following discusses two of the most common forms of unreason: “Anger does in a way listen to reason, but mishears it; as quick servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what is said, and then mistake the order” (Ethics, bk. vii., c. vi.).

“Reason or some impression of the mind shows there is insolence or contempt in the offender and then anger, reasoning as it were that one ought to fight against what is such, fires up immediately; whereas lust, if reason or sense, as the case may be, merely says a thing is sweet, rushes to the enjoyment of it. And so anger follows reason in a manner, but lust does not, and is therefore more disgraceful.” (Ethics, bk. vii., c. vi.)

That all wrong-doing flows from false reasoning is again asserted by Marcus Aurelius in this tolerant saying: “When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt neither wonder nor be angry” (Meditations, c. viii.); and in like manner in this passage (c. x.):

“When thou art offended at any man’s fault, forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for example, in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or reputation, and the like.”

The tendency and possible consequence, *i.e.*, madness itself, of yielding to the false processes of unreason, Aristotle portrays in this fashion,

“In the fool the grasping after what is pleasant is insatiable and indiscriminating; and every acting out of the desire increases the kindred habit, and if the desires are great and violent in degree, they even expel reason entirely” (Ethics, bk. iii., c. xiv.).

The same thing Marcus Aurelius in the following passage (Meditations, c. ix.) says even more convincingly:

“Hast thou determined to abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of this atmosphere which surrounds us.”

And the happy outcome of return to rational behaviour the imperial philosopher well sets forth in this: “Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, if

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thou wilt return to thy principles and devotion to reason" (Meditations, c. iv.).

But that evil will, or can, ever pass away and be lost out of the universe, however much men may as individuals eschew it, Socrates repudiates as a paradox, in this passage in "Theætetus": "Evils, Theodorus, can never perish; for there must always remain something which is opposite to good."

CHAPTER II

SCIENCE, THE BASIS OF ETHICS

IN order that the individual become skillful in the art of self-government, it is of course clearly necessary that he know what things are, what he is doing and what is that which is likely to result from his acts.

Science as knowledge of the consequences of effect upon cause, that is, of the regular and inevitable operation of universal laws, and consequently the basis of reasoning and therefore of all ethical conduct, Socrates appraised at its full worth in Plato's "Republic" (bk. vii.), saying, "Science is pursued for the sake of the knowledge of what eternally exists, and not of what comes for a moment into existence, and then perishes."

Naturally this did not make so profound and vivid an impression upon the transcendental Plato as upon the sterner stuff of him who was in turn Plato's pupil, Aristotle, who said of it sententiously in his "Ethics" (bk. vi., c. iii.), "What we scientifically know cannot be otherwise than it is."

The reality of invisible law, so much more reliable when once demonstrated, than appearances which often delude, the great teacher often adverted to, as in this pregnant, if homely, comparison in the

“Republic” (bk. x.), “Let us not be at all surprised at finding that things as substantial as a bed are shadowy objects when contrasted with reality.”

Upon none of the sagest and most eminent of his followers, did this identification with the laws of God of truths discovered by scientific research so impress itself as upon the noble Romans whose thinking and whose lives reflected so much of the glory of the teachings of Socrates. Thus Marcus Aurelius in many passages adverts to it, with enthusiasm, as in this, “If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it” (Meditations, c. iv.).

The elevation of the human mind which accompanies due attention to the acts collected by research and the truths discovered by reasoning upon them, he celebrates with enthusiasm thus:

“Look around at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going along with them, and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one another; for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life” (Meditations, c. vii.).

And the beneficence of the operation of God’s laws and man’s unavoidable compliance therewith, which should also be glad and willing, he sets forth in this: “That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it.” (Meditations, c. x.)

Neither Socrates nor Marcus Aurelius who vindicated even upon his throne the claim of Socratic ethics to veneration through all ages, failed to point out the severely practical benefits of accurate learning; for Socrates remarks of the estimates which all form of him who knows and of him who does not know, in "Lysis," "If you acquire knowledge, all men will be friendly to you . . . you will be useful and good. If not, you will have no friend in anyone, not even in your father or mother, or any of your own family." And Marcus Aurelius expatiates upon the lamentable consequences of one form of almost inexcusable ignorance, in this fashion:

"To expect bad men not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational and arbitrary." (Meditations, c. xi.)

Plato puts similar words upon the lips of Socrates in "The Apology," thus:

"Do you mean to say that you, who are so much younger than I, are yet so much wiser than I, that you know that bad citizens always do evil, and that good citizens always do good, to those with whom they come in contact, while I am so extraordinarily stupid as not to know that if I made any of my companions a rogue, he will probably injure me in some way, and as to commit this great crime, as you allege, intentionally?"

Of the universal obligation of God's laws, which are no less than expressions of Himself, extending to and controlling even Himself, Seneca says, echoing Socrates' own view, "The Creator and Ruler of the universe Himself, though He has given laws to the fates, yet is guided by them. He always obeys, He only once commanded." (On Providence, c. v.)

The unavoidable consequence of punishment upon violation of nature's laws, Xenophon in his "Memorabilia" (bk. iv., 4) represents Socrates to have descanted upon somewhat at length, in this dialogue:

"'Is it not everywhere a law, also,' said Socrates, 'that men should do good to those who do good to them?' 'It is a law,' answered Hippias, 'but it is transgressed.' 'Do not those therefore who transgress it incur punishment,' continued Socrates, 'by being deprived of good friends, and being compelled to have recourse to those who hate them?'"

Observation of Facts. The necessity, therefore, for investigating the operation of God's laws to the end that His purposes shall be manifest, Marcus Aurelius expresses in this aphorism: "He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the world is." (Meditations, c. viii.)

The mutability of phenomena and the persistence of unchanging law are contrasted in these two sayings: "All things are changing: and thou thyself

art in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the universe, too." (Meditations, c. ix.) "He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which is and everything which will be for time without end; for all are of one kin and of one form." (Meditations, c. vi.)

Aristotle, in his "Ethics," (bk. i., c. vi.) puts the emphasis upon **harmony** and changelessness in this brief sentence: "With what is true all things which really are, are in harmony; but with that which is false the true very soon jars."

The marvels of nature's processes and especially transmutations of material substances into life and motion, by procreation and digestion, Marcus Aurelius proclaims in these words:

"A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause takes it, and labours on it and makes a child. What a thing from such a material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat and then another cause takes it and makes perception and motion and, in fine, life and strength and other things—how many and how strange!" (Meditations, c. x.)

The order of organic nature and the superior place of man because of his power of reason, Epictetus sets forth thus:

"God hath constituted every other animal, one to be eaten, another to serve for tilling the land, another to yield cheese, another to some kindred

use; for which things what need is there of the observing and studying of appearances, and the ability to make distinctions in them? But man He hath brought in to be a spectator of God and of His works, and not a spectator alone, but an interpreter of them." (Dissertations, i., 6.)

Aristotle held that there are no assignable limits to the ability of human intelligence to apprehend the facts and through them the laws of nature; for he says in his "Ethics" (bk. vi., c. xxx.): "All science is thought to be capable of being taught, and what comes within its range capable of being learned."

He also emphasized the need of accurate knowledge, in this:

"Nor again does good sense consist in a knowledge of general principle only, but it is necessary that one should know also the particular details, because it is fitted for action, and action is concerned with details; for which reason sometimes men who have not much knowledge are more practical than others who have—among others, they who derive all they know from actual experience." (Ethics, bk. vi., c. viii.)

Indeed he held, as also did Socrates, that, save in rare instances, men cannot master that knowledge which best regulates human conduct before they are of mature age, saying (Ethics, bk. vi., c. viii.):

"The young come to be geometricians, and mathematicians, and wise in such matters, but it is

not thought that a young man can come to be possessed of good sense; for the reason that this good sense has for its object particular facts which come to be known from experience, which the young man has not, because it is produced only by length of time."

Marcus Aurelius hesitates not to allege that all evils that come upon men are due to their ignorance of good and evil, saying:

"Begin the morning by saying to thyself, 'I shall meet with the busy-body, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil.'" (Meditations, c. ii.)

The fundamental canon of mental morality, the basis of all morality,—that which, when sincerely apprehended, keeps the seeker after truth ever humble and modest—Plato records in "Charmides" that Socrates enunciated in these words: "It is . . . the knowledge of one's self to know what one knows and what one does not know."

Investigation of Phenomena. Xenophon in his "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 1) thus contrasts Socrates' discussions with the debates of sophists;

"He did not dispute about the nature of things as most other philosophers disputed, speculating how that which is called by sophists the world was produced, and by what necessary laws everything in the

heavens is effected, but endeavoured to show that those who chose such subjects of contemplation were foolish."

This he is also represented by Xenophon, as expatiating upon, on more than one occasion as in the following:

"Concerning celestial matters in general, he dissuaded every man from becoming a speculator how the divine power contrives to manage them; for he did not think that such points were discoverable by man, nor did he believe that those acted dutifully toward the gods who inquired into things which they did not wish to make known. He observed, too, that a man who was anxious about such investigations, was in danger of losing his senses, not less than Anaxagoras, who prided himself highly on explaining the plans of the gods, lost his. . . . For Anaxagoras, when he said that fire and the sun were of the same nature, did not reflect that people can easily look upon fire, but cannot turn their gaze to the sun, and that men, if exposed to the rays of the sun, have complexions of a darker shade, but not if exposed to fire; he omitted to consider, too, that of the productions of the earth, none can come fairly to maturity without the rays of the sun, while, if warmed by the heat of fire, they all perish; and when he said that the sun was a heated stone, he forgot that a stone placed in the fire does not shine, or last long, but that the sun continues perpetually the most luminous of all bodies." (*Memorabilia*, bk. iv., 7.)

This quotation shows the marvelous prescience of Socrates concerning matters of physical science as, for instance, concerning radio-activity: since the very latest views of modern science wholly harmonize with his own, and scarcely at any point with those attributed to Anaxagoras.

Socrates' Scientific Discoveries. This is but one of many instances likewise, among which also the following from "Phædo":

"'But there is nothing to prevent my describing to you what I believe to be the form of the earth, and its regions.' 'Well,' said Simmias, 'that will do.' 'In the first place, then,' said he, 'I believe that the earth is a spherical body placed in the centre of the heavens, and that therefore it has no need of air or of any other force to support it; the equiformity of the heavens in all their parts, and the equipoise of the earth itself, are sufficient to hold it up.'"

Consult also this description of the appearance of the earth from without, with its gaseous envelope, which, Plato records in "Phædo," the Sage gave to his disciples:

"'In the first place, the earth itself, if a man could look at it from above, is like one of those balls which are covered with twelve pieces of leather, and is marked with various colours, of which the colours that our painters use here, are, as it were, samples. But there the whole earth is covered with them, and

with others which are far brighter and purer ones than they. For part of it is purple of marvelous beauty and part of it is golden, and the white of it is whiter than chalk or snow. It is made up of the other colours in the same way, and also of colours which are more beautiful than any that we have ever seen."

Consider, also, how Socrates, ages ago, penetrated the mystery that both sound and sight are modes of motion at different velocities—a discovery which with modern scientists is of but yesterday; for in the "Republic" (bk. vii.), he says:

"Well, motion, if I am not mistaken, admits of certainly more than one variety; a perfect enumeration of these varieties may perhaps be supplied by some learned philosopher. Those which are manifest to people like us are two in number' . . . 'Pray what are they?' 'We have already described one; the other is its counterpart.' 'What is that?' 'It would seem,' I replied, 'that our ears were intended to detect harmonious movements, just as our eyes were intended to detect the motions of the heavenly bodies; and that these constitute in a manner two sister sciences.'"

The "unceasing purpose which through all the ages runs" and which was revealed by the white light of Darwin's discoveries, is surely recognized by Socrates in this saying, reported by Plato in "Pro-

tagoras": "His object in all these contrivances being to prevent any species from becoming extinct."

Mere Groping Condemned. Yet the Sage surely did decry methods of alleged physical investigation as an end in and for itself; for he asks in "Phædo," "But what about the actual acquisition of wisdom? If the body is taken as a companion in the search for wisdom, is it a hindrance or not? For example, do sight and hearing convey any real truth to man?"; and this he thus answers emphatically in the negative, "'Then when does the soul attain truth?' he asked. 'We see that, as often as she seeks to investigate anything in company with the body, the body leads her astray.'" (Phædo.)

Socrates had not always thought so; he tells of his early ambition to conquer life's problems by means of material investigations, in these words:

"When I was a young man, I had a passionate desire for the wisdom which is called physical science. I thought it a splendid thing to know the causes of everything; why a thing comes into being, and why it perishes, and why it exists. I was always worrying myself with such questions as, 'Do living creatures take a definite form, as some persons say, from the fermentation of heat and cold?' 'Is it the blood, or the air, or fire by which we think?' 'Or is it none of these, but the brain which gives the senses of hearing and sight and smell, and do memory and opinion come from these, and knowledge from memory and opinion when in a state of quiescence?'" (Phædo.)

In "Phædo" also, he relates his baffling experiences with the theories of Anaxagoras in considerable detail as follows:

"But one day I listened to a man who said that he was reading from a book of Anaxagoras, which affirmed that it is Mind which orders and is the cause of all things. I was delighted with this theory; it seemed to me to be right that Mind should be the cause of all things, and I thought to myself, 'If this is so, then Mind will order and arrange each thing in the best possible way.' . . . I never thought that, when he said that things are ordered by Mind, he would introduce any reason for their being as they are, except that they are best so. I thought that he would assign a cause to each thing, and a cause to the universe, and then would go on to explain to me what was best for each thing, and what was the common good of all. I would not have sold my hopes for a great deal. I seized the books very eagerly, and read them as fast as I could, in order that I might know what is best and what is worse.

"All my splendid hopes were dashed to the ground, my friend, for as I went on reading I found that the writer made no use of Mind at all, and that he assigned no causes for the order of things. His causes were air, and ether, and water, and many other strange things. . . . If it were said that without bones and muscles and the other parts of my body I could not have carried my resolutions into effect, that would be true. But to say that they are the cause of what I do, and that in this way I am

acting by mind, and not from choice of what is best, would be a very loose and careless way of talking. . . . And so one man surrounds the earth with a vortex, and makes the heavens sustain it. Another represents the earth as a flat kneading-trough, and supports it on a basis of air. But they never think of looking for a power which is involved in these things being disposed as it is best for them to be, nor do they think that such a power has any divine strength; they expect to find an Atlas who is stronger and more immortal and abler to hold the world together, and they never for a moment imagine that it is the binding force of good which really binds and holds things together. I would most gladly learn the nature of that kind of cause from any man. But I wholly failed either to discover it myself, or to learn it from anyone else." (Phædo.)

Science Means Reasoning. Socrates' scorn was directed, then, really not against physical science as such but against the emphasis placed upon mere observation of things, the relationship of which the pseudo-scientist made no effort to trace, and also upon idle speculation about their causes. Thus in the following passage he is represented as condemning the passing from plane surfaces to movements of the heavenly bodies, instead of to bodies of three dimensions:

"Why, after considering plane surfaces, we proceeded to take solids in a state of revolution (*i.e.*, astronomy, the movement of heavenly bodies),

before considering solids themselves. Whereas, the correct way is, proceed from two dimensions to three; which brings us, I believe, to cubical dimensions, and figures into which thickness enters." (Republic, bk. vii.)

In the study of the heavenly bodies also he favoured investigation of the mathematical laws at work, instead of mere observation and speculation; of this he spoke as follows: "Hence, we shall pursue geometry."

It was his view that everything which evoked reason is valuable while the knowledge which never becomes wisdom is useless; of this he speaks as follows:

"Some objects tend to stimulate thought, while others have no bias towards awakening reflection—placing in the former category everything that strikes upon the senses in conjunction with its immediate opposite and in the latter everything of which this cannot be said." (Republic, bk. vii.)

The superiority of abstract reason he celebrates, in this, among many passages:

"Since this fretted sky is still a part of the visible world, we are bound to regard it, though the most beautiful and perfect of visible things, as far inferior nevertheless to those true revolutions, which real velocity, and real slowness, existing in true number, and in all true forms, accomplish relatively to each other." (Republic, bk. vii.)

It is clearly impossible that the straight-forward mind of Socrates should really have condemned honest research. The mind which centuries before modern scientific methods brought the truth about these matters to light, discerned so surely the spherical shape of the earth pending from no visible support in the heavens, and interpreted light and sound as velocities of motion, could not possibly underrate real achievements in scientific research. Rather must he have been of the view, expressed some centuries later by Marcus Aurelius:

“For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it.” (Meditations, c. iii.)

For Socrates says of this. that

“if the study of all these sciences which we have enumerated, should ever bring us to their mutual association and relationship, and teach us the nature of the ties which bind them together, I believe that the diligent treatment of them will forward the objects which we have in view, and that the labour, which otherwise would be fruitless, will be well bestowed.” (Republic, bk. vii.)

How much, therefore, of the alleged statements of Socrates derogatory to physical science and of

patient, plodding research is the mere misunderstanding by Xenophon of his denunciation of observation without the exercise of reason and how much is merely Plato's attributing to his beloved teacher opinions which he, Plato, partial rather to disquisition than to impartial inquiry, closely cherished, it is now impossible to say; but that Socrates could not have meant that physical science is to be tabooed or neglected is surely shown by this tribute to its value and the fundamental need of it, in "Phædrus":

"All the higher arts"—of which he always ranks the art of living highest—"require, over and above their immediate discipline, a subtle and speculative acquaintance with physical science, it being, I imagine, by some such door as this that there enters that elevation of thought and universal mastery over the subject in hand."

CHAPTER III

THE SOUL

SOCRATES taught that the soul exists as a thing separate from the body and that its cultivation is of first importance and man's chief duty. He considered the demonstration of its existence and qualities one of the earliest duties of human reason.

The Soul is Pure Being. Of this he inquires in the "Republic" (bk. ix.), as follows:

"Speaking universally, does not the cultivation of the body in all its branches contain truth and real existence in a less degree than the cultivation of the soul in all its branches? . . . And do you not regard the body itself as less true and real than the soul?"

The qualities of the soul he distinguishes as follows:

"Then do you think that pure being enters more largely into the constitution of the class of substances like bread and meat and drink, and good generally, than into the constitution of that species of things which includes true opinion and science and

understanding, and in a word, all virtue?" (Republic, bk. ix.);

and, in "Phædrus," he described the relation which the soul is compelled to bear to the body, thus: "Nor as yet entombed in that which we now drag about with us and call the body, being fettered to it as an oyster to his shell."

This Epictetus puts perhaps more strikingly, "Thou art a little soul bearing up a corpse." (Fragment, clxxvi.)

The dignity of the office of the soul is thus given by Socrates in "Philebus," "Wisdom, however, and mind could not exist without soul": and again, somewhat more fully, in this passage of the "Republic" (bk. i.),

"Could we in justice assign superintendence and government, deliberation and the like, to anything but the soul, or should we pronounce them to be peculiar to it? . . . Again, shall we declare life to be a function of the soul?"

In this passage from "Phædrus," Socrates is recorded to have laid down a rule by means of which the soul is discerned: "For every body which receives motion from without we call soulless; but that, which receives motion from within and of itself, we say is possessed of soul, as though in this lay the soul's very nature."

The Soul's Transforming Power. This is repeated in even more cogent form in "Charmides,"

as the view of an ancient physician: "For all things proceed from the soul, both the good and bad, to the body and to the whole man, and flow from thence, as from the head to the eyes."

Attendance upon the soul is, of course, to be of such sort that, when accomplished, one will in the words of Socrates, as reported in "Phædrus," have "enslaved that portion of the soul wherein vice is contained, and liberated that where virtue dwells."

In the "Republic" (bk. iii.) he pays this enthusiastic tribute to the soul's beauty, transforming the body with its loveliness:

"Surely, then, to him who has an eye to see, there can be no fairer spectacle than that of a man who combines the possession of moral beauty in his soul with outward beauty of form, corresponding and harmonizing with the former, because the same great pattern enters into both."

In "Phædrus," he breathes forth this prayer for inner excellence and outward harmony with it, "Grant me to be beautiful in the inner man, and all I have of outer things to be at peace with those within!"

The Soul, the Real Man. Marcus Aurelius (Meditations, c. xii.) thus depicts the triune composition of a human being, "The things are three of which thou art composed, body, breath, intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is truly thine"; and the foolishness of man in consider-

ing that the body or even the animal life is himself, he descants upon in this passage (c. x.):

“And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the food and the air which is inspired.”

Xenophon in his “*Memorabilia*” (bk. i., 2) records Socrates as demonstrating the essentially external and foreign character of a man’s mere body in this fashion:

“[He] used to say, besides, that when the soul has departed, in which alone intelligence exists, men take away the body of their dearest friend, and put it out of sight, as soon as possible. . . . Every man while he is alive, removes of himself from his own body, which he loves most of all things, and allows others to remove from it, everything that is useless and unprofitable; since men themselves take off portions of their nails, and hair, and callous parts, and resign themselves to surgeons to cut and burn them with labour and pain, and think it their duty even to pay them money for their operations.”

Marcus Aurelius puts the same idea most illuminatingly, thus:

“Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is hidden within; this is the power of

persuasion, this is life, this, if one may so say, is the man. In contemplating thyself never include the vessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached about it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that they grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without the cause which moves and checks them, than in the weaver's shuttle, the writer's pen, and the driver's whip." (Meditations, c. x.)

And Epictetus in this yet more striking and convincing form, "But the tyrant will bind—what? The leg. He will take away—what? The head. What, then, can he not bind and not take away? The will." (Dissertations, i., 18.)

Epictetus shrewdly says, however, of the greater care which men exhibit to avoid injury to the body than to shun harm to the soul, "In going about, you are careful not to step upon a nail or to twist your foot. Care thus, also, lest you injure your ruling faculty." (Encheiridion, xxxviii.) And he exclaims of the blessed state of him who guards his soul's welfare and not his body's, "For thou art not flesh and hair, but a will; if thou keep this beautiful, then wilt thou be beautiful." (Dissertations, iii., 1.)

The Soul Not an Organism. Plotinus, in his essay upon "The Immortality of the Soul," distinguishes it from the body, as a "simple" or "elemental" and not a "composite" or what moderns would call "organism," in this way, "What, therefore, is the nature of this thing? If indeed it is a

body, it is in every respect capable of being analyzed. For every body is a composite."

Marcus Aurelius has these things, among many, to say of the soul and its qualities: "Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig." (Meditations, c. vii.) "The universe is transformation: Life is thinking." (C. iv.)

Soul Presupposes Over-Soul. Marcus Aurelius asserts that the soul comes from its own source:

"For as my earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source." (Meditations, c. iv.);

and again, by way of contrast with the animal life, he argues that it is from the Over-Soul, thus: "Among animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed." (C. ix.)

Socrates demonstrates the necessity to assume God in order to account for the human soul, in this colloquy:

"Shall we not affirm that the body with us possesses a soul?' 'It is evident; we shall affirm it.' 'From whence, friend Protarchus, did it obtain it, unless the body of the universe happens to be with a soul

and possessing the same things as this, but in every way more beautiful?" (Philebus.)

Marcus Aurelius reaffirms this in the following eloquent sentence, "Every man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of the deity; nothing is a man's own, but his child and his body and his very soul came from the deity." (*Meditations*, c. xii.)

Epictetus thus dwells upon the sacredness of the charge which is thus given into man's keeping,

"Do not artists work in stone or brass or gold or ivory? And the Athena of Phidias, when she hath once stretched out her hand and received upon it the figure of Victory, standeth thus for all time? But the works of God have motion and breathing, and the use of appearances and the judgment of them. Wilt thou dishonour such a Maker, whose work thou art? Nay, for not only did He make thee, but to thee alone did He trust and commit thyself. Wilt thou not remember this, too, or wilt thou dishonour thy charge? But if God had committed some orphan child to thee, wouldst thou have neglected it?" (*Dissertations*, ii., 8.)

And in this passage, Epictetus proclaims the identity of the rational faculty with God—a very part of himself:

"But what? Are not those creatures also works of God? Surely; yet not supreme objects, yet not parts of the gods. But thou art a supreme object,

thou art a piece of God, thou hast in thee something that is a portion of Him. Why, then, art thou ignorant of thy high ancestry?" (Dissertations, ii., 8.)

Virtue is of the Soul. Aristotle urges, in his "Ethics," that the purpose to be served by man in his sojourn in the world is to develop his soul, saying upon this subject, "And we assume the work of man to be life of a certain kind, that is to say, an exercise of the soul and actions with reason, and of a good man to do these things well and nobly."

Marcus Aurelius thus admonished the old man who has not manumitted his reason from subordination to his fears and follies:

"The third then is the ruling part; consider thus: 'Thou art an old man; no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from the future.'" (Meditations, c. ii.)

The Soul's Welfare Supreme. In "Protagoras," Socrates reminds men how much more care they devote to their perishing bodies than to that which is most precious because essentially their very selves, in these burning words:

"If you had had occasion to entrust your body to any one's care, at the risk of its becoming either healthy or depraved, frequent would have been your

deliberations on the propriety of the measure; you would have summoned both friends and relatives to a consultation and taken many days to consider the matter; yet now, when your soul is concerned, your soul, which you prize far more highly than your body, and whereon your all depends for good or ill, according as it turns out healthy or depraved; when this, I say, is at stake, you communicate neither with your father, nor your brother, nor with any of us, your friends."

This sentiment Plato fully shared, saying of it in "The Laws," (bk. v., pt. ii.).

"For there are, in all, three things about which every man has an interest and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them. Midway comes the interest of the body and first of all that of the soul."

Socrates, facing his accusers before the tribunal of his judges, boldly proclaimed his fidelity and devotion to the cause of the infinitely superior claims of the human soul, his own and every other man's, above every earthly consideration, including those of life or death, when he said, in "The Apology":

"If you were therefore to say to me, 'Socrates, this time we will not listen to Anytus; we will let you go, but on this condition, that you cease from carrying on this search of yours, and from philosophy. If you are found following those pursuits again, you

shall die.' I say, if you offered to let me go on these terms, I should reply:

"Athenians, I hold you in the highest regard and love; but I will obey God rather than you; and as long as I have breath and strength, I will not cease from philosophy and from exhorting you, and declaring the truth to every one of you whom I meet, saying, as I am wont: "My excellent friend, you are a citizen of Athens, a city which is very great and very famous for wisdom and power of mind: are you not ashamed of caring so much for the making of money, and for reputation, and for honour? Will you not think or care about wisdom, and truth, and the perfection of your soul?

"And if he disputes my words, and says that he does not care about these things, I shall not forthwith release him and go away: I shall question him and cross-examine him and test him: and if I think that he has not virtue, though he says that he has, I shall reproach him for setting the lower value on the most important things, and a higher value on those that are of less account. This I shall do to every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or stranger, but more especially to the citizens, for they are more nearly akin to me. For, know well, God has commanded me to do so. And I think that no better piece of fortune has ever befallen you in Athens than my service to God. For I spend my whole life in going about and persuading you all to give your first and chiefest care to the perfection of your souls, and not, till you have done that, to think of your bodies, or your wealth; and telling you that virtue

does not come from wealth, but that wealth, and every other good thing which men have, whether in public or in private, comes from virtue.'” (The Apology.)

CHAPTER IV

THE HIGHEST GOOD

SINCE Socrates considered living the art of producing the best attainable results for a human soul, the question of the "summum bonum," the highest good, naturally became the chief object of his investigation; for upon its determination, quite obviously, the plan of life which should be followed, must depend. Consequently, he and the philosophers who followed him busied themselves with discussions concerning what constitutes the highest good.

“In the world of knowledge, the essential form of good is the limit of our inquiries, and can barely be perceived; but, when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful,—in the visible world giving birth to light, and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full authority, truth and reason;—and that whosoever would act wisely, either in private or in public, must set this form of good before his eyes.” (Republic, bk. vii.)

This statement of Socrates renders clear the function that reason must perform, if conduct is truly to be based upon it, *i.e.*, it must demonstrate what is the highest good. The Sage, himself, realized to the full the heavy responsibility which this entails; for in the same book, (bk. v.) he is elsewhere found saying, "I verily believe it is a more venial offense to be the involuntary cause of death to a man, than to deceive him concerning noble and good and just institutions."

Men Seek What They Esteem Their Best Good. Followers of Socrates saw clearly that every man pursues that which he esteems his good. Of it, Epictetus says,

"But this is the nature of every creature, to pursue the good and flee the evil." (Dissertations, iv., 5); and this, which is scarcely less striking, though much less epigrammatic,

"For every living thing was so framed by nature as to flee and turn from things, and the causes of things, that appear hurtful, and to follow and admire things, and the causes of things, that appear serviceable." (Encheiridion, xxxi.)

Marcus Aurelius even put it as an opportunist's justification, saying,

"For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they will be easy to thee; but if contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy

own nature, and strive towards this, even if it brings no reputation, for every man is allowed to seek his own good." (Meditations, c. xi.)

Aristotle speaks of it more conservatively, in his "Ethics," "The generality of mankind seek their own good, and hold that this is their proper business." (Bk. vi., c. viii.); and elsewhere in the same work more decidedly, "No man wishes for that which he does not think to be good." (Bk. v., c. xii.)

That a firm and clear mental grasp of what the highest good is, must be had by every superior man and very especially by all who aspire to govern, Socrates declares in the following passage from the "Republic" (bk. vi.)

"This good, then, which every soul pursues, as the end of all actions, divining its existence, but perplexed and unable to apprehend satisfactorily its nature, or to enjoy that steady confidence in relation to it, which it does enjoy in relation to other things, and therefore doomed to forfeit any advantage which it might have derived from those same things;—are we to maintain that, on a subject of such overwhelming importance, the blindness we have described is a desirable feature in the character of those best members of the state in whose hands everything is to be placed?"

None is Willingly Deceived. In the "Republic" (bk. iv.) Plato represents Socrates as voicing the

opinion that no one desires to be deceived about what is his good, thus:

“Is it not evident, that though many persons would be ready to do and seem to do, or to possess and seem to possess, what seems just and beautiful, without really being so; yet, when you come to things good, no one is content to acquire what only seems such?”

Concerning which, Aristotle’s “Ethics” (bk. iii., c. vi.) points out that the great distinction is as follows:

“May we say that, abstractly and as a matter of objective truth, the really good is the object of desire; but to each individual, whatever impresses his mind with the notion of good? And so to the good man that is an object of desire which is really and truly so, and to the bad man anything may be.”

The process of eliminating the gross things which turn the perceptions of the soul downward and of cultivating the fine things which turn the perceptions of the soul upward, so that it may inerrantly perceive the good, is described by Socrates in the “Republic,” thus:

“But if from earliest childhood these characters had been shorn and stripped of those leaden, earth-born weights, which grow and cling to the pleasures of eating and gluttonous enjoyments of a similar nature, and keep the eye of the soul turned upon the

things below;—if, I repeat, they had been released from these snares, and turned round to look at objects that are true, then these very same souls of these very same men would have had as keen an eye for such pursuits as they actually have for those in which they are now engaged.” (Republic, bk. vii.)

This is perhaps even more effectively stated in this passage, spoken in the same connection:

“The real nature of education is at variance with the account given of it by certain of its professors, who pretend, I believe, to infuse into the mind a knowledge of which it was destitute, just as sight might be instilled into blinded eyes. . . . Our present argument shows us that there is a faculty residing in the soul of each person, and an instrument enabling each of us to learn; and that, just as we might suppose it to be impossible to turn the eye round from darkness to light without turning the whole body, so must this faculty, or this instrument, be wheeled round, in company with the entire soul, from the perishing world, until it be enabled to endure the contemplation of the real world and the brightest part thereof, which, according to us, is the form of good.” (Republic, bk. vii.)

Training of the Intellect. The superior office of dialectics in this process and the sad plight of him who does not learn it, Socrates sets forth in yet another place in the same book:

"Unless a person can strictly define by a process of thought the essential form of the good, abstracted from everything else, and unless he can fight his way as it were through all objections, studying to disprove them not by the rules of opinion, but by those of real existence, and unless in all these conflicts he travels to his conclusion without making one false step in his train of thought,—unless he does all this, shall you not assert that he knows neither the essence of good, nor any other good thing, and that any phantom of it, which he may chance to apprehend, is the fruit of opinion and not of science, and that he dreams and sleeps away his present life, and never wakes on this side of that future world, in which he is doomed to sleep forever?" (Republic, bk. vii.)

Elsewhere he also says, succinctly, "None will know the just and the beautiful satisfactorily till he knows the good." (Republic, bk. vi.) And yet again, giving a first glance at that which he esteems the "*summum bonum*," he avers,

"that the essential form of the good is the highest object of science, and that the essence, by blending with just things and all other created objects, renders them useful and advantageous" and adds, "If, I say, we know everything else perfectly, without knowing this,—you are aware that it will profit us nothing; just as it would be equally profitless to possess everything without possessing what is good." (Republic, bk. vi.)

Aristotle fully adopted this view, declaring in his "Ethics," "If pure intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine, compared with man's ordinary life." (Bk. x., c. vi.)

And Epictetus echoes it in this inspired passage:

"God is beneficial. But the good is also beneficial. It is likely, then, that where the essence of God is, there also should be the essence of good. And what is the essence of God? Flesh? God forbid. A property in land? God forbid. Fame? God forbid. Mind, intelligence, right, reason? Even so. Here, then once for all, seek the essence of the good!" (Dissertations, ii., 8.)

Perception of the Good. In the following from the "Republic" Socrates demonstrated that what is requisite to perceive the good is to turn the eye of reason away from the delusions of the material world:

"Just in the same way, I understand the condition of the soul to be as follows: Whenever it has fastened upon an object, over which truth and real existence are shining, it seizes that object by an act of reason, and knows it, and thus proves itself to be possessed of reason; but, whenever it has fixed upon objects that are blent with darkness,—the world of birth and death,—then it rests in opinion, and its sight grows dim, as its opinions shift backwards and

forwards, and it has the appearance of being destitute of reason.'

"'True, it has.'

"'Now, this power, which supplies the objects of real knowledge with the truth that is in them, and which renders to him who knows them the faculty of knowing them, you must consider to be the essential form of good, and you must regard it as the origin of science and of truth, so far as the latter comes within the range of knowledge, and, though knowledge and truth are both very beautiful things, you will be right in looking upon good as something distinct from them, and even more beautiful,'" (Republic, bk. vi.).

The One Thing Really Worth While. Elsewhere in the same book Plato reports his Master as affirming:

"'He who has his thoughts truly set on the things that really exist, cannot even spare time to look down upon the occupations of men, and, by disputing with them, catch the infection of malice and hostility. On the contrary, he devotes all his time to the contemplation of certain well-adjusted and changeless objects; and, beholding how they neither wrong, nor are wronged by, each other, but are all obedient to order and in harmony with reason, he studies to imitate and resemble them as closely as he can.'" (Republic, bk. vi.)

Which indicates with certainty the uses to which he, who has divined by means of exalted reasoning

the true end of life, must put his new-found wisdom. Of this, Aristotle's "Ethics" also remarks,

"In matters of moral action mere speculation and knowledge are not the real end, but rather practice; and if so, then neither in respect of virtue is knowledge enough; we must further strive to have and use it, and take whatever other means there are of becoming good." (Bk. x., c. viii.)

Epictetus, not merely by way of agreement with the views of his Master but also in testimony of the harmony of the Master's life with his thought and word, has said:

"Rule us as reasoning beings; show us what is for our good, and we shall follow it; show us what is for our ill, and we shall turn away from it; make us emulators of Thyself, as Socrates made his disciples." (Dissertations, iii., 7.); and in this passage he also argues that, when it is known what a man deems to be his good, the man himself is known, whether in things of the will or in things without,

"But try them, not, as others do, if they were born of the same parents and nurtured together, and under the same tutor, but by this alone, wherein they place their profit, whether in outward things or in the will. If in outward things, call them no more friends, than faithful or steadfast or bold or free—yea, nor even men, if you had sense." (Dissertations, ii., 22.)

The triumph which the comprehension of man's highest good by reason constitutes, Socrates celebrates thus, in the "Republic," (bk. vii.):

"Have we not here the actual hymn, of which dialectics is the consummation? This hymn, falling as it does within the domain of the intellect, can only be imitated by the faculty of sight; which, as we said, strives to look steadily first at material animals, then at the stars themselves, and last of all at the very sun itself. In the same way, whenever a person strives, by the help of dialectics, to start in pursuit of very reality by a simple process of reason, independent of all sensuous information,—never flinching, until by an act of the pure intelligence he has grasped the real nature of good,—he arrives at the very end of the intellectual world."

CHAPTER V

HAPPINESS, MAN'S GOAL

THE view of Socrates and of virtually all his great followers was that excellence in rational conduct constitutes not only the highest good but likewise true happiness.

"Observe that in the pleasure of all except the wise man, there is something positively unreal and ungentle, and slight as the rude outline of a picture," he remarked in the "Republic," (bk. ix.), where he discussed the essential "form of good" and dismissed the claims of the fool's pleasures; yet Aristotle, the most rigid reasoner of all the Sage's followers well said in his "Ethics," "Moral virtue has for its object-matter pleasures and pains, because by reason of pleasure we do what is bad, and by reason of pain decline doing what is right." (Bk. ii., c. ii.)

By this, however, Aristotle must not have intended what he elsewhere calls "happiness;" for he also says,

"Since then of all things which may be done there is some one end which we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire everything else, and since we do not choose in all instances with a further end in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the chief good, and the best thing of all." (Ethics, bk. i., 1.); and also this, "Of this nature happiness is mostly thought to be, for this we choose always for its own sake, and never with a view to anything further." (Bk. i., c. iv.)

He also remarks of it: "Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all things which are and may be done" (Ethics, bk. i., c. iv.); which view he supports by reasoning, thus, "We define that to be self-sufficient 'which, taken alone, makes life choiceworthy and to be in want of nothing;' and of such kind we think happiness to be." (Bk. i., c. iv.)

The road to this happiness Marcus Aurelius thus indicates,

"Thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happiness anywhere, not in reasoning, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what man's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come his desires and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to good and bad, the belief that

there is nothing good for man, which does not make him just, temperate, manly, free and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned." (Meditations, c. viii.)

What it is not, Socrates asserts in the following dialogue in Xenophon's "Memorabilia" (bk. iv., c. ii.): "But as to happiness, Socrates," said Euthydemus, 'that at least appears to be an indisputable good.' 'Yes, Euthydemus,' replied Socrates, 'if we make it consist in things that are themselves indisputably good.' 'But what,' said he, 'among things constituting happiness can be a doubtful good?' 'Nothing,' answered Socrates, 'unless we join with it beauty, or strength, or wealth, or glory, or any other such thing.'"

Aristotle denotes what it consists of, most admirably, in this passage in his "Ethics,"

"Wisdom makes happiness, not as the medical art, but as healthfulness makes health; because, being a part of virtue in its most extensive sense, it makes a man happy by being possessed, and by operating" (bk. vi., c. xii.); and Marcus Aurelius speaks much to the same effect in this, "If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it back immediately—if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied

with thy present activity according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy." (Meditations, c. iii.)

Seneca, in his essay "On Providence," remarks regarding this phase of the matter,

"After this, I shall prevail upon you never to pity any good man; for though he may be called unhappy, he cannot be so" (On Providence, bk. i., 3); and Epictetus also in this, "But if anyone is unfortunate, remember that it is of his own doing. For God hath made all men to be happy, and of good estates." (Dissertations, iii., 24.)

Pure Joy. Aristotle offers this explanation of what must have seemed paradoxical,

"To like and dislike what one ought, is judged to be most important for the formation of good moral character, because these feelings extend all one's life through, giving a bias towards, and exerting an influence on the side of, virtue and happiness, since men choose what is pleasant, and avoid what is painful." (Ethics, bk. x., 1.)

The definition of real pleasure he makes:

"Those things are really precious and pleasant which seem so to the good man" (Ethics, bk. x., c. v.); and that it is not that which gives satisfaction to the feeble intellect, he asserts in this: "No one would

choose to live with a child's intellect all his life through, though receiving the highest possible pleasure from such objects as children receive it from; or to take pleasure in doing any of the most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained" (bk. x., c. ii.); but on the contrary, that it is at its highest and best the attendant upon reason at its purest, saying, "Pleasure is attendant upon every percipient faculty, and in like manner on every intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which is most perfect and that most perfect which is the working of the best faculty upon the most excellent of the objects within its range." (Bk. x., c. iv.)

No other of the great followers of Socrates discussed happiness so fully nor in a manner which seems so to echo the words of the Master. Another illustration is afforded by this passage,

"So long as the object of intellectual or sensitive perception is such as it should be, and also the faculty which discerns or realizes the object, there will be pleasure in its functioning" (Ethics, bk. x., c. iv.); and, yet more aptly by this, "The pleasure proper to any form of activity increases that activity; for they who work with pleasure, sift all things more closely and carry them out to a certain degree of nicety." (Bk. x., c. iv.)

Aristotle's conclusion, which seems to answer all requirements is that,

"If then there be one or several functions which pertain to the perfect and blessed man, the pleasures which perfect these functions must be said to be specially and properly the pleasures of man; and all the rest in a secondary sense, and in various degrees, according as the functions are related to those which are highest and best." (Ethics, bk. x., c. ii.)

That Aristotle considers that this conception of what true happiness is, shuts out that which the crowd deems happiness, mere merriment and entertainment, he renders unmistakably clear by these comments upon the subject: "Happiness then stands not in amusements; in fact, the very notion of the end being amusement is absurd, and of one's toiling and enduring hardness all one's life long with a view to amusement." (Ethics, bk. x., c. v.)

Socrates, however, in "Philebus," says of pleasure,

"It is evident that the greatest pleasures, and likewise the greatest pains, are produced in some wickedness of the soul and of the body, and not in their virtuous state;" and again in the same book he asks: "Are not those pleasures the superior, which the strongest desires precede? . . . But do not both they, who are in a fever, and those afflicted with diseases of that kind, thirst more, and shiver more, and suffer more all that persons are wont to do in the body, and are more conversant with the want of those things, in which, being supplied, they feel a greater pleasure? Or shall we deny all this

to be true? . . . What then, should we appear to speak correctly by saying that if any one would know what are the greatest pleasures, he must not go and look upon the healthy, but upon the sick?" (Philebus.)

These pleasures, though keen, he declares, also in "Philebus" to be false and chimerical,

✓ "Of these phantasies, shall we say that the true are painted and placed before the good, for the most part, on account of these persons being god-loved, but the contrary before the bad, for the most part? Or shall we deny it? . . . To wicked men, then, likewise, pleasures are present, painted within them; but these are of the false kind. . . . Wicked men, therefore, for the most part delight in false pleasures; but the good, in the true."

Pleasure Merely Release from Pain. He also represents pleasure to constitute, at bottom, only release from pain, in this passage from Plato's "Republic" (bk. ix.),

"Speaking roughly, most of the so-called pleasures which reach the mind come through the body, and the keenest of them belong to this species; that is to say, they are a kind of release from pain;" and to be a mere species of enchantment in this passage: "The repose felt at the times we speak of is not really, but only appears to be, pleasant, by the side of what is painful, and painful by the side of what

is pleasant; and these representations will in no instance stand the test of comparison with true delight because they are only a species of enchantment." (Republic, bk. ix.)

Upon this he briefly expatiates, exposing the ignorance which lies beneath this folly,

"Can you wonder, that persons unacquainted with truth, besides holding a multitude of other unsound opinions, stand to pleasure and pain and their intermediate, in such a position, that though when they are carried to what is painful, they form a correct opinion of their condition, and are really in pain, yet, when they are carried from pain to the middle point between pain and pleasure, they obstinately imagine that they have arrived at fullness of pleasure,—which they have never experienced?" (Republic, bk. ix.)

And he illustrates it in a brief sentence as follows,

"They tell us that nothing is pleasanter than health, but that, before they were ill, they had not found out its supreme pleasantness." (Republic, bk. ix.)

That to expect pleasures of the lower sort without the attending penalty of pain is to disregard all human experience, is shown by these words of the Sage, reported in "Philebus,"

"Our argument then points out, that in laments and songs of joy, and not only in dramas, but in

the whole tragedy and comedy of life, and in ten thousand other cases, pains and pleasures are mingled together;" and again in this crisp sentence from the same book, "For apart from pain, we should never be able fully to try pleasure"; and once more in "Phædo" thus, "How strange a thing is what men call pleasure! How wonderful is its relation to pain, which seems to be the opposite of it! They will not come to a man together, but if he pursues the one and gains it, he is almost forced to take the other also, as if they were two distinct things united at one end."

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Preferable with both Pleasure and Pain. That life, composed as it is of both pain and pleasure, is to be preferred, if there be also mental activity, Socrates argues in this colloquy with Protarchus:

"Whether any of us would choose to live, possessing intellect, and mind, and science, and a perfect memory of all things, but partaking of pleasure, neither much nor little; nor, on the other hand, of pain; but being wholly exempt from all things of the sort?"

"To me, Socrates, neither life is eligible; nor would it, I think, ever appear so to any other person."

"What do you think, Protarchus, of a life mixed up with, and common to, both together?"

"Do you mean of pleasure, and of mind and intellect?"

"Just so; and of such a life am I speaking."

"Every person would certainly prefer such a

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kind of life to either and, moreover, not one this, and another that.'” (Philebus.)

Marcus Aurelius enforces this argument by saying of pain,

“The pain which is intolerable carries us off but that which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own tranquillity by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not made worse” (Meditations, c. vii.); and again, “Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear.” (c. v.)

He also praised the carrying of Stoicism to such extremes as the following:

“Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing something else.” (Meditations, c. vi.)

Aristotle in his “Ethics” warns, however, against excessive depreciation of pleasure, saying,

“In matters relating to men’s feelings and actions, theories are less convincing than facts. Whenever, therefore, they are found conflicting with actual experience, they not only are despised, but involve the truth in their fall. He, for instance, who depreciates pleasure, if once seen to aim at it, gets

the credit of thinking all pleasure a thing to be pursued, the mass of men being incapable of nice distinctions" (bk. x., 1); and proclaims his saner view, thus: "Functions differ from one another in goodness and badness, some being fit objects of choice, others of avoidance, and others in their nature indifferent. Pleasures are similarly related, since its own proper pleasure attends on each form of activity. Of course, that proper to a good function is good, that proper to a bad bad; for even the desires for what is noble are praiseworthy, and the desires for what is base, blameworthy." (Bk. x., c. iv.)

This, also, is the very core of the meaning of this noble statement, also from his "Ethics":

"We exist by what we do, that is, by living and acting; he, then, that has created a given work, exists, it may be said, by his act of working; therefore, he loves his work because he loves his life. And this is natural, for the work produced displays concretely, what existed before potentially." (Bk. ix., 1.)

The irresistible attraction of his own work for a man Epictetus thus describes:

"What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write the things he wrote? What else than nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to her will." (Dissertations, ii., 20.)

He also contrasts sensual pleasures with the highest good and condemns them, thus:

"Now the good must be a thing of such sort that we ought to trust in it? Truly. And we ought to have a faith in it? We ought. And ought we to trust in anything which is unstable? Nay. And hath pleasure any stability? It hath not. Take it then, and fling it out of the scales, and set it far away from the place of good." (Dissertations, ii., 11.)

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Again in these words he condemns the illusion of material comforts:

"Some, indeed, like cattle, concern themselves with nothing but fodder, even such as those that care for possessions and lands and servants and offices, for these are nothing more than fodder" (Dissertations, ii., 14); and lays down the salutary rule for man's guidance in this: "In things that concern the body accept only so far as the bare need—as in food, drink, clothing, habitation, servants. But all that makes for glory or luxury thou must utterly proscribe." (Encheiridion, xxxiii.)

Temperance, the Rule of Reason. Upon the same topic, Xenophon relates of Socrates,

"He advised them to be cautious of taking anything that would stimulate them to eat when they were not hungry, and to drink when they were not

thirsty; for he said that those were the things that disordered the stomach, the head, and the mind." (Memorabilia, bk. i., 3.)

The inanity of luxury Epictetus thus portrays,

"What other desire have such men than to sleep their fill unhindered, and when they have risen, to yawn for languor, and wash their faces, and write and read whatever pleaseth them; then have some trivial talk, and be praised by their friends, whatever they say; then go forth to walk about, and having done this a little, go to the baths; then eat; then retire to rest—such a rest as is the wont of such men, and why need we say what, for it is easily guessed?" (Dissertations, iii., 24.)

Contrast with it this picture presented by Socrates in Xenophon's "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 6), "But do you think that from all these gratifications so much pleasure can arise as from the consciousness that you are growing better yourself, and are acquiring more valuable friends?"

Marcus Aurelius identifies the pursuit of sensual pleasure with impiety, saying,

"And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety, for of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of

pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure while the good have pain for their share and possess the things which cause pain." (Meditations, c. ix.)

The Soul's Joys Highest and Best. In "Philebus," Socrates affirms the superiority of intellectual satisfactions, saying,

"Philebus then asserts, that the good is to all animals joy, pleasure and delight, and whatever else harmonizes with such kind of things; but what I contend for is, that it is not those things, but that to be wise, and to understand, and to remember, and whatever is of a kindred nature, both correct opinion, and true reasonings, are better and more acceptable than pleasure, to all who are able to partake in them."

To illustrate the folly of the contrary view, he thus contrasts the life of pleasure with that of intellect,

"In the life of pleasure, let there be no intellect; nor in that of intellect, pleasure; for, if either of them be the good, it need not want anything additional from any other quarter. But, if either of them appear to require aught else, this can no longer be the good?" (Philebus.)

Aristotle says concerning this,

"Whatever is proper to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him. Such, then, is to man the life in accordance with pure intellect, since this principle is most truly man; and if so, then it is also the happiest." (Ethics, bk. x., c. vi.)

He reasons it out yet further, with this conclusion:

"If from a living being you take away action, still more if creation, what remains but contemplation? So then the energy of the gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for contemplative speculation; and, of all human energies, that will have the greatest capacity for happiness which is nearest akin to this." (Ethics, bk. x., c. vi.)

Marcus Aurelius triumphantly vindicates the purpose for which man was created, thus,

"Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why dost thou wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou? To enjoy pleasure? See if common sense allows this" (Meditations, c. viii.); which proposition Aristotle in his "Ethics" amplifies in a single sentence:

"As in the case of flute-player, sculptor, or artisan of any kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or sort of activity, their chief good and excel-

lence are thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him" (bk. i., c. v.); and asks this pithy question, to ask which is to answer it, "Are we then to suppose, that while carpenter and cobbler have certain work and courses of action, man as man has none, but is left by nature without a task?" (Bk. i., c. v.)

And as a call to achievement, through whatever trials and ordeals, Socrates in "Phædrus" sounds this tocsin, "If the ends be glorious, all that befalls us in seeking them is glorious also."

Happiness Only in Right-Doing. That happiness attends virtue Socrates demonstrates in the "Republic" (bk. iv.), thus:

"To produce health is so to constitute the bodily forces as that they shall master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature; and to produce disease is to make them govern and be governed by one another in a way which violates nature.'

"True.'

"Similarly, will it not be true that to beget justice is so to constitute the powers of the soul that they shall master and be mastered by one another in accordance with nature, and that to beget injustice is to make them govern and be governed by one another in a way which violates nature?'

"Quite so.'

"Then virtue, it appears, will be a kind of health and beauty, and good habit of the soul; and vice will be a disease and deformity, and sickness of it.'"

Aristotle thus describes the voluntary character of individual acts of vice and the involuntary character of their consequence upon the man,

"Now regarding the vice of being destitute of all self-control, the particular instances are on the contrary quite voluntary, being done with desire and direct exertion of the will; but the general result is less voluntary since no man desires to form the habit" (*Ethics*, bk. iii., c. xiv.); and also says, "As for the plea that a man did not know that habits are produced from separate acts of exercise, we reply that such ignorance is a mark of excessive stupidity." (*Bk. iii.*, c. vii.)

Socrates emphasized this in the following,

"But the shortest, and safest, and best way, Critobulus, is to strive to be really good in that in which you wish to be thought good. Whatever are called virtues among mankind, you will find, on consideration, capable of being increased by study and exercise." (*Memorabilia*, bk. ii., 6.)

This idea Epictetus also enunciated in this pregnant passage:

"And thus it is in spiritual things also. When thou art wrathful, know that not this single evil hath happened to thee, but that thou hast increased the aptness to it, and, as it were, poured oil upon the fire." (*Dissertations*, ii., 18.)

Vice is Subordination of Reason. Aristotle, in his "Ethics," thus defines virtue and vice, "Virtue is supposed to be that habit which is such, in relation to pleasures and pains, as to effect the best results, and vice the contrary." (Bk. ii., c. ii.)

Epictetus thus discusses things, virtuous, vicious and indifferent,

"Of things some are good, some evil, and some indifferent. Now the good things are the virtues, and those that have the nature of virtue, and the evil things the vices, and those that have the nature of vice; and the indifferent things are between these, as wealth, health, life, death, pleasure, affliction." (Dissertations, ii., 19.)

In the "Republic" (bk. ix.), Socrates described foul practices as the subordination of reason to the animal in man, in these words,

"May we not assert that the practices which are held to be fair and foul, are fair or foul according as they either subjugate the brutal parts of our nature to the man,—perhaps I should rather say, to the divine part,—or make the tame part the servant and slave of the wild?"

These things also Marcus Aurelius repeats in this wise saying: "For the movement towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature." (Meditations, c. ix.)

The fatuity of a man's congratulating himself upon escaping exposure for a time, Socrates, according to Plato's "Republic" (bk. iv.), thus demonstrates:

"And by what argument can we uphold the advantages of disguising the commission of injustice, and escaping the penalties of it? Am I not right in supposing that the man, who thus escapes detection, grows still more vicious than before?"

The barter of one's soul for gain, Socrates in the same book exposes as voluntary enslavement, thus,

"Then, according to this argument, I proceeded: Can it be profitable for anyone to take gold unjustly, since the consequence is, that, in the moment of taking the gold, he is enslaving the best part of him to the most vile?" (Republic, bk. ix.)

Inharmony of the Vicious Soul. In the "Republic" (bk. iii.), the Sage is represented to have described the state of a soul which is harassed by vice thus: "It would not be amiss, I imagine, to compare this whole system of feeding and living to that kind of music and singing which is adapted to the panharmonium, and composed in every variety of rhythm."

And elsewhere in the same book Socrates more particularly portrays its chaotic condition, thus,

"Those, therefore, who are unacquainted with wisdom and virtue, and who spend their time in

perpetual banqueting and similar indulgences, are carried down, as it appears, and back again only as far as the midway point on the upward road; and between these limits they roam their life long, without ever overstepping them so as to look up towards, or be carried to, the true Above, and they have never been really filled with what is real, or tasted sure and unmingled pleasure; but like cattle, they are always looking downwards, and hanging their heads to the ground, and poking them into their dining-tables, while they graze and get fat and propagate their species; and, to satiate their greedy desire for these enjoyments, they kick and butt with hoofs and horns of iron, till they kill one another under the influence of ravenous appetites; because they fill with things unreal the unreal and incontinent part of their nature." (Republic, bk. ix.)

In "Phædrus" Socrates describes the effect of vice upon the soul in this vivid figure of speech:

"Now of this nature are beauty, wisdom, virtue and all similar qualities. By these, then the plumage of the soul is chiefly fostered and increased; by ugliness, vice and all such contraries, it is wasted and destroyed."

Aristotle, in his "Ethics," thus holds one responsible for preventable disease of the intellect as for preventable disease of the body,

"In respect of bodily diseases, those which depend on ourselves are censured, those which do not are

not censured; and if so, then in the case of the mental disorders, those which are censured must depend upon ourselves" (bk. iii., c. vii.); and Marcus Aurelius (c. viii.) thus contrasts men's tolerance of evil in themselves with their intolerance of it in others, "It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which is impossible."

The imperial Sage elsewhere calls it folly to expect that from the base evil will not come, saying,

"Consider that he, who would not have the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree to bear juice in the figs and infants to cry and the horse to neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such a character?" (Meditations, c. xii., 7.)

The Life of Reason Best and Happiest. In the "Republic" (bk. ix.), Socrates depicts in glowing colours the superior desirability of the pleasures of the life of reason, thus,

"Of all the appetites with which the gain-loving and honour-loving elements are conversant, those which follow the leading of science and reason, and along with them pursue the pleasures which wisdom directs, till they find them, will find not only the truest pleasures that they can possibly find, in consequence of their devotion to truth, but also the

pleasures appropriate to them, since what is best for each is also most appropriate. . . . Hence, so long as the whole soul follows the guidance of the wisdom-loving element without any dissension, each part can not only do its own proper work in all respects, or in other words, be just; but, moreover, it can enjoy its own proper pleasures, in the best and truest shape possible."

In "Protagoras," he lays bare in a single sentence that which constitutes vice and that which is virtue,

"Neither is subjection to self aught else than ignorance, mastery over self aught else than wisdom"; and in "Crito," enunciates this truth as the prime essential of the art of life, "We should set the highest value, not on ~~on~~ living, but on living well."

CHAPTER VI

IMMEDIATE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS

IN order to enforce virtuous thinking and conduct and as a compelling sanction for it, Socrates showed that here and now the balance is all in favour of virtue.

Self-Mastery. "Now the chariots of the gods, being of equal poise, and obedient to the rein, move easily, but all others with difficulty; for they are burdened by the horse of vicious temper, which sways and sinks them towards the earth, if haply he has received no good training from his charioteer."

By these words Socrates, in "Phædrus," contrasts the poise of the man whose reason rules, with the state of him whose reason served his appetites. Epictetus puts it, pithily, from another viewpoint, "Think you, you can be a sage, and continue to eat and drink and be wrathful and take offence just as you were wont." (Encheiridion, xxv.)

In the "Republic" (bk. vi.) Socrates explains thus how philosophy frees man from evil desires,

"When the current has set towards science, and all its branches, a man's desires will, I fancy, hover

around pleasures that are purely mental, abandoning those in which the body is instrumental,—provided that the man's love of wisdom is real, not artificial. . . . Such a person will be temperate and thoroughly uncovetous; for he is the last person in the world to value those objects, which make men anxious for money at any cost."

Marcus Aurelius particularizes concerning the matter in this fashion, "Wipe out imagination; check desire; extinguish appetite; keep the ruling faculty in its own power." (*Meditations*, c. ix.)

Of all the followers of Socrates, however, Aristotle is preëminent for the emphasis which he laid upon the necessity for self-mastery, as in this,

"Not only do we by abstaining from pleasures come to be perfected in self-mastery, but when we have come to be so, we can best abstain from them." (*Ethics*, bk. ii., c. 2.) He defines it in this discriminating manner, "He is perfected in self-mastery who not only abstains from the bodily pleasures, but is glad to do so: whereas he who abstains, but is sorry to do it, has not self-mastery." (*Bk. ii.*, c. 2.)

Socrates showed self-mastery to be the dominion of the soul, saying of the soul,

"Does she yield to the passions of the body, or does she oppose them? I mean this: When the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul drag it away and prevent it from drinking, and when it is hungry,

does she not prevent it from eating? And do we not see her opposing the desires of the body in a thousand other ways?" (Phædo.)

Aristotle describes it as dominion over the appetites which we share with brutes, saying of it,

"The habits of perfected self-mastery and entire absence of self-control have then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share in, for which reason they are plainly servile and brutish; such are touch and taste." (Ethics, bk. iii., c. xiii.)

Suppression of Desire. In "Phædo" Plato represents Socrates to have inquired, "Does not temperance belong only to such men as most despise the body?"

Cicero, in his essay "On Old Age," said the same thing when he remarked, "He cannot be said to lack who does not want; my contention is that not to want is the pleasanter thing."

Marcus Aurelius epitomizes the idea in this eloquent sentence, "The mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable." (Meditations, c. viii.)

Seneca in his essay "On Providence" pays this exalted tribute to this rare, but altogether possible, achievement of man,

"In this you can surpass God himself: He is beyond suffering evil, you are above it." He

utilizes elsewhere in the same book this idea to destroy the notion that evil befalls good men, saying, "Yet, why does God permit evil to happen to good men? He does not permit it. He takes away from them all evils, such as crimes, and scandalous wickedness, daring thoughts, grasping schemes, blind lusts and avarice coveting its neighbour's goods."

Xenophon relates in his "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 6) that Socrates himself asserted that to want nothing is like unto the gods, saying, "You, Antipho, seem to think that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods."

Epictetus did not fail to understand the bliss which attends mastery over self; for he says, "For never can happiness and the longing for what is not, exist together." (Dissertations, iii., 24.)

But because noble things also give pleasure, Aristotle argues thus that pleasure tempts the good man most,

"There are principally three things moving us to choice and three to avoidance, the beautiful or noble, the expedient, the pleasant; and their three contraries, the ugly or base, the hurtful, and the painful. Now the good man is apt to go right, and the bad man wrong, with respect to all these of course, but most especially with respect to pleasure, because not only is this common to him with all animals, but also it is a concomitant of all those

things which move to choice, since both the beautiful or noble and the expedient give an impression of pleasure." (Ethics, bk. ii., c. ii.)

Elsewhere in the same book he praises courage, giving as his reason,

"Courage involves pain, and is justly praised, since it is a harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain from such as are pleasant" (Ethics, bk. iii., c. xii.); but, in this, finds pleasure also hard to resist, "It is harder, as Heraclitus says, to fight against pleasure than against anger." (Bk. ii., c. ii.)

Aristotle, however, by no means thought that one should become angry in no circumstances; for he says,

"They who are not angry at things at which they ought to be angry, are thought to be foolish, and they who are angry not in right manner, nor in right time, nor with those with whom they ought." (Ethics, bk. iv., c. vii.) He also says succinctly, "There are occasions when anger is a duty." (Bk. iii., c. iii.)

Again, palliating offenses when done in wrath, in precisely the same way that the criminal law does in regard to crimes of violence, he declares,

"Acts done from anger are fairly judged not to be from malice prepense, because it is not the man

who acts in wrath who is the originator really, but he who caused his wrath. And again, the question at issue in such cases is not respecting the fact, but respecting the justice of the case, the occasion of anger being a notion of injury." (Ethics, bk. v., c. ii.)

But Marcus Aurelius holds otherwise, saying,

"And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent." (Meditations, c. xi.)

This view Cicero, in his essay "On Duties," thus expresses,

"This doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics and wisely approved if only they did not speak in praise of anger and tell us that it is a gift bestowed on us by nature for a good purpose. But in reality anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated." (Bk. i., 30.)

Epictetus scarcely indicates a preference for wrath, in this comparison:

"When we are gluttonous, sensual, reckless, filthy, thoughtless, to what are we then sunken? To sheep.

What have we lost? Our faculty of reason. And when we are contentious, and hurtful, and angry and violent, to what are we sunken? To wild beasts." (Dissertations, ii., 9.)

Marcus Aurelius warns against all the evils of the passions and appetites, thus:

"Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh whether of pleasure or of pain" (Meditations, c. v.); and of pleasures, Seneca remarks: "By no means can God discredit objects of desire so effectually as by bestowing them upon the worst of men, and removing them from the best." (On Providence, bk. i., 5.) Cicero, in his essay "On Old Age," affirms, "Far from being a charge against old age, that it does not much feel the want of any pleasures, it is its highest praise."

Resignation. Epictetus urges that one should wish things to be as they are, admonishing, "Seek not to have things happen as you choose them, but rather choose them to happen as they do, and so shall you live prosperously." (Encheiridion, viii.)

Of misfortunes Marcus Aurelius speaks depreciatingly as follows,

"That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from within."

(Meditations, c. iv.) Seneca gives a yet more roseate hue in this, "God hardens, reviews, and exercises those whom he tests and loves" (On Providence, bk. i., 4); and in the same connection inquires, "How can I know how calmly you would endure to be childless, if you see all your children around you?" (Bk. i., 4.)

Epictetus makes of misfortune a cause for thanksgiving, saying:

"I obey, I follow, praising my Leader and hymning His works. For I came when it pleased Him, and when it pleases Him I will go. In my life-time also my work was to sing the praise of God, both alone to myself, and to single persons, and in presence of many. He doth not provide me with many things, nor with the great abundance of goods; He will not have me live delicately." (Dissertations, iii., 2.)

Epictetus also warned against setting one's heart upon anything, however precious, as if it were not the perishable thing it truly is, thus,

"Each thing that allures the mind, or offers an advantage, or is loved by you, remember to speak of it as it is, from the smallest things upward. If you love an earthen jar, then think, 'I love an earthen jar'; for so shall you not be troubled when it breaks. And when you kiss your little child, or wife, think, 'I kiss a mortal'; and so shall you not

be troubled when they die." (Encheiridion, iii., 4); and with fine scorn he thus refers to the things which make up the melodrama, rather than the true tragedy, of human life, "Behold now tragedies are made, when common chances happen to foolish men!" (Dissertations, ii., 16.)

Marcus Aurelius, however, consoles with this truth,

"Remember that philosophy requires only the things which thy nature requires." (Meditations, c. v.) And Socrates himself avoids over-emphasis upon either the difficulty or the supreme virtue of that self-mastery which is but doing what the reason, permitted clearly to function, compels; and merely says of it, "We shall be fully justified in pronouncing temperance to be that unanimity, which we described as a concord, between the naturally better element and the naturally worse, whether in a state or in a single person, as to which of the two has the right to govern." (Republic, bk. iv.)

That Socrates realized all this in his own life is attested by Xenophon in his "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 2.):

"Socrates was not only the most rigid of all men in the government of his passions and appetites, but also most able to withstand cold, heat, and every kind of labour; and, besides, so inured to frugality,

that, though he possessed very little, he very easily made it a sufficiency."

Concrete Rewards of Virtue. "'Without introducing the rewards and the reputation which justice confers, as you said that Homer and Hesiod do, have we not found that justice, taken by itself, is best for the soul, also taken by itself, and that the soul is bound to practice just actions, whether it possess the ring of Gyges, and, in addition to this ring, the helmet of Hades, or not?' 'It is most true that we have done so.' 'Then may we now, Glaucon, proceed without offense to take into account those great and abundant rewards which justice, along with the rest of virtue, wins to the soul from gods and men, not only during a man's lifetime, but also after his death?'" (Republic, bk. x.)

The "Republic" is an account of a discussion whether or not, during one's mundane existence, the consequence of leading a just life is happiness.

The effect of right-doing upon the man, himself, was the first step in this proof called for by Adeimantus, thus,

"Do not content yourself with proving to us that justice is better than injustice; but show us what is that influence exerted by each on its possessor, by which, whether gods and men see it or not, the one is in itself a blessing, and the other a bane." (Republic, bk. ii.)

As reported by Plato in "Philebus," Socrates posited that it is mind only which enables one to know joy or to know that he has known it, in this remarkable pronouncement,

"Possessing neither mind, nor memory, nor science, nor a true opinion, it is surely necessary for you, in the first place, to be ignorant, whether you had any joy, or not, being void of all intellect."

Aristotle also, in his "Ethics" (bk. i., c. vi.) thus defined "happiness," "Happiness has been stated by us to be pretty much a kind of living well and doing well."

This is perhaps not far from begging the question; it must be taken to mean about the same as the saying of Marcus Aurelius, "What is thy art? To be good?" (Meditations, c. xi.)

But Aristotle, in the same connection (Ethics, bk. i., c. vi.), defines happiness further in a manner more accurately conforming with the fundamental proposition put forward by Socrates, thus, "The actions and workings of the soul constitute happiness."

Epictetus, also, must have had the same thing in mind, when he wrote,

"That which ought to be the fairest and comeliest to those who have been truly taught,—tranquillity, courage, and freedom." (Dissertations, ii., 1.)

Aristotle, also, in various passages in his "Ethics," from which the following are selected, so defined good

and pleasure as to render it impossible that the good man should be considered otherwise than blest:

“Whatever is naturally good is also in itself good and pleasant to the good man.” (Ethics, bk. ix., c. ix.)
“The good man, in that he is good, takes pleasure in the actions which accord with virtue, and is annoyed at those which spring from vice, just as a musical man is pleased with beautiful melodies and annoyed by bad ones.” (Bk. ix., c. ix.) “And if, as we have said, the exercises of faculty are what determine the character of the life, no one of the happy can ever become wretched, because he will never do those things which are hateful and mean.” (Bk. i., c. viii.)

External Things Indifferent. This, however, is perhaps still beside the subject of the inquiry proposed by Socrates; for, although it be true that happiness is a state of mind, yet the question for discussion is whether or not the right conduct brings those concrete things which produce that state of mind.

Marcus Aurelius thus urges that external things are as one thinks them and should have no power to disturb the soul,

“But, I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so. Whatever anyone does or says, I must be good, just as if the gold or the emerald or the purple were always saying this: ‘Whatever any-

one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my colour.'” (Meditations, c. vii.)

Marcus Aurelius, indeed, urges in the following that benevolence renders mistreatment all but impossible,

“Consider that benevolence is invincible, if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a benevolent disposition towards him?” (Meditations, c. xi.)

Aristotle’s “Ethics” thus cogently counsels against preferring mere wordly prudence to integrity of soul,

“Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man, to mind only man’s affairs, or as mortal, only mortal things, but, so far as we can, to make ourselves like immortals, and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest principle in us; for, small as it may be in bulk, yet in power and preciousness it far more excels all the others” (bk. x., c. viii.); and in the following passages (all from bk. i., c. vi.) pleads that pleasure and happiness attend virtuous and noble conduct as consequential delights: “A man is not a good man at all who feels no pleasure in noble actions.” “Actions done in accordance with virtue must be in themselves pleasurable.”

The following from Marcus Aurelius promises all good things to them who seek first the higher things of spirit,

“All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road, thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future to providence and direct the present only, conformably to piety and justice.” (Meditations, c. xii.)

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The Soul's Weal Outweighs All Else. Socrates in “Theætetus” thus epitomizes the whole matter:

“‘For they do not know the penalty of wrongdoing which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.’ ‘What is that?’ ‘There are two patterns set before them, the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched, and they do not see in their utter folly and infatuation that they are growing like the one and unlike the other by reason of their evil deeds!’”

The great argument of Aristotle is that virtue, not fortune, is determining; of this he says,

“Is not this the solution, that to make our sentence dependent on the changes of fortune is no way right, for not in them stands the well, or the ill, but

though human life needs these as accessories (which we have allowed already), the exercise of his faculties in the way of virtue is what determines happiness and the contrary the contrary." (Ethics, bk. i., c. viii.)

He also posits concerning happiness, the following,

"It may through learning and diligence of a certain kind exist in all who have not been maimed for virtue" (Ethics, bk. i., c. vii.); and Marcus Aurelius thus denies the power of wrongdoing to injure anyone except the wrongdoer, "Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and particularly, wickedness does no harm to another." (Meditations, c. viii.)

Concerning which, Marcus Aurelius also inquires, "Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What, then, can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, just?" (Meditations, c. viii.)

That this is also the view of Socrates is clear from the following, taken from the résumé of his investigation of the entire subject in Plato's "Republic" (bk. x.):

"In the case of the just man, we must assume that, whether poverty be his lot, or sickness, or any other reputed evil, all will work for his final advantage, either in this life, or in the next. For, unquestionably, the gods can never neglect a man who

determines to strive earnestly to become just, and by the practice of virtue to grow as much like God as man is permitted to do."

And, in "The Apology," his conviction that all is well with him in whom is no evil, is affirmed in this ringing sentence: "I am sure that God will not allow a good man to be injured by a bad one."

CHAPTER VII

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

SOCRATES, the most discerning of men, could not have failed to observe, when he stood beside the body of a friend, silent and motionless in death, that this which he beheld was not his friend and, since this was all that he had ever beheld, that he had in very truth never looked upon his friend. From this it was but a step, since he had known and loved and valued the friend whom he had never seen, to credit that he who had not been visible, yet lived, though still invisible.

The manner of disposing of the body preferred by philosophers, viz., upon the funeral pyre, instead of burying it out of sight, helped, by destroying the appearance that the friend continued to exist as a dead body, to emphasize the illusive character of the impression during life that the lineaments and bodily parts which the unseen life had drawn by subtle processes from air and food and water and had put together, was the real man—an illusion which burial preserves.

Socrates conceived of man's Soul as a thing which functions best when kept pure from the body; from which he inferred, as beyond question, that, the

nearer to being dead, *i.e.*, free from the body, one approaches, the better will be the operation of the intellect and therefore, that, when the body is forever laid down, the best and highest state of pure reason will be attained.

This, however, was by no means the conclusion of his reasoning upon immortality; instead he deemed it the business of every rational man to satisfy himself that the soul is immortal and the proof of it, according to Plato, he esteemed not difficult. Of this he speaks in a dialogue in "The Republic" (bk. x.), as follows:

"“Do you think that it is the duty of an immortal thing to trouble itself about this insignificant interval, and not about eternity? . . . Have you not learned,’ I asked, ‘that our soul is immortal, and never dies?’ He looked at me and said in amazement, ‘No, really, I have not; but can you maintain this doctrine?’ ‘Yes, as I am an honest man,’ I replied: ‘And I think you could also. It is quite easy to do it.’”

Methods of inductive proof have in the last fifty years been applied to the investigation of the phenomenal evidence of the soul's immortality. Such methods of investigation were not unknown in Socrates' day, when soothsayers, oracles and divination were common and inter-communication between men and gods, as well as with the shades of the departed, was alleged to occur not infrequently. Socrates, also, was not indifferent to

these things. It was the oracle at Delphi which had proclaimed him the wisest of men; and he himself held communion with a discarnate soul, which warned and guided him.

Notwithstanding, he does not refer to such intercommunication as proof of the future life. The proof which he sought, was not merely of continued but of perpetual, existence; and for this he esteemed the purest exercise of reason alone sufficient.

Because of this, presumably, he also does not repeat his reasoning that death is surely not an evil, or that the soul reasons best and most clearly when the body is nearest to death, *i.e.*, inactive and not interfering with the soul's activities; for, while that might render it probable that the soul continues to exist after death, it could not prove it to be imperishable.

What Could Destroy the Soul? The inquiry which Socrates sets on foot, then, in order to determine whether the soul is immortal, is, "What could destroy the soul?" This he proceeds to consider as follows:

"I hold that the term "evil" comprises everything that destroys and corrupts, and the term "good" everything that preserves and benefits. . . . Again, do you maintain that everything has its own evil, and its own good? Do you say, for example, that the eyes are liable to the evil of ophthalmia, the entire body to disease, corn to mildew, timber to rot, copper and iron to rust, or, in other words,

that almost everything is liable to some connatural evil and malady? . . . And is it not the case that, whenever an object is attacked by one of these maladies, it is impaired, and, in the end, completely broken up and destroyed by it? . . . Hence everything is destroyed by its own connatural evil and vice; otherwise, if it be not destroyed by this, there is nothing else that can corrupt it. For that which is good will never destroy anything, nor yet that which is neither good nor evil. . . . If, then, we can find among existing things one which is liable to a particular evil, which can indeed mar it, but cannot break it up or destroy it, shall we not be at once certain that a thing so constituted can never perish?

“‘That would be a reasonable conclusion.’

“‘Well, then, is not the soul liable to a malady which renders it evil? . . . That being the case, does any one of these things bring about the dissolution and destruction of the soul? . . . The depravity of the body, that is to say, disease, wastes and destroys the body, and reduces it to a state in which it ceases to be a body; and all the things, which we named just now, are brought by their own proper vice, such corrupts them by its adhesion or indwelling, to a state in which they cease to exist. I am right, am I not? . . . Then proceed to examine the soul on the same method. Is it true that, when injustice and other vices reside in the soul, they corrupt and wither it by contact or indwelling, until they have brought it to death and severed it from the body?’” (Republic, bk. x.)

Socrates goes on to show that "it is irrational to suppose that a thing can be destroyed by the depravity of another thing, though it cannot be destroyed by its own." (Republic, bk. x.)

He expatiates upon this, showing that sickness, not being an evil of the soul, cannot work its annihilation, thus,

"Unless depravity of body introduces into the soul depravity of soul, let us never suppose that the soul can be destroyed by an alien evil without the presence of its own peculiar disease; for that would be to suppose that one thing can be destroyed by the evil of another thing. . . . Well, then, let us either refute this doctrine and point out our mistake, or else, so long as it remains unrefuted, let us never assert that a fever, or any other disease, or fatal violence, or even the act of cutting up the entire body into the smallest possible pieces, can have any tendency to destroy the soul, until it has been demonstrated, that, in consequence of this treatment of the body, the soul itself becomes more unjust and more unholy. For, so long as a thing is exempt from its own proper evil, while an evil foreign to it appears in another subject, let us not allow it to be said that this thing, whether it be a soul or anything else, is in danger of being destroyed.'" (Republic, bk. x.)

The Master sums up this argument, thus:

"For surely when the soul cannot be killed and destroyed by its own depravity and its own evil,

hardly will the evil, which is charged with the destruction of another thing, destroy a soul or anything else, beyond its own appropriate object.' 'Yes, hardly; at least that is the natural inference.' 'Hence, as it is destroyed by no evil at all, whether foreign to it or its own, it is clear that the soul must be always existing, and therefore immortal.'" (Republic, bk. x.)

Life Implies Death and Death, Life. Socrates returns to the topic of immortality in "Phædo," adducing proof of another character, viz.:

"Is it the case that everything, which has an opposite, is generated only out of its opposite?"; which he restates thus, "In fact, is it not a universal law, even though we do not always express it in so many words, that opposites are generated always out of one another, and that there is a process of generation out of one into the other?"

This he there illustrates by the following,

"Sleep is the opposite of waking. Out of sleep is produced the state of waking; and out of the state of waking is produced sleep" (Phædo); and pertinently inquires, "Is there any opposite to life, in the same way that sleep is the opposite of being awake?" (Phædo.)

By the same method, he deduced the following, showing the alternation of life and death: "'Death

is the opposite of life, is it not?' 'It is.' 'And they are generated the one out of the other?' 'Yes.'" (Phædo); and proceeded to a conclusion, thus:

"Then we are agreed on this point, namely, that the living are generated out of the dead, no less than the dead out of the living. But we agreed that, if this be so, it is a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must exist somewhere, whence they come into being again." (Phædo.)

The meaning of which is that, as dark implies what is not dark, *i.e.*, light, so life implies what is not life, *i.e.*, death, and coming to life implies coming out of what is not life, *i.e.*, out of death, quite as dying means going out of what is not death, *i.e.*, out of life.

This argument he sums up into a syllogism at its close, thus:

"If the soul exists in a previous state, and if when she comes into life and is born, she can only be born out of death and out of a state of death, must she not exist after death too, since she has been born again?" (Phædo.)

Lucretius, echoing the doctrine of Epicurus, accepted this, though he eschewed the notion of conscious immortality; for in "The Nature of Things," he sang:

"Things seem to die but die not. The spring flowers
Die in the bosom of the motherly earth

But rise again in fruits and leaves and flowers
And every death is nothing but a birth."

But, while Socrates was quite ready to concede that direct memory of past events might be, and often is, erased, he maintained as is elsewhere seen in this chapter, that the same soul, in its own character, persists and revives.

Socrates argues that to assume the contrary, that everything dies and remains dead, would mean that ultimately everything would be lifeless,

"If, for example, the one opposite, to go to sleep, existed, without the corresponding opposite, to awaken, which is generated out of the first, then all nature would at last make the tale of Endymion meaningless, and he would no longer be conspicuous; for everything else would be in the same state of sleep that he was in. . . . Just in the same way, my dear Cebes, if all things, in which there is any life, were to die, and when they were dead were to remain in that form and not come to life again, would not the necessary result be that everything at last would be dead, and nothing alive? For if living things were generated from other sources than death, and were to die, the result is inevitable that all things would be consumed by death." (Phædo.)

Realization of Absolutes, Innate. At the outset of the foregoing argument Socrates had premised:

"If it be true that the living are born from the dead, our souls must exist in the other world; otherwise they could not be born again." (Phædo.)

He now states that which he expects to be able to show, viz.,

"I will go back to what we have so often spoken of, and begin with the assumption that there exist absolute beauty, absolute good and absolute greatness, and so on. If you grant me this, and agree that they exist, I hope to be able to show you what my cause is, and to discover that the soul is immortal." (Phædo.)

This is also put upon the lips of Cebes in the discussion, thus,

"If the doctrine . . . that our learning is only a process of recollection, be true, then I suppose we must have learnt at some former time what we recollect now. And that would be impossible unless our souls had existed somewhere before they came into this human form. So that is another reason for believing the soul immortal." (Phædo.)

That is, Cebes argues not merely for an infinite future but also that the past has been infinite. Socrates recurs to this argument, saying, "Either we are all born with the knowledge, and retain it all our life; or, after birth, those who, we say, are learning, are only recollecting, and our

knowledge is recollection." (Phædo.) This power to conceive of, and to know, the abstract and absolute, he attributes also in the same book, to something which is born with us and in us and which accordingly we must have received earlier; of this he argues, also in Plato's "Phædo":

"Did we not see, and hear, and possess the other senses as soon as we were born?"

"Yes, certainly."

"And we must have received the knowledge of abstract equality before we had these senses?"

"Yes."

"Then, it seems, we must have received that knowledge before we were born?"

This proof he completes, by citing the fact that the ideas of beauty, of good and of justice are eternal and unchanging and by saying of this,

"If, as we are forever repeating, beauty and good and the other ideas really exist, and if we refer all the objects of sensible perception to these ideas which were formerly ours, and which we find to be ours still, and compare sensible objects with them, then, just as they exist, our souls must have existed before ever we were born. But if they do not exist, then our reasoning will have been thrown away. Is it so? If these ideas exist, does it not at once follow that our souls must have existed before we were born, and if they do not exist, then neither did our souls?" (Phædo.)

Immortality of the Soul III

Summing up his consideration of the subject in this connection, Socrates asks,

“Is the result of all that we have said that the soul is most like the divine, the immortal, the intelligible, the uniform, the indissoluble and the unchangeable; while the body is most like the human, the mortal, the unintelligible, the multiform, the dissoluble, and the changeable?” (Phædo); and inquires in conclusion, also: “Then if this is so, is it not the nature of the body to be dissolved quickly, and of the soul to be wholly or very nearly indissoluble?”

The Self-Moving is Uncreate and Therefore Immortal. In “Phædrus” Socrates approaches the subject from another angle, viz., “Thus we see, then, that that which is self-moved is the beginning of motion, and, as being such, can neither be created nor destroyed”; which he proceeded to apply, in this fashion:

“Every soul is immortal—for whatever is in perpetual motion is immortal. Now the thing which moves another and is by another moved, as it may cease to be moved, may cease also to move; it is only that which moves itself, inasmuch as it never quits itself, that never ceases moving, but is to everything else that is moved, a source and beginning of motion.”

This argument perhaps adheres more closely than is at first apparent, to that which precedes it; for

the earliest of self-motions, as the babe's cry or the comfort of nursing at the breast, reveal both the will to live and the conscious choice of that which brings pleasure and that which avoids or allays pain—both, evidences of earlier experiences.

This he illustrates by the following account (Philebus) of how thirst comes to be relieved:

“Now he does not desire that which he is suffering. For he is suffering thirst, and that is emptiness; but he desires repletion. . . . Something, therefore, in the things belonging to the thirsty person, would have a perception, in some manner, of repletion. . . . Now the body is unable, for it is suffering emptiness. . . . It is plain, then, that it is left for the soul to have perception, by means of memory, of repletion; for by what other means could the soul have such perception?”

The Soul is Life, Itself. Socrates argues in the following colloquy that the soul is verily life itself:

“‘Tell me, what is that which must be in a body, to make it alive?’

“‘A soul,’ he replied.

“‘And is this always so?’

“‘Of course,’ he said.

“‘Then the soul always brings life to whatever contains her?’

“‘No doubt,’ he answered.

“‘And is there an opposite to life, or not?’

“‘Yes.’

“‘What is it?’

“‘Death.’

“‘And we have already agreed that the soul cannot ever receive the opposite of what she brings?’

“‘Yes, certainly we have,’ said Cebes.

“‘Well; what name did we give to that which does not admit the idea of the even?’

“‘The uneven,’ he replied.

“‘And what do we call that which does not admit justice or music?’

“‘The unjust, and the unmusical.’

“‘Good; and what do we call that which does not admit death?’

“‘The immortal,’ he said.

“‘And the soul does not admit death?’

“‘No.’

“‘Then the soul is immortal?’” (Phædo.)

Plotinus, in his essay “On the Immortality of the Soul,” pursues this argument, thus,

“For matter will not give form to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is necessary that there should be something which is the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond, every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychical power.”

Socrates asks, in “Phædo,” what actually takes place when a man dies, putting his question in this fashion, “Does not death mean that the body

comes to exist by itself, separated from the soul, and that the soul exists by itself, separated from the body? What is death but that?"

The Soul Cannot be Disintegrated. In the following, taken from "Phædo," the Master recurs to his argument that death is not an evil since the soul thinks and reasons best when not pestered by the body and its wants, saying,

"The soul of a philosopher will consider that it is the office of philosophy to set her free. . . . She gains for herself peace from these things, and follows reason and ever abides in it, contemplating what is true and divine and real, and fostered up by them. . . . A soul that has been so nurtured, and so trained, will never fear lest she should be torn in pieces at her departure from the body, and blown away by the winds, and vanish, and utterly cease to exist."

This idea that the soul would at death be dispersed into its elements, even as the body is so dispersed, was a favourite argument against the soul's immortality. It rested upon the proposition that the soul is organic, *i.e.*, is composed of other things. This issue Socrates, in "Phædrus," states thus:

"Every one . . . who seriously communicates an art of rhetoric, will, in the first place, with all accuracy notice and make apparent whether the soul be single and uniform by nature, or, like the

body, of many different kinds." In "Phædo" he takes up the fundamental propositions of these objectors and picks them in pieces in the following dialogue:

"Now is it not the compound and composite which is naturally liable to be dissolved in the same way in which it was compounded? And is not what is uncompounded alone not liable to dissolution, if anything is not?"

"I think that that is so," said Cebes.

"And what always remains in the same state and unchanging is most likely to be uncompounded, and what is always changing and never the same, is most likely to be compounded, I suppose?" (Phædo.)

Plotinus thus presents in his essay "On the Immortality of the Soul" the case of the body which dissolves,

"Since the body, therefore, is itself a composition, reason shows that it cannot remain perpetually the same; and sense likewise sees that it is dissolved and wastes away, and receives all various destructions"; and thus the case of the soul which, being a "simple" and not an organism, is not capable of dissolution,

"But soul, being one simple energy, and a nature characterized by life, cannot be corrupted as a composite. Will it therefore through being divided and distributed into minute parts, perish? Soul,

however, is not as we have demonstrated, a certain bulk or quantity."

The corruption which comes from the delusions of the senses, Plotinus thus affirms that the soul, set free by the death of the body, will throw off,

"Consider the soul, therefore, by taking away that which is extraneous or, rather, let him who takes this away, survey himself and he will believe himself to be immortal, when he beholds himself in the intelligible world and situated in a pure abode. For he will perceive intellect, seeing not anything sensible, nor any of these mortal objects, but by an eternal power contemplating that which is eternal; everything in the intelligible world, and itself also, being then luminous, in consequence of being enlightened by the truth proceeding from the good, which illuminates all intelligibles with reality. By such a soul as this, therefore, it may be properly said, 'Farewell, a god immortal of the soul.'" (On the Immortality of the Soul.)

Multiplication of Souls Apparent, Not Real.

Marcus Aurelius finds a difficulty about the proof of immortality and meets it to his own satisfaction in this passage,

"If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity? But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of

these bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make room for other dead bodies, so the souls which are removed into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there." (C. iv.)

Which can but mean that he was not fully and firmly convinced by Socrates' argument, already adduced, that the soul of man is from everlasting unto everlasting. Socrates, in Plato's "Republic" (bk. x.), disposes of the same objection in this manner, more consistent with his proposition.

"'Well then,' I continued, 'let us consider this proved. And, if so, you understand that the souls that exist must be always the same. For, if none be destroyed, they cannot become fewer. Nor yet can they become more numerous; because, if any class of things immortal became more numerous, you know that something mortal must have contributed to swell its numbers, in which case, everything would finally be immortal.'"

All Elemental Things, Permanent. Marcus Aurelius thus taught the perpetuity both of matter and of spirit:

"I am composed of the formative and the material, and neither of them will perish into non-existence

as neither of them came into existence out of non-existence" (Meditations, c. v.); and said, discerningly, "That which has died, falls not out of the universe" (c. viii.); and yet again, more definitely: "Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole; and everything formative is very soon taken back into the universal reason." (C. vii.)

Thus he describes what he conceives to be the soul's destiny, "Thou existeth as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which produced thee." (Meditations, c. iv.)

This, however, is much more transcendental than anything accredited to Socrates and is much more like the Buddhistic doctrine of Karma. The nearest that Socrates came to a statement like that, is perhaps this, from "Phædo," "God and the essential form of life, and all else that is immortal, never perishes"; but the Greek Sage plainly meant that personality is permanent as well as the mere principle of life, for in the same connection he had already shown,

"If the immortal is imperishable, the soul cannot perish when death comes upon her. It follows, from what we have said that she will not ever admit death, or be in a state of death, any more than three, or the odd itself, will ever be even, or fire, or the heat itself which is in fire, cold." (Phædo.)

And, cryptic as some of the sayings of Marcus Aurelius, just quoted, may appear, the following

eloquent passage from his works show that he too meant conscious individual immortality,

“How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died, should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished?” (Meditations, c. xii.)

Socrates Himself Firmly Convinced. Socrates himself was manifestly entirely convinced that the soul of man is deathless; he was serenely confident, when in the immediate presence of death, and at that moment, according to Plato's account in “Phædo,” he thus conversed with his disciples:

“‘But how shall we bury you?’

“‘As you please,’ he answered: ‘Only you must catch me first, and not let me escape you.’”

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE LIFE

CONCERNING knowledge of man's life beyond the grave, Socrates is represented by Plato in "The Apology" to have said, "If I were to claim to be at all wiser than others, it would be because I do not think that I have any clear knowledge about the world, when, in fact, I have none." But what he meant by "clear knowledge" must have been that which is supported by the conclusive testimony of the senses; for, as the result of his reasoning, he affirms, "The dead do come to life again, and the living are generated from them, and the souls of the dead exist; and with the souls of the good it is well, and with the souls of the evil it is evil." (Phædo.)

And, when confronting his own fate, near at hand, he declared that a discussion concerning that far country to which he was going was most timely, saying, "Indeed, as I am setting out on a journey to the other world, what could be more fitting for me than to talk about my journey, and to consider what we imagine to be its nature?" (Phædo.)

He was, therefore, far from thinking that one should dismiss the people's notions of the great

mystery and what may be beyond, as merely silly old-wives' fables. Instead, he shared with Cephalus the views which that disciple expressed in Plato's "Republic" (bk. i.), viz.:

"When a man is nearly persuaded that he is going to die, he feels alarmed and concerned about things which never affected him before. Till then he has laughed at those stories about the departed which tell us that he who has done wrong here must suffer for it in the other world; but now his mind is tormented with a fear that these stories may possibly be true. And either owing to the infirmity of old age or because he is now nearer to the confines of the future state, he has a clearer insight into those mysteries."

What Socrates deemed the process of death to be, in reality, both as regards the body and as regards the soul, is well set forth in this sentence taken from "Phædo": "When death attacks a man, his mortal part dies, but his immortal part retreats before death, and goes away safe and indestructible."

Epictetus adopts this view, also, adding to it the hopeful and inspiring thought that there is yet opportunity for usefulness for the intelligence thus set free from a body no longer suitable for its occupancy, when he makes reply as follows: "Shall I, then, exist no longer? Nay, thou shalt exist, but as something else, whereof the universe hath now need." (Dissertations, iii., 24.)

The Soul's State After Death. Before taking final farewell of his companions, Socrates, as reported by Plato in "Phædo," proposed, not to reason about the matter as was his custom but to give his mere opinion concerning this future life. Its wonderfully veridical character in certain regards as, for instance, that the earth is a sphere, that from afar the solid earth would not be seen but its gaseous envelope and that from it would gleam all the colours of the spectrum and brilliant combinations of them—all of which are generally supposed to be comparatively recent discoveries—makes for its credibility in other respects.

The immediate state of the soul, when death has departed it from the body, he conceives to differ, according as it is purified from, or attached to, the lusts of the body, as follows,

"The orderly and wise soul follows her leader, and is not ignorant of the things of that world; but the soul which lusts after the body, flutters about the body and the visible world for a long time, as I have said, and struggles hard and painfully, and at last is forcibly and reluctantly dragged away by her appointed genius. And when she comes to the place where the other souls are, if she is impure and stained with evil, and has been concerned in foul murders, or if she has committed any other crimes that are akin to these, and the deeds of kindred souls, then every one shuns her and turns aside from meeting her, and will neither be her companion nor her guide, and she wanders about by herself in

extreme distress until a certain time is completed, and then she is borne away by force to the habitation which befits her. But the soul that has spent her life in purity and temperance has the gods for her companions and guides, and dwells in the place which benefits her." (Phædo.)

Judgment Upon the Just and Unjust. After a time, according to the Sage, these souls are brought to judgment, of which he speaks thus,

"When the dead come to the place whither each is brought by his genius, sentence is first passed on them according as their lives have been good and holy, or not. Those whose lives seem to have been neither very good nor very bad, go to the river Acheron, and embarking on the vessels which they find there, proceed to the lake. There they dwell and are punished for the crimes which they have committed, and are purified and absolved; and for their good deeds they are rewarded, each according to his deserts. But all who appear to be incurable from the enormity of their sins—those who have committed many and great sacrileges, and foul and lawless murders, or other crimes like these—are hurled down to Tartarus by the fate which is their due, whence they never come forth again. Those who have committed sins which are great, but not too great for atonement, such, for instance, as those who have used violence towards a father or a mother in wrath, and then repented of it for the rest of their lives, or who have committed homicide in some

similar way, have also to descend into Tartarus; but then when they have been there a year, a wave casts them forth, the homicides by Cocytus, and the parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon; and when they have been carried as far as the Acherusian lake, they cry out and call on those whom they slew or outraged, and beseech and pray that they may be allowed to come out into the lake, and be received as comrades. And if they prevail, they come out, and their sufferings cease; but if they do not, they are carried back to Tartarus, and thence into the rivers again, and their punishment does not end until they have prevailed on those whom they wronged; such is the sentence pronounced on them by their judges. But such as have been preëminent for holiness in their lives are set free and released from this world, as from a prison; they ascend to their pure habitation, and dwell on the earth's surface. And those of them who have sufficiently purified themselves with philosophy, live thenceforth without bodies and proceed to dwellings still fairer than these, which are not easily described and of which I have not time to speak now." (Phædo.)

With the conception set forth by Socrates in the foregoing that these wicked souls must obtain the forgiveness of those whom they have injured, compare the smug and comfortable doctrine of absolution by sacrifices to the gods and partaking in mysteries which Adeimantus is quoted in the "Republic" (bk. ii.) as setting forth,

“And they produce a host of books, written by Musæus and Orpheus, children, as they say, of Selene and of the Muses, which form their ritual—persuading not individuals merely, but whole cities also, that men may be absolved and purified from crimes, both while they are still alive, and even after their decease, by means of certain sacrifices and pleasurable amusements which they call mysteries, which deliver us from the torments of the other world, while the neglect of them is punished by an awful doom.”

Reincarnation. They who have not attained to beatitude, Socrates assumed, are disposed of in several ways. Thus the better of them are permitted to be born again in a human form. This doctrine of transmigration is recorded by Plato in several of his books. In the story of Er, at the close of the “Republic” (bk. x.), it is put by Socrates in this fashion:

“Thus saith the maiden Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity, ‘Ye short-lived souls, a new generation of men shall here begin the cycle of its mortal existence. Your destiny shall not be allotted to you, but you shall choose it for yourselves. Let him who draws the first lot be the first to choose a life, which shall be his, irrevocably.’ Having said this, she threw the lots down upon the crowd; and each spirit took up the one which fell by his side, except Er himself, who was forbidden to do so. Each, as he took up

his lot, saw what number he had drawn. This done, the plans of life, which far outnumbered the souls that were present, were laid before them on the ground. They were of every kind. There were lives of all living things, and among them every sort of human life."

The following soothing comment is made in the same connection, lest one consider that only the prize-winners are fortunate,

"Even the last comer, if he chooses with discretion and lives strenuously, will find in store for him a life that is anything but bad, with which he may well be content. Let not the first choose carelessly or the last despond." (Republic, bk. x.)

This tale might be dismissed as something which Socrates himself deemed fanciful, were it not both that he is caused to make it the close of his long and serious conversation on human conduct and also that in "Phædrus" he is much more explicit about this very matter, saying,

"But whenever, from inability to follow, it (*i.e.*, the soul) has missed that glorious sight, and, through some mishap it may have encountered, has become charged with forgetfulness and vice, and been thereby so burdened as to shed its feathers and fall to the earth, in that case there is a law that the soul thus fallen be not planted in any bestial nature during the

first generation, but that if it has seen more than others of essential verity, it pass into the germ of a man who is to become a lover of wisdom, or a lover of beauty, or some votary of the Muses and Love; if it be of second rank, it is to enter the form of a constitutional ruler, a warrior, or a man fitted for command; the third will belong to a politician, or economist, or merchant; the fourth, to a laborious professor of gymnastics, or some disciple of the healing art; the fifth will be possessed by a sooth-sayer, or some person connected with mysteries; the sixth will be best suited by the life of a poet or some other imitative artist; the seventh, by the labour of an artisan or a farmer; the eighth, by the trade of a sophist or a demagogue; and the ninth, by the lot of an absolute monarch."

Transmigration. It is not, however, merely reincarnation of human souls in human bodies that Socrates tells of; instead, of such as have only animal propensities, he distinctly saw that they must again sink lower than men in the scale of creation and be reborn as beasts; of this he says in "Phædo,"

"Opposite Oceanus, and flowing in the reverse direction, is Acheron, which runs through desert places, and then under the earth until it reaches the Acherusian lake, whither the souls of the dead generally go, and after abiding there the appointed time, which for some is longer, and for others shorter, are sent forth again to be born as animals," and in

the following, which preceded in "Phædo" the passage just quoted, he is more explicit about it by far:

"The corporeal must be burdensome, and heavy, and earthly, and visible; and it is by this that such a soul is weighed down and dragged back to the visible world. Because she is afraid of the invisible world of Hades, and haunts, it is said, the graves and tombs, where shadowy forms of souls have been seen, which are the phantoms of souls that were impure at their release, and still cling to the visible; which is the reason why they are seen. . . . These are not the souls of the good, but of the evil, which are compelled to wander in such places as a punishment for the wicked lives that they have lived; and their wanderings continue until, from the desire for the corporeal that clings to them, they are again imprisoned in a body.'

"And,' he continued, 'they are imprisoned, probably in the bodies of animals with habits similar to the habits which were theirs in their lifetime.'

"What do you mean by that, Socrates?'

"I mean that men who have practiced unbridled gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, probably enter the bodies of asses, and such like animals. Do you not think so? . . . And those who have chosen injustice, and tyranny, and robbery, enter the bodies of wolves, and hawks, and kites. Where else should we say that such souls go?'"

In the story of Er, in the "Republic" (bk. x.), he gives this yet more in detail, selecting legendary personages as illustrations, thus:

"'It was a truly wonderful sight,' he said, 'to watch how each soul selected its life,—a sight, at once melancholy, ludicrous and strange. The experience of their former life generally guided the choice. Thus he saw the soul, which had once been Orpheus, choosing the life of a swan, because, from having been put to death by women, he detested the whole race so much, that, he would not consent to be conceived and born of a woman. And he saw the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale. He saw also a swan changing its nature, and selecting the life of a man; and its example was followed by other musical animals. The soul that drew the twentieth lot choose a lion's life. It was the soul of Ajax, the son of Telamon, who shrunk from becoming a man, because he recollected the decision respecting the arms of Achilles. He was followed by the soul of Agamemnon, who had also been taught by his sufferings to hate mankind so bitterly, that he adopted in exchange an eagle's life. . . . In like manner some of the other animals passed into men, and into one another,—the unjust passing into the wild, and the just into the tame; and every kind of mixture ensued.'"

Each Soul, its Own Sort of Life. The varying fates of souls according to their quality, including the nature and development of those which have

no need again to pass through mundane life at all, Socrates, according to Plato in "Phædo," describes in the following dialogue:

"Each enters an animal with habits like its own. . . . And of these,' he said, 'the happiest, who go to the best place, are those who have practiced the popular and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and which come from habit and practice, without philosophy or reason.'

"And why are they the happiest?"

"Because it is probable that they return into a mild and social nature like their own, such as that of fleas, or wasps, or ants, or, it may be into the bodies of men, and that from them are made worthy citizens. . . . But none but the philosopher or the lover of knowledge, who is wholly pure when he goes hence, is permitted to go to the race of the gods.'"

In "The Laws," Plato himself epitomizes this as follows,

"Know that if you become worse, you shall go to the worse souls or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death, you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like." (Bk. x., pt. ii.)

For the exact truth of the account that he had given in "Phædo," Socrates did not vouch, but of it said,

"A man of sense will not insist that these things are exactly as I have described them. But I think that he will believe that something of the kind is true of the soul and her habitations, seeing that she is shown to be immortal, and that it is worth his while to stake everything on this belief. The venture is a fair one, and he must charm his doubts with spells like these. That is why I have been prolonging fable all this time. For these reasons a man should be of good cheer about his soul, if in his life he has renounced the pleasures and adornments of the body, because they were nothing to him, and because he thought that they would do him not good but harm; and if he has instead earnestly pursued the pleasures of learning, and adorned his soul with the adornment of temperance, and justice, and courage, and freedom, and truth, which belongs to her, and is her own, and so awaits his journey to the other world, in readiness to set forth whenever fate calls him." (Phædo.)

In "Phædrus" he gives to this inspiring view of man's upward climb: "There is a law that the paths of darkness beneath the earth shall never again be trodden by those who have so much as set their foot on the heavenward road."

Spirit-Communion. Socrates gave little attention to whether or not the awakened souls beyond the grave are watchful over, and interested in, those whom they have left behind, unless his own "dæmon" is to be taken as one such or the account of

“earth-bound” spirits is of souls yet held here, not so much by their own unworthiness, as by their love for the living.

Aristotle, however, argues that the departed must be concerned about those left behind; of which he says, in the “Ethics,” “That the fortunes of their descendants, and friends generally, contribute nothing towards forming the condition of the dead, is plainly a very heartless notion” (bk. i., c. ix.); but that this must not affect their lot, either for better or worse, he declares in this passage:

•

“If any thing does pierce the veil and reach them, be the same good or bad, it must be something trivial and small, either in itself or to them, or at least of such a magnitude or such a kind as neither to make happy them that are not so otherwise, nor to deprive of their blessedness them that are.” (Bk. i., c. ix.)

There is little, if anything, therefore, in the Socratic teachings, which asserts the watchfulness of departed spirits over their friends yet in the world, suffering with their suffering, rejoicing with their rejoicing and especially shamed by their misdeeds and elated over their virtuous actions such as, in the scheme of the Chinese sage, Confucius, played so important a part as the sanction for good conduct which only the shamelessly depraved will ignore.

Preparation for the Future Life. That one must keep a firm mental grasp on the verities and realities not only throughout life but in the very moment of

death, if he would be blest in the next world, the Sage asserts in the following passage of the "Republic" (bk. x.):

"This, my dear Glaucon, is apparently the moment when everything is at stake with a man; and for this reason, above all others, it is the duty of each of us diligently to investigate and study, to the neglect of every other subject, that science which may haply enable a man to learn and discover who will render him so instructed, as to be able to discriminate between a good and an evil life, . . . giving the name of evil to the life which will draw the soul into becoming more unjust, and the name of good to the life which will lead it to become more just, and bidding farewell to every other consideration. For we have seen that in life and in death it is best to choose thus. With iron resolution must he hold fast this opinion when he enters the future world, in order that, there as well as here, he may escape being dazzled by wealth and similar evil and may not plunge into usurpations or other corresponding courses of action, to the inevitable detriment of others, and to his own still heavier affliction; but may know how to select that life which always steers a middle course between such extremes, and to shun excess on either side to the best of his power, not only in this life, but also in that which is to come. For, by acting thus, he is sure to become a most happy man."

And Marcus Aurelius perhaps had part, at least, of the same conception in mind when he wrote,

"Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly." (Meditation, c. ii.)

Associations of the Just After Death. Socrates affirmed again and again his confidence that, if a man die, he shall live again and meet and know his friends, as in this passage from "Phædo," "I believe that in the next world, no less than in this, I shall meet with good masters and friends, though the multitude are incredulous of it"; and that in the world to come, if in this world he has been good and wise, he will have illimitable opportunities to become better and wiser, of which he says,

"I should be wrong, Cebes and Simmias, not to grieve at death, if I did not think that I was going to live both with other gods who are good and wise, and with men who have died, and who are better than the men of this world. But you must know that I hope that I am going to live among good men, though I am not quite sure of that. But I am as sure as I can be in such matters that I am going to live with gods who are very good masters. And therefore I am not so much grieved at death. I am confident that the dead have some kind of existence, and, as has been said of old, an existence that is far better for the good than for the wicked." (Phædo.)

And again he sounded this clear, ringing note of unflinching trust in the beneficent purposes of the

ruler of the universe, "Believe this as a truth, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life, or after death." (The Apology.)

In the following passage from "Phædo," he discusses more fully the rationale of the state and prospects of the soul which is freed by the exercise of its reason from slavery to the body, and of the state and prospects of the soul which is but the willing minister, in all its reasonings, to bodily lusts and worldly desires:

"I will tell you what happens to a soul which is pure at her departure, and which in her life has had no intercourse that she could avoid, with the body, and so draws after her, when she dies, no taint of the body, but has shunned it, and gathered herself into herself, for such has been her constant duty;—and that only means that she has loved wisdom rightly, and has truly practiced how to die. . . . Does not the soul, then, which is in that state, go away to the invisible that is like herself, and to the divine, the immortal and the wise, where she is released from error, folly, fear and fierce passions, and all the other evils that fall to the lot of men, and is happy, and for the rest of time lives in very truth with the gods, as they say that the initiated do? Shall we affirm this, Cebes? . . . But if she be defiled and impure when she leaves the body, from being ever with it, and serving it and loving it, and from being besotted by it, and by its desires and pleasures, so that she thinks nothing true, but what is bodily, and can be touched

and seen, and eaten, and drunk, and used for men's lusts; if she has learned to hate, and tremble at, and fly from what is dark and invisible to the eye, and intelligible and apprehended by philosophy—do you think that a soul which is in that state will be pure and without alloy at her departure?"

If Plato is to be credited, then,—and if he is not, he has both invented the reasoning of Socrates and also these word-pictures of life beyond the grave which are the most veridical in all literature and seem characteristically Socratic throughout—Socrates gave more thought to the future life and projected its nature and characteristics more boldly upon his imagination, than any of his followers has ever done.

Immortality the Great Sanction of Ethics. The portentous significance of the future life, respecting the course which man should pursue in this world, was urged in "Phædo" by the Greek Sage most earnestly in these wise, discerning sentences,

"If it be true that the soul is immortal, we have to take care of her, not merely on account of the time which we call life, but also on account of all time. Now we can see how terrible is the danger of neglect. For if death had been a release from all things, it would have been a godsend to the wicked; for when they died, they would have been released with their souls from the body and from their own wickedness. But now we have found that

the soul is immortal; and so her only refuge and salvation from evil is to become as perfect and wise as possible. For she takes nothing with her to the other world but her education and culture; and these, it is said, are of the greatest service or of the greatest injury to the dead man, at the very beginning of his journey thither." (Phædo.)

And in the same book, he gives the following account of what he conceives to be the conditions of this supra-mundane existence, the difficulty of realizing the higher life here, the advantages of freedom from the body which can be fully realized only at death and the sort of preparation which is requisite in order that such freedom be realized:

"It seems that there is a narrow path which will bring us safely to our journey's end, with reason as our guide. As long as we have this body, and an evil of that sort is mingled with our souls, we shall never fully gain what we desire, which is truth. For the body is forever taking up our time with the care which it needs; and, besides whenever diseases attack it, they hinder us in our pursuit of real being. It fills us with passions, desires and fears, and all manner of phantoms, and much foolishness; and so, as the saying goes, in very truth we can never think at all for it. And therefore, for all these reasons, we have no leisure for philosophy. And last of all, if we ever are free from the body for a time, and then turn to examine some matter, it falls in our way at every step of the inquiry. . . . Then, it seems,

after we are dead, we shall gain the wisdom which we desire, and for which we say we have a passion, but not while we are alive, as the argument shows. . . . And while we live, we shall come nearest to knowledge, if we have no communion or intercourse with the body beyond what is absolutely necessary, and if we are not defiled with its nature. We must live pure from it until God himself releases us." (Phædo.)

CHAPTER IX

CHARACTER

THE development of character by the cultivation of the soul was made by Socrates and his followers the chief object of man's study and endeavour.

In the "Republic" (bk. x.), Plato reports Socrates as saying,

"The man of understanding will direct all his energies through life, to this one object, his plan being, in the first place, to honour those studies which will impress this high character upon his soul, while at the same time he slights all others"; and again, more sententiously and perhaps more cogently (bk. iii.), "My belief is, not that a good body will by its own excellence, make the soul good, but, on the contrary, that a good soul will by its excellence render the body as perfect as it can be."

Mens Sana in Corpore Sano. Xenophon in his "Memorabilia" (bk. iv., 1) thus asserts, however, that Socrates enjoined great care of the physical health,

"He earnestly recommended those who conversed with him to take care of their health, both by learn-

ing whatever they could respecting it from men of experience, and by attending to it, each for himself, throughout his whole life, studying what food or drink, or what exercise, was most suitable for him, and how he might act in regard to them so as to enjoy the best health; for he said it would be difficult for a person who thus attended to himself to find a physician that would tell better than himself what was conducive to his health."

In the same book also he reports the following inquiries of the Master himself which set forth his own practice,

"Do you not know that those who are by nature the weakest, become, by exercising their bodies, stronger in those things in which they exercise them, than those who neglect them, and bear the fatigue of exercise with greater ease? And do you not think that I, who am constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure whatever may happen to it, bear everything more easily than you who take no exercise?" (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., 6.)

In "Charmides," Socrates gives especial point to this view by quoting one of an older generation, with approval, thus,

"It is not proper to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the body; so neither is it proper to cure the body without the

soul. . . . When this is not in a good state, it is impossible for a part to be well."

Regarding food and exercise, Socrates was ever a champion of great moderation; according to Xenophon's "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 2), "He did not approve that a person should eat to excess, and then use immoderate exercise, but recommended that he should work off, by a proper degree of exercise, as much as the appetite received with pleasure."

Of this Epictetus remarks,

"It betokens a dull nature to be greatly occupied in matters that concern the body, as to be much concerned about exercising one's self, or eating, or drinking, or other bodily acts. But these things should be done by the way, and all attention be given to the mind." (Encheiridion, xli.)

In "Gorgias," Socrates expresses much the same view when he inquires, "Do you think that all our cares are to be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost?"

Xenophon also reports in the "Memorabilia" (bk. iii., 13) the following dialogue:

"Another person saying that he ate without pleasure, 'Acumenus,' said Socrates, 'prescribes an excellent remedy for that disease.' The other asking, 'What sort of remedy?' 'To abstain from eating,' said Socrates; 'for he says that, after abstain-

ing, you will live with more pleasure, less expense, and better health.'"

Marcus Aurelius speaks, much to the same effect, of this very matter, thus,

"The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I wish for green things, for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be, with respect to all food, just as the mill with respect to all things which it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought to be prepared for everything which happens." (Meditations, c. x.)

The imperial sage considered, peculiarly enough, that in life and in death, body and soul should both be sound, for of this he said, "Consider in what condition both in body and soul, a man should be when he is overtaken by death!" (Meditations, c. xii.)

The Soul's Impress Upon the Aspect. The constant attention which one should give to that about which his thoughts are busy, Marcus Aurelius thus describes, "Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts" (Meditations, c. v.); and that this will inevitably show in the countenance and should do so in the entire body, he thus declares (c. vii.), "For what the mind shows in the face, by

maintaining in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the whole body."

This is yet another exceedingly graphic expression of the same conviction by this Roman follower of Socrates,

"A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often assumed, the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all." (*Meditations*, c. viii.)

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This physical emanation of the inner man he also elsewhere proclaims, thus,

"The voice ought to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man's character is, he immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved, forthwith reads everything in the eyes of lovers." (*Meditations*, c. xi.)

That we should look with compassion upon one who, being crippled in his highest faculty, by his behaviour exposes his diseased state, Socrates is said in Xenophon's "*Memorabilia*" (bk. iii., 12) to have urged in the following,

"A person being angry because, on saluting another, he was not saluted in return, 'It is an odd thing,' said Socrates to him, 'that if you had met a man ill-conditioned in body, you would not have

been angry, but to have met a man rudely disposed in mind provokes you.'"

And Cicero, in this, advised that one should, for his soul's health, welcome criticism of his faults, "They are not at all vexed at having committed a fault, but very angry at being reproved for it. On the contrary, they ought to be grieved at the crime and glad of the correction." (On Friendship.)

This is put yet more vividly by Epictetus, thus,

"If one shall hear thee word that such a one hath spoken evil of thee, then do not defend thyself against his accusations, but make answer, 'He little knew my other vices, or he had not mentioned only these.'" (Encheiridion, xxxiii.)

Aristotle urges in his "Ethics" (bk. x., c. vii) that, as man is both soul and body, the physical must not be neglected,

"So happiness must be a kind of contemplative speculation; but since it is man we are speaking of, he will need likewise external prosperity, because his nature is not by itself sufficient for speculation, but there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all kinds."

And Cicero in like manner in his essay "On Old Age" pleaded for the care of both body and soul, saying,

“We must stand up against old age and make up for its drawbacks by taking pains. We must fight it as we should an illness. We must look after our health, use moderate exercise, take just enough food and drink to recruit, but not to overload, our strength.”

Socrates, however, according to Plato in his “Republic” (bk. iii.), was almost a fierce foe of valetudinarianism, concerning which he said, “Let us inform ourselves whether valetudinarianism, though an obstacle to mental application in carpentering and the other arts, forms no impediment to the fulfillment of the precept of Phocylides.”

Elsewhere in the same book he said of it,

“But quite the worst of it is, that it is a grievous hindrance to studies of all kinds and reflection, and inward meditation, being ever apprehensive of some headache, or dizziness, which it accuses philosophy of producing; and therefore, in so far as virtue is practiced and proved by intellectual study, it is a sheer obstacle to it, for it makes a man always fancy himself ill, and never lets him rest from the pangs of anxiety about health. . . . Then must we not maintain that Æsculapius, knowing all this, revealed the healing art for the benefit of those whose constitutions were naturally sound, and had not been impaired by their habits of life, but who were suffering from some specific complaint, and that he used to expel their disorders by drugs and

the use of the knife, without interrupting their customary avocations, that he might not damage the interests of the state; but where the constitution was thoroughly diseased to the core, he would not attempt to protract a miserable existence by a studied regimen, drawing off from the system, and again pouring into it a little at a time, and suffer his patients to beget children, in all probability as diseased as themselves, thinking medical treatment ill-bestowed on one who could not live in his regular round of duties, since such a person is of no use either to himself or to the state?" (Republic, bk. iii.)

This, also, notwithstanding that, as he declared, these ancient physicians well knew what could be accomplished by hygienic measures, strictly enforced and religiously carried out, but because such were unworthy of souls worth while; for he also said:

"It was not because Æsculapius did not know, or had not tried this kind of medical treatment, that he never discovered it to his followers; but because he was aware that in all well-regulated communities each has a work assigned to him in the state, which he must needs do, and that no one has leisure to spend his life as an invalid in the doctor's hands, a fact which we perceive in the case of the labouring population, but which, with ludicrous inconsistency, we fail to detect in the case of those who are reputed rich and happy." (Republic, bk. iii.)

In "Charmides," Socrates quotes a philosopher of an earlier generation with approval, that one should proceed with the cure of his reasoning faculty, the soul, until "such temperance was generated in the soul, which, when generated and present, can easily impart health both to the head and to the rest of the body."

The Ruling Passion. "Every man spends his life in honouring and imitating to the best of his power that particular god of whose choir he was a member, so long as he is exempt from decay, and living his first generation here."

Thus, in "Phædrus," Plato represents Socrates to have spoken. This is not left by the Master without adequate explanation; for in the "Republic," this discourse concerning it is found,

"Some of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites are, if I mistake not, unlawful and these would appear to form an original part of every man; though, in the case of some persons, under the correction of the laws and the higher appetites, aided by reason, they either wholly disappear, or only a few weak ones remain, while, in the case of others, they continue strong and numerous."

The following colloquy of Socrates with one of his disciples, reported by Plato in "Philebus," shows material desires to be affections of the soul,

"'This reasoning shows us that desire is not produced from the body.' 'How so?' 'Because it

shows that the endeavour of every animal is opposed to its sufferings.' 'Very much so.' 'Now the inclination, leading to a point opposite to the sufferings, indicates somehow the remembrance of things opposite to those sufferings.' 'Clearly.' 'The reasoning then, having shown that memory leads us to the things desired, discovers the general inclination and desire, and the ruling power of the soul in every animal.' 'Most correctly.' 'The reasoning then proves that by no means does our body thirst, or hunger, or suffer any of such affections.'"

The Soul's Good. Marcus Aurelius thus warns of the peril of permitting the heart to be wearied from its love of wisdom, to which it may never be able to return,

"But if nothing appears to be better than the deity which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind, if thou findest everything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without distraction be able to give the preference to that good thing which is thy proper possession and thine own." (Meditations, c. iii.)

Epictetus also descanted upon this in the following strong passage:

“Therefore, if a man place in the same thing both profit and holiness, and the beautiful and fatherland, and parents and friends, all these things shall be saved; but if he place profit in one thing, and friends and fatherland and kinsfolk, yea, and righteousness itself some other where, all these things shall perish, for profit shall outweigh them.” (Dissertations, ii., 22);

and much more sententiously in another place he prescribed the remedy for an evil habit, “And what remedy is to be found against a habit? The contrary habit.” (Dissertations, i., 27.)

That the consequence of the dissipation of the soul is weakness and of its concentration upon the love of wisdom, power, as well as the criterion by means of which its state may be known, viz.: by that upon which its love is fixed, is declared by Socrates in the following:

“A thing cannot easily be eternal, as we have just proved the soul to be, if it is compounded of many parts. . . . To understand its real nature, we must look at it, not, as we are now doing, after it has been marred by its association with the body, and by other evils; but we must carefully contemplate it by the aid of reasoning, when it appears in unsullied purity; and then its surpassing beauty will be discovered, and the nature of justice and injustice, along with all the questions which we have now discussed, will be far more clearly discerned. . . . But we ought to fix our attention on one part of it

exclusively, Glaucon.' 'On what part?' 'On its philosophy, that we may learn to what it clings, and with what it desires to have intercourse, in virtue of its close connection with the divine, the immortal, and the eternal.'" (Republic, bk. x.)

Holiness of Spirit. "You have not explained to me the essence of holiness; you have been content to mention an attribute which belongs to it, namely, that all the gods love it."

Thus Socrates is represented by Plato in "Euthyphron" to have spoken of that loftiness of character which gives men spirituality like unto the divine. It is of this, also, and the duty to devote all one's strength to its cultivation, once the barest needs are provided for, to which Phocylides refers in the "Republic" (bk. iii.), when he says, "So soon as a man has got whereon to live, then he ought to practice virtue."

In "Lysis" also, Socrates emphasizes the necessity that one be a man, saying, "Not even you are loved by your own father, nor is any one else by any one else in the world, in so far as you or he is useless?"

Marcus Aurelius admonishes the careless or indifferent to be tireless in well-doing, by these telling contrasts,

"But those who love their several arts, exhaust themselves in working at them, unwashed and without food; but thou valuest thine own nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money values his

money, or the vainglorious man his little glory."
(Meditations, c. v.)

Xenophon relates in his "Memorabilia" that Socrates expressed this opinion (bk. i., 7),

"He always used to say that there was no better road to honourable distinction, than that by which a person should become excellent in that in which he wished to appear excellent."

Epictetus declared, sententiously, "Be not elated in mind at any superiority that is not of yourself!" (Encheiridion, vi.)

And, discussing the many failures and half-successes which frail mortals score, Epictetus also says, "What then? Can a man make this resolve, and so stand up faultless? He cannot; but this much he can, be ever straining towards faultlessness." (Dissertations, iv., 12.)

Marcus Aurelius thus adjures the indifferent to make character their first care,

"Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou art not simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar, whoever shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer, unless thou shalt be such!" (Meditations, c. x.);

and also counselled thus (c. viii): "Thou hast not leisure to read. But thou hast leisure to check arrogance; thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure and pain."

Perils to Character. Seneca in his essay "On Providence" thus indicates what is perhaps the gravest peril in the way of him who would excel,

"While all excesses are hurtful, excess of comfort is the most hurtful of all. It affects the brain; it leads men's minds into vain imaginings; it spreads a thick cloud over the boundaries of truth and falsehood."

Marcus Aurelius, in the following, inculcates the lesson that men really become that with which their minds concern themselves continually, "It is thy duty to understand however that every man is worth just so much as the things are worth about which he busies himself." (Meditations, c. vii.)

Seneca in his essay "On Providence" (bk. i., 2), proclaims the immunity of a man to all evils but the evils within himself, "Why do many things turn out badly for good men? Why, no evil can befall a good man; contraries cannot combine."

Poise. Marcus Aurelius (c. vii.) teaches, in this passage, that moral character is self-mastery and poise: "The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor play-

ing the hypocrite"; and in this longer disquisition (*Meditations*, c. ii.), describes it as living according to nature: '

"What then is that which is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping the little god within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is compounded."

He elsewhere puts it in nine words: "I do my duty: other things trouble me not." Epictetus says this often and in manifold ways, among them these: "If it shall ever happen to thee to be turned to outward things in the desire to please some person, know that thou hast lost thy way of life." (*Encheiridion*, xxiii.) "But none the less is it needful that one find the means to this also, to be able to suffice to himself, and to be his own companion." (*Dissertations*, iii., 13.) "Whosoever, then, will be free, let him neither desire nor shun any of the things that are in others' power; otherwise he must needs be enslaved." (*Encheiridion*, xiv.) "You may be always victorious if you will never enter into

any contest but where the victory depends upon yourself." (Encheiridion, xviii.)

In the following eloquent passage he enlarges somewhat upon this fundamental idea:

"If thou wouldst advance, be content to let people think thee senseless and foolish as regards external things. Wish not ever to seem wise, and if ever thou shalt find thyself accounted to be somebody, then mistrust thyself." (Encheiridion, xiii.)

Plato was not altogether persuaded of this, for in "The Laws" (bk. xii., pt. ii), he said,

"And to be thought, or not to be thought, well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves."

From the viewpoint of the outward appearance of such a man, Marcus Aurelius thus describes him,

"Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man and even to him, ready to show him his mistake, not reproaching, nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it" (Meditations, c. xi.);

and thus exhorts to unflinching firmness (c. iv.), "Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it."

The Sage. Aristotle thus celebrates the superiority of the sage,

"Of course, the actual necessities of life are needed alike by the sage and the just man, and all the other characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to practice his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected self-mastery, and the brave man and so on of the rest; whereas the sage can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the more entirely he deserves the appellation, the more able is he to do so." (Ethics, bk. x., c. vi.)

Epictetus sounds the call from the glory of worldly achievement to the things of the spirit, thus,

"But thou art no Hercules, and canst not purge away evils not thine own? Nor yet Theseus, who cleared Attica of evil things? Then clear away thine own. From thy breast, from thy mind cast out, instead of Procrustes and Sciron, grief, fear, covetousness, envy, malice, avarice, effeminacy, profligacy. And these things cannot otherwise be cast out than by looking to God only, being affected only by Him, and consecrated to His commands. But, choosing

anything else than this, thou wilt follow with groaning and lamentation whatever is stronger than thou, ever seeking prosperity in things outside thyself, and never able to attain it. For thou seekest it where it is not, and neglectest to seek it where it is." (Dissertations, ii., 16.)

Marcus Aurelius epitomizes it in two words, "Look within." (Meditations, c. vi.)

Epictetus announces his complete resignation as regards external things, thus, "I will, therefore, absolutely end mine own-grief, for this I can; and that of another according to my means, but this I will not attempt absolutely." (Dissertations, iii., 24.)

But Marcus Aurelius, with a more cheerful and complacent spirit,

"To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is instructed in modest ways: 'Give what thou wilt; take back what thou wilt!' And he says this not proudly, but obediently and well pleased with her." (Meditations, c. x.)

The same he puts very cleverly and, despite its light expression, with truly stoical clearness, in the following,

"Everything which happens either happens in such wise that thou art formed by nature to bear it, for that thou art not formed by nature to bear it. If then it happens to thee in such way that thou art

formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise that thou art not able to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee." (Meditations, c. x.)

In these brief passages, Marcus Aurelius emphasizes again and again this lesson: "It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man." (Meditations, c. viii.) "A man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything which it is in his power to do according to his own nature." (C. x.). "In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be present: 'I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world?'" (C. v.)

Aristotle puts the whole matter pithily thus: "Doing what is noble and excellent is one of those things which are choiceworthy for their own sake alone." (Ethics, bk. x., c. v.)

Socrates, as reported by Plato in "The Apology," delivered this earnest and illuminating exordium,

"My friend, if you think that a man of any worth at all ought to reckon the chances of life and death when he acts, or that he ought to think of anything but whether he is acting rightly or wrongly, and as a good or a bad man would act, you are grievously mistaken. . . . Wherever a man's post is, whether he has chosen it of his own will, or whether he has been placed at it by his commander, there it is his

duty to remain and face the danger, without thinking of death, or of any other thing, except dishonour."

Of such enlightened self-interest, also, resulting in self-sacrifice that through service one may be victorious, he was thinking when he answered the question concerning character, quoted at the opening of this chapter, by asking this other, "Then it is loved by the gods because it is holy: it is not holy because it is loved by them?" (Euthyphron.)

CHAPTER X

EDUCATION

SINCE conduct and character are to rest upon the use of the reasoning faculty, obviously that faculty must be developed by use and practice. In his "Memorabilia" Xenophon gives an extended account of Socrates' attitude toward education in general, from which the following is extracted:

"Those who thought that they had good natural abilities, but despised instruction, he endeavoured to convince that minds which show most natural power have most need of education, pointing out to them that horses of the best breed, which are high-spirited and stubborn, become, if they are broken when young, most useful and valuable, but if they are left unbroken, remain quite unmanageable and worthless; and that hounds of the best blood, able to endure toil and eager to attack beasts, prove, if they are well trained, most serviceable for the chase, and every way excellent, but, if untrained, are useless, rabid, and unruly. . . . In like manner he showed that men of the best natural endowments, possessed of the greatest strength of mind, and most energetic

in executing what they undertake, become, if well disciplined and instructed in what they ought to do, most estimable characters, and most beneficent to society (as they then performed most numerous and important services), but that, if uninstructed, and left in ignorance, they proved utterly worthless and mischievous; for that, not knowing what line of conduct they ought to pursue, they often entered upon evil courses and, being haughty and impetuous, were difficult to be restrained or turned from their purpose, and thus occasioned very many and great evils.

. . . But those who prided themselves on their wealth, and thought that they required no education, but imagined that their riches would suffice to effect whatever they desired, and to gain them honour from mankind, he tried to reduce to reason by saying that the man was a fool who thought that he could distinguish the good and the evil in life without instruction and that he also was a fool who, though he could not distinguish them, thought that he would procure whatever he wished and effect whatever was for his interest, by means of his wealth." (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 1.)

Play, Music and Song Earliest. The utility of what is now known as kindergarten work and yet more the necessity for supervised and guided play, as an essential to correct education, he inculcates in the "Republic," thus,

"Must not our children from the very first be restricted to more lawful amusements, because when

amusements are lawless and children pursue them, it is impossible for such children to grow into loyal and virtuous men? . . . When our children, beginning with right diversions, have received loyalty into their minds by the instrumentality of music, the result is the exact reverse of the former, for loyalty accompanies them into everything and promotes their progress." (Republic, bk. iv.)

The Sage is recorded by Plato in his "Republic" to have recommended music and tales as the very earliest means of education, not for one child but for all, in these words,

"What, then, is the education to be? Perhaps we would hardly find a better than that which the experience of the past has already discovered, which consists, I believe, in gymnastics for the body, and music for the mind. . . . Shall we not then begin our course of education with music rather than with gymnastics? . . . Under the term music, do you include narratives or not?" (Republic, bk. ii.)

Socrates, himself, thoroughly human, not merely enjoyed music but throughout life felt the call to compose it; of which in Plato's "Phædo," he said: "The same dream used often to come to me in my past life, appearing in different forms at different times, but always saying the same words, 'Socrates, work at music and compose it.'"

The Sage was as decided in his view that some sorts of music insidiously undermine the character of a

people as was the great Chinese teacher, Confucius; of this he says,

“The introduction of a new kind of music must be shunned as imperiling the whole state; since styles of music are never disturbed without affecting the most important political institutions. . . . It is here that lawlessness easily creeps in unawares . . . in the guise of amusement, and professing to do no mischief.” (Republic, bk. iv.)

That too great fondness for sentimental music, especially if plaintive, may be destructive, the Sage pronounces, thus,

“Accordingly, when a man surrenders himself to music and flute-playing, and suffers his soul to be flooded through the funnel of his ears with those sweet and soft and plaintive harmonies of which we just spoke, and spends his whole life in warbling and delighting himself with song, such a man at the outset tempers like steel whatever portion of the spirited element he possesses, and makes it useful instead of brittle and useless; if, however, he relaxes not in his devotion, but yields to the enchantment, he then begins to liquefy and waste away, till the spirit is melted out of him, and the sinews of his soul are extirpated, and he is made ‘a feeble wielder of the lance.’” (Republic, bk. iii.)

But the verve and vigour of the man whom the higher order of music inspires, and the love and ap-

preciation of such a man for all that is worthy in others, Socrates thus acclaims, "Then the truly musical person will love those who combine most perfectly moral and physical beauty, but will not love anyone in whom there is dissonance." (Republic, bk. iii.)

The philosophy of this, Plato, in the same connection, puts upon Socrates' lips, thus,

"Is it then, Glaucon, on these accounts that we attach such supreme importance to a musical education, because rhythm and harmony sink most deeply into the recesses of the soul, and take most powerful hold upon it, bringing gracefulness in their train, and making a man graceful if he be richly nurtured, but if not, the reverse? And also because he that has been duly nurtured therein, will have the keenest eye for defects, whether in the failures of art or the misgrowths of nature and, feeling a most just disdain for them, will commend beautiful objects, and gladly receive them into his soul, and feed upon them, and grow to be noble and good, whereas he will rightly censure and hate all repulsive objects, even in his childhood, before he is able to be reasoned with; and when reason comes, he will welcome her most cordially, who can recognize her by the instinct of relationship, and because he has been thus nurtured?" (Republic, bk. iii.)

Moral Value of Rhythms. That rhythms, as well as tone-harmonies, have moral values, he thus urges, in the same connection,

"Come, then, . . . let us finish our purgation. Next after the harmonies will follow our law of rhythms, to the effect that we must not aim at a variety of them, or study all movements indiscriminately, but observe what are the natural rhythms of a well-regulated and manly life, and when we have discovered these we must compel the foot and the music to suit themselves to the sense of such a life, and not the sense to suit itself to the foot and the music." (Republic, bk. iii.)

That the lawlessness of some modern forms of rhythms would hardly be spared by the Sage, under rules such as these, may be deduced from the following colloquy between Socrates and Adeimantus, in the "Republic":

"And you will grant that the harmony and the rhythm ought to follow the words.'

"Undoubtedly.'

"But we said, you know, that in the case of words we did not require dirges and complaints.'

"No, we do not.'

"Which, then, are the plaintive harmonies? Tell me, for you are musical.'

"Mixed Lydian and Hyperlydian, and such as are like these.'

"These then must be discarded; for they are useless even to women that are to be virtuously bestowed, not to say to men.'

"Quite so.'

"And you will grant that drunkenness, effemi-

nacy, and idleness are most unbecoming things in guardians.'

"'Undoubtedly they are.'

"'Which of the harmonies, then, are effeminate and convivial?'

"'The Ionian and Lydian, which are called lax.'

"'Will you employ these then, my friend, in the training of men of war?'

"'By no means; and if I mistake not, you have only the Doric and the Phrygian left you.'" (Republic, bk. iii.)

And in another passage, Socrates, again conversing with Adeimantus, coördinated music with rational inquiry as absolute requisites for the attainment and maintenance of a lofty character, thus,

"'His virtue is not free from blemish owing to his having parted from the best guardian.' 'Who is that guardian?' asked Adeimantus. 'Rational inquiry,' I replied, 'blended with music; for this alone by its presence and indwelling can preserve its owner in the possession of lifelong virtue.'" (Republic, bk. viii.)

That both the music and the story or song, with which the child is entertained and educated, must be chosen with consummate care, Socrates thus enjoins, also in the "Republic," "In every work the beginning is the most important part, especially in dealing with anything young and tender? For that is the time when any impression, which one may desire to

communicate, is most readily stamped and taken."
(Republic, bk. ii.)

The Tales Must be Veridical. And concerning the accounts of men—and yet more of gods or demi-gods—lamenting immoderately over disasters, deprivations and sufferings, he proscribes such, saying,

“For, if, my dear Adeimantus, our young men were to listen seriously to such accounts, instead of laughing at them as unworthy descriptions, it would be very unlikely that any one of them should look upon himself, who is but a man, as above such behaviour, and rebuke himself if he were ever betrayed into it, either in word or act; nay rather, unchecked by shame or fortitude, he would chant a multitude of dirges and laments over even trivial misfortunes.” (Republic, bk. iii.)

The following, also, which he said in the same connection, may afford, in part, an explanation why schooling in the sublime Iliad or Odyssey had somehow failed to yield uniform or nearly uniform results in perfected character.

“We must not tell a youthful listener that he will be doing nothing extraordinary if he commit the foulest crimes, nor yet if he chastizes the crimes of a father in the most unscrupulous manner, but will simply be doing what the first and greatest of the gods have done before him. . . . Nor yet, . . . is it proper to say in any case . . . what is indeed

true—that gods wage war against gods, and intrigue and fight among themselves; that is, if the future guardians of our state are to deem it a most disgraceful thing to quarrel lightly with one another. A child cannot discriminate between what is allegory and what is not; and whatever at that age is adopted as a matter of belief, has a tendency to become fixed and indelible; and therefore, perhaps, we ought to esteem it of the greatest importance that the fictions which children first hear should be adapted in the most perfect manner to the promotion of virtue.” (Republic, bk. ii.)

And, referring to the demoralizing accounts of the alleged grosser misconduct of the gods, he says,

“When a poet holds such language concerning the gods, we shall be angry with him, and refuse him a chorus; neither shall we allow our teachers to use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would have our guardians grow up to be as godlike and god-fearing as it is possible for man to be.” (Republic, bk. ii.)

Natural Education. How the child should insensibly be led by his own consuming curiosity to learn useful things, Socrates explains in this colloquy:

“Arithmetic, therefore, and geometry, and all the branches of that preliminary education which is to pave the way for dialectic, must be taught our pupils in their childhood;—care being taken to convey in-

struction in such a shape as not to make it compulsory upon them to learn.'

"'Why so?'

"'Because,' I replied, 'no trace of slavery ought to mix with the studies of the freeborn man. For the constrained performance of bodily labours does, it is true, exert no evil influence upon the body; but in the case of the mind, no study, pursued under compulsion, remains rooted in the memory.'

"'That is true.'

"'Hence, my excellent friend, you must train the children to their studies in a playful manner, and without any air of constraint, with the further object of discerning more readily the natural bent of their respective characters.'" (Republic, bk. iii.)

Mathematics. Plato, in the following dialogue in his "Republic," represents Socrates discussing what studies should be introduced for mental discipline and cultivation of reasoning and reflection, thus:

"'If we can find nothing beyond and independent of these, let us take one of those studies which are of universal application.'

"'Pray which?'

"'That general one, for example, of which all arts, trains of thought, and sciences, avail themselves; and which is also one of the first things that every one must learn.'

"'Tell me the nature of it.'

"'I allude to that common process of distinguishing the numbers, one, two, three. And I call it,

briefly, number and calculation. For may it not be said of these, that every art and science is compelled to call upon them in part? . . . Can we avoid concluding that to be able to calculate and count is a piece of knowledge indispensable to a warrior?’

“‘Yes, most indispensable, if he is to understand how to marshal troops at all, or rather, if he is to be anything of a man.’

“‘And does your notion of this science coincide with mine?’

“‘Pray what is your notion?’

“‘It seems to be by nature one of those studies leading to reflection, of which we are in quest.’”
(Republic, bk. vii.)

It seems remarkable, in view of this opinion, that universities wholly proscribed, until within a few centuries, the study of mathematics, as constituting no part of a liberal education.

He therefore favoured making mathematical instruction compulsory, saying of it,

“‘Therefore, Glaucon, it will be proper to enforce the study by legislative enactment, and to persuade those who are destined to take part in the weightiest affairs of state, to study calculation and devote themselves to it, not like amateurs, but perseveringly, until, by the aid of pure reason, they have attained to the contemplation of the nature of numbers,—not cultivating it with a view to buying and selling, as merchants or shopkeepers, but for purposes of war and to facilitate the conversion of the soul itself

from the changeable to the true and the real."
(Republic, bk. vii.)

He also pays this tribute to it, "It mightily draws the soul upwards, and compels it to reason about abstract numbers, steadily declining the discussion when any numbers are proposed which have bodies that can be seen and touched."

Vocational Training. Socrates was also strongly in favour of vocational training, for Xenophon said of his Master,

"Of all men that I have known, he was the most anxious to discover in what occupation each of those who attended to him was likely to prove skillful; and of all that it becomes a man of honour and virtue to know, he taught them himself whatever he knew, with the utmost cheerfulness; and what he had not sufficient knowledge to teach, he took them to those who knew, to learn." (Memorabilia, bk. vi., c. vii.)

Epictetus also enforces this, saying, "All cannot be the same thing, nor would it be better if they were"; (Dissertation iii., 24), and Socrates is quoted by Xenophon in his "Memorabilia," as saying,

"Relatives, as relatives, were of no profit to people who were sick, or to people going to law, but physicians aided the one, and lawyers the other. . . . It was of no profit that they were well-disposed,

unless they were able also to assist." (Memorabilia, bk. i., 2.)

In Plato's "Republic" he recommended also in the strongest terms that all children be trained especially in that for which they were best suited, saying,

"It would be right to send away any inferior child that might be born among the guardians, and place it in another class; and if a child of peculiar excellence were born in the other classes, to place him among the guardians. This was intended to intimate that the other citizens also ought to be set to the work for which nature has respectively qualified them, each to some one work, that so each, practicing his single occupation, may become not many men, but one." (Republic, bk. iv.)

Plato, in "The Laws," himself reinforced this view, yet more explicitly, saying,

"For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play and the future warrior should learn riding or some other exercise for amusement; and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life."

Physical Training. Socrates urged thorough training in gymnastics, not merely as a thing to be combined with other schooling, but as a thing to which years should be set apart. Xenophon, in his

"Memorabilia," reports him to have spoken at length of this, as follows:

"Yet, in the dangers of war, not a few, through weakness of body, either lose their lives, or save them with dishonour; many, from the same causes, are taken alive and, as prisoners of war, endure for the rest of their lives, if such should be their fate, the bitterest slavery; or, falling into the most grievous hardships, and paying for their ransom sometimes more than they possess, pass the remainder of their existence in want of necessities, and in the endurance of affliction; and many, too, incur infamy, being thought to be cowards merely from the imbecility of their bodily frame. . . . Yet the lot which falls to those who have their bodies in good condition is exactly the reverse of that which falls to those who have them in ill condition; for those who have their bodies in a good state are healthy and strong; and many, from being possessed of this advantage, save themselves with honour amid the struggles of war, and escape every peril; many, also, assist their friends and benefit their country, and, for such services, are thought worthy of favour, acquire great glory, and attain the highest dignities; and, on these accounts, pass the rest of their lives with greater pleasure and honour, and bequeath finer fortunes to their children. . . . Nor, because the city does not require warlike exercises publicly, ought we, on that account, to neglect them privately, but rather, to practice them the more; for be well assured that neither in any other contest, nor in any affair what-

ever, will you at all come off the worse because your body is better trained than those of other men, since the body must bear its part in whatever men do and in all the services required from the body, it is of the utmost importance to have it in the best possible condition. . . . For even in that in which you think that there is least exercise for the body, namely, thinking, who does not know that many fail greatly from ill-health? And loss of memory, despondency, irritability, and madness, often, from ill-health of body, attack the mind with such force as to drive out all previous knowledge." (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 12.)

Military Training. Socrates was positive, moreover, in asserting that every free citizen should receive military training and be capable of efficiently aiding in the defence of his country; and his own creditable part in the ranks as an Athenian soldier gives point and emphasis to this opinion. He repeatedly voiced it in the conversations preserved in Plato's "Republic," as in these passages:

"We must put them on horseback at the earliest possible age, and when we have had them taught to ride, we must take them to see the fighting, mounted, not on spirited animals, or good chargers, but on horses selected for speed and docility. For by this plan they will obtain the best view of their future occupation, and at the same time will be most secure of making good their escape in case of need, following in the train of leaders of mature years." (Republic, bk. v.)

“You may understand from this what we were labouring, to the best of our ability, to bring about, when we were selecting our soldiers and training them in music and gymnastics. Imagine that we were only contriving how they might be best wrought upon to take as it were, the colour of the laws, in order that their opinion concerning things to be feared, and on all other subjects, might be indelible, owing to their congenial nature and appropriate training, and that their colour might not be washed out by such terribly efficacious detergents as pleasure, which works more powerfully than any potash or lye, and pain and fear and desire, which are more potent than any other solvent in the world. This power, therefore, to hold fast continually the right and lawful opinion concerning things to be feared and things not to be feared, I define to be courage, and call it by that name, if you do not object.” (Republic, bk. iv.)

And not only for its physical benefits, its cultivation of courage and of a scorn for effeminate pleasures, but also because this training creates a sense of serious responsibility, he strongly commended it, as witnesses the following:

“Then, Glaucon, can you tell me of a science which tends to draw the soul from the fleeting to the real? While I speak, I bethink myself that we certainly said, did we not, that our pupils must be trained in their youth to war?” (Republic, bk. vii.)

The importance of training in courage—that is, in what is to be feared and in what is not to be feared—Socrates in the same book in this colloquy enjoins,

“‘Then a city is brave as well as wise, in virtue of a certain portion of itself, because it has in that portion a power which can without intermission keep safe the right opinion concerning things to be feared.’ . . . ‘I say that courage is a kind of safe-keeping.’ ‘What kind of safe-keeping?’ ‘The safe-keeping of the opinion created by law through education, which teaches what things and what sort of things are to be feared.’” (Republic, bk. iv.)

And that the state is no stronger against its enemies than are its forces, trained and ready to take the field for it, he thus affirms, “In pronouncing a city to be cowardly or brave, who would look to any but the portion of it which fights in its defense and takes the field in its behalf?” (Republic, bk. iv.)

According to Xenophon’s “Memorabilia,” in scorn of those whose hearts are set upon luxurious living, he also inquired, “Which of the two would most readily seek the field of battle, he who cannot exist without expensive dishes or he who is content with whatever comes before him?” (Memorabilia, bk. i., 6.)

If the Sage reasoned rightly of these things, the destruction of the liberties of free peoples, who loved luxury and neglected universal military training, may not be hard to account for.

Dialectics or Inquiry. Training in dialectics or the use of reason, Socrates placed next in order. Of Socrates' own teaching, Xenophon, who was his pupil, says,

"I will now endeavour to show that Socrates rendered those who associated with him more skillful in argument. For he thought that those who knew the nature of things severally, would be able to explain them to others; but as to those who did not know, he said it was not surprising that they fell into error themselves, and led others into it. He therefore never ceased to reason with his associates about the nature of things." (*Memorabilia*, bk. iv., 6.)

This, according to Plato's "*Republic*," he recommended, however, only after the two or three years have been devoted to gymnastics and military training and only for those who have shown themselves capable of learning it, as the following:

"'After this period,' I continued, 'these choice characters, selected from the ranks of the young men of twenty, must receive higher honours than the rest; and the detached sciences in which they were educated as children must be brought within the compass of a single survey, to show the co-relation which exists between them, and the nature of real existence.'

"'Certainly this is the only kind of instruction which will be found abiding, when it has once effected an entrance.'

“‘Yes, and it is also a most powerful criterion of the reasoning character. For according as a man can survey a subject as a whole or not, he is, or is not, a reasoner. . . . Hence it will be your duty to have an eye to those who show the greatest ability in these questions, and the greatest firmness, not only in study, but also in war and the other branches of discipline; and when they are thirty years old and upwards, you must select them out of the ranks of your picked men, and raise them to greater honour and try them by the test of dialectic ability, in order to determine who is able to divest himself of his eyes and his other senses, and advance in company with truth towards real existence.’” (Republic, bk. vii.)

Later in the same connection, he urges again that such reasoning is for mature minds, preferably those of men beyond thirty, thus,

“‘In order that you may not have to feel this pity for these men of thirty, must you not use every precaution in introducing them to dialectic? . . . And will it not be one of great precaution to forbid their meddling with it while young? For I suppose you have noticed that, whenever boys sample dialectic for the first time, they pervert it into an amusement and ever make use of it for purposes of contradiction, and imitate in their own persons the artifices of those who study refutation—delighting, like puppies, in pulling and tearing to pieces, by means of logic, anyone who comes near them. . . . The man of more advanced years, on the contrary,

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will not suffer himself to be led away by such madness; but will imitate those who are resolved to discuss and examine truth, rather than those who play at controversy for amusement; and, as a consequence of his superior discretion, he will increase, instead of diminish, the general respect for the pursuit." (Republic, bk. vii.)

Self-Knowledge. The great learning, however, as Socrates ever insisted, is to know one's self. Xenophon, in his "Memorabilia," relates the following conversation of the Sage with Euthydemus upon this absorbing topic:

"Socrates then said, 'Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphi?' 'Yea, twice,' replied he. 'And did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple wall, KNOW THYSELF?' 'I did.' 'And did you take no thought of that inscription, or did you attend to it, and try to examine yourself, to ascertain what sort of character you are?' 'I did not need to try; for I thought that I knew very well already, since I should hardly know anything else if I did not know myself.'"

Socrates disabused him of this delusion and set forth the true theory of self-knowledge in these words:

"But is it not evident, . . . that men enjoy a great number of blessings in consequence of knowing themselves, and incur a great number of evils

through being deceived about themselves? For they who know themselves know what is suitable for them, and distinguish between what they can do and what they cannot; and, by doing what they know how to do, procure for themselves what they need, and are prosperous, and by abstaining from what they do not know, live blamelessly, and avoid being unfortunate? By this knowledge of themselves, too, they can form an opinion of other men, and, by their experience concerning the rest of mankind, obtain for themselves what is good, and guard against what is evil.

“But they who do not know themselves, but are deceived about their own powers, are in similar case with regard to other men, and other human affairs, and neither understand what they require, nor what they are doing, nor the characters of those with whom they connect themselves; but, being in error as to all these particulars, they fail to obtain what is good, and fall into evil.

“They, on the other hand, who understand what they take in hand, succeed in what they attempt and become esteemed and honoured; those who resemble them in character willingly form connections with them; those who are unsuccessful in life desire to be assisted by their advice, and to prefer them to themselves; they place in them their hopes of good, and love them, on all these accounts, beyond all other men.” (*Memorabilia*, bk. iv., 2.)

The Study of Right Conduct. The mission to teach the supreme necessity for self-knowledge and

knowledge of right conduct was that which Socrates took upon himself, as he declared before his judges, saying,

“I went instead to each one of you by himself, to do him, as I say, the greatest of services, and strove to persuade him not to think of his affairs, until he had thought of himself, and tried to make himself as perfect and wise as possible.” (The Apology);

and again this,

“And if I tell you that no better thing can happen to a man than to converse every day about virtue and the other matters about which you have heard me conversing and examining myself and others, and that an unexamined life is not worth living, then you will believe me still less. But that is the truth, my friends, though it is not easy to convince you of it.” (The Apology.)

Xenophon quotes him thus in the “Memorabilia” (bk. iii., 9) to like effect,

“When some one asked him what object of study he thought best for a man, he replied, ‘Good conduct.’ When he asked him again whether he thought ‘good fortune’ an object of study, he answered: ‘Fortune and conduct I think entirely opposed; since for a person to light on anything that he wants without seeking it, I consider to be good

fortune, but to achieve anything successfully by learning and study, I regard as good conduct; and those who make this the object of their study appear to me to do well.'"

And in another passage, Xenophon says of the teaching of Socrates,

"For himself, he would hold discourse, from time to time, on what concerned mankind, considering what was pious, what impious; what was becoming, what unbecoming; what was just, what unjust; what was sanity, what insanity; what was fortitude, what cowardice; what a state was, and what the character of a statesman; what was the nature of government over men, and the qualities of one skilled in governing them; and touching on other subjects, with which he thought that those who were acquainted were men of worth and repute, but that those who were ignorant of them might justly be deemed no better than slaves." (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., I.)

Socrates was of the opinion, however, that teaching alone cannot make men virtuous; for, in the "*Protagoras*" he says, "Virtue is not a thing that can be taught." Aristotle strongly echoed this view in the following, "The intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently, from teaching (for the most part, that is), and needs therefore experience and time; whereas the moral comes from custom." (*Ethics*, bk. ii., c. i.); and also in this,

"The virtues we get by first performing single acts, which again is the case of other things, as the arts, for instance; for what we have to do when we have learned how, these we learn how to do by doing." (Bk. ii., c. i.) and that this is as true of vice, in this apt figure of speech, "It is by playing the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are formed." (Bk. ii., c. i.)

Xenophon relates in the "Memorabilia," however, that Socrates replied to an inquiry "Whether fortitude was a quality acquired by education or bestowed by nature," in these words:

"I think that as one body is by nature stronger for enduring toil than another body, so one mind may be by nature more courageous in meeting dangers than another mind; for I see that men who are brought up under the same laws and institutions differ greatly from each other in courage. . . . I am of opinion, however, that every natural disposition may be improved as to fortitude, by training and exercise." (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 9.)

Socrates in Xenophon's "Memorabilia" (bk. iii., 3) puts not a little emphasis, notwithstanding, upon the efficacy of what St. Paul called "the foolishness of preaching," saying,

"Have you not reflected, that whatever excellent principles we have learned according to law, principles by which we know how to live, we learned

through the medium of speech; and that whatever other valuable instruction any person acquires, he acquires by means of speech likewise?"; but Aristotle regards this as well-nigh wasted upon the young, saying,

"The young man is not a fit student of moral philosophy, for he has no experience in life's deeds; and, in the second place, since he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as though he heard not, and to no profit." (*Ethics*, bk. i., c. i.)

Epictetus, however, indicates that by example, rather than precept, the young also may be reached and led, thus, "Thou wouldst do them good—then do not chatter to them, but show them in thyself what manner of men philosophy can make." (*Dissertations*, iii., 13.)

It must be upon the power of such example chiefly that Socrates relies, when, speaking of children found worthy to be future guardians of the state, he says,

"All who are above ten years old in the city must be despatched into the country, and their children must be taken and bred up beyond the influence of that common character, which their parents among others possess, in the manners and laws of the true philosophers, the nature of which we have described above." (*Republic*, bk. vii.)

CHAPTER XI

ETHICAL VALUE OF THE FINE ARTS

SOCRATES lived at a time when the fine arts were, according to the opinion of competent judges, at their highest development as regards ancient times and perhaps all times. He was the contemporary of Pheidias, of Parrhasius and of the foremost lyric and dramatic poets of Greece in her greatest age.

It was but natural, therefore, that his superior reason should sit in judgment upon the excellence of each of these arts, especially as regards its ethical significance and moral influence, as in this, "May we not assert that each single thing involves three particular arts, the province of the first being to use the thing, of the second to produce it, of the third to imitate it?" (Republic, bk. x.)

Marcus Aurelius puts it illuminatingly, thus, "For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be adapted to the work for which it has been made." (Meditations, c. vi.) Aristotle not only emphasizes it, but also identifies virtue, *i.e.*, the art of life, with the other arts, in this, "It is about that which is more than commonly difficult that art comes into being, and virtue too." (Ethics, bk. ii., c. ii.)

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Imitative Art, Not Man's Highest Achievement.

Socrates, who appraised this art of right-living as the highest attainable achievement of man, was, according to Plato's accounts, not so appreciative of the imitative arts, painting, sculpture, poetry, the drama; in the "Republic" he is recorded as saying of those who devoted themselves to such pursuits,

"If he were truly instructed as to the nature of the things which he imitates, he would, I imagine, bestow far more industry upon real actions than upon the imitations, and he would endeavour to leave behind him a number of excellent works, as memorials of himself, and would be more anxious to be the panegyriized than the panegyrist." (Republic, bk. x.)

Marcus Aurelius was also of the opinion that nature's own art is superior to all other, saying,

"There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate the natures of things. But if this is so, that Nature which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of the superior; therefore the Universal Nature does so, too." (Meditations, c. xi.);

but Aristotle challenged this notion as a matter of definition, thus, "Neither things which exist or come into being necessarily, nor things in the way of nature, come under the province of art, because these are self-originating." (Ethics, bk. vi., c. iv.)

Socrates, however, pronounced imitative art "an amusement and not a serious business," in the following passage taken from the "Republic" (bk. x.):

"The imitations have reference to the beauty or badness of the things which he imitates. . . . However, he will go on imitating, notwithstanding his being thoroughly ignorant as to what constitutes a thing good or bad. Nay, apparently he will copy the vague notions of beauty which prevail among the uninformed multitude. . . . Then, to all appearance, we are pretty well agreed so far as this, that the imitative artist knows nothing of importance about the things which he imitates, and that therefore imitation is an amusement and not a serious business."

Yet, in the same book, he admits the efficacy of good imitative art to achieve the end at which it is aimed, when he says,

"But nevertheless let us admit, that, if the poets whose end is to please, and imitation, can give any reasons to show that they ought to exist in a well-constituted state, we for our part will gladly welcome them home again. For we are conscious of being enchanted by such poetry ourselves, though it would be a sin to betray what seems to us the cause of truth" (Republic, bk. x.);

yet in the same connection, he also concludes, "At any rate, we have learned that we must not make a

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serious pursuit of such poetry, in the belief that it grasps truth and is good."

Poetry of the Passions Condemned. The following, also from the "Republic," (bk. x.) epitomizes one group of his objections to that poetry which magnifies the untoward excitement of passion, anger, grief, pleasure or desire,

"And in the case of love and anger, and all the mental sensations of desire, grief, and pleasure, which, as we hold, accompany all our actions, is it not true that poetic imitation works upon us similar effects? For it waters and cherishes these emotions, which ought to wither with drought, and constitutes them our rulers, when they ought to be our subjects, if we wish to become better and happier instead of worse and more miserable;"

of which he also remarks, sagely:

"It is given, I think, only to a few to reflect that the conduct of other people must necessarily influence our own, and that it is no easy matter, after feeding the strength of the principle of pity upon the sufferings of others, to keep it under restraint when we suffer ourselves." (Republic, bk. x.)

This he likewise discusses in the following:

"A good man, if he meet with a misfortune, like that of losing a son or anything else that he values

most highly, will bear it more easily than anyone else." (Republic, bk. x.)

Not the calm, resolute and self-possessed, however, but others quite, are selected as heroes for poetry, of whom Socrates says,

"This being the case, the peevish temper furnishes an infinite variety of materials for imitation; whereas the temper, which is wise and calm, is so constantly uniform and unchanging, that it is not easily imitated; and, when imitated, it is not easily understood, especially by a general gathering of all sorts of persons, collected in a theatre." (Republic, bk. x.)

This the Sage condemns and would not acclaim, saying,

"He resembles the painter in producing things that are worthless when tried by the standard of truth; and he resembles him also in this, that he holds intercourse with a part of the soul which is like himself, and not with the best part, and, this being the case, we shall henceforth be justified in refusing to admit him into a state that would fain enjoy a good constitution, because he excites and feeds and strengthens this worthless part of the soul, and thus destroys the rational part." (Republic, bk. x.)

The following, from an earlier part of the "Republic," (bk. iii.) gives point to his argument that,

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the greater the success of such imitative art, the greater the crime of it,

“These verses and all that are like them, we shall entreat Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we erase, not because they are unpoetical, or otherwise than agreeable to the ears of most men; but because, in proportion as they are more poetical, so much the less ought they to be recited in the hearing of boys and men, whom we require to be freemen, fearing slavery more than death.”

And this gives point to his argument that the supreme art, that of living, may be perverted by such poetry as by other seductive excitations, “Indeed, my dear Glaucon, the choice between becoming a good or a bad man involves a great stake,—yes, a greater stake than people suppose. Therefore it is wrong to be heedless of justice and the rest of virtue, under the excitement of honour, wealth, power or even poetry.” (Republic, bk. x.)

He is unsparing in his condemnation of this pernicious effort of successful art in the following, “That poetry should be able to damage the great majority even of good men, is, I conceive, a crime of the deep-dye.” (Republic, bk. x)

In another of these passages he urges that one cannot but see that to be affected by the art of such poetry is to succumb to unworthy sentiments, quite as if in life,

“If you consider that the part which is forcibly held down when those calamities of our own occur, and which has hungered for the privilege of weeping and bewailing itself fully and without stint, because it is its nature to covet this satisfaction, is the very part that is fed to satiety by the poets, and delights in those descriptions; and that, meanwhile, that part of us which is naturally the noblest, from not having been sufficiently trained by reason and by habit, relaxes in its watch over this querulous part, because it is surveying the afflictions of others, and because it is not discreditable to itself to praise and compassionate another man, who professes to be good, though his grief is ill-timed.” (Republic, bk. x.)

Forms of Poetry Distinguished. In another part of the “Republic” he is represented as distinguishing the forms of poetic creation, so as to indicate which of these he would most condemn, thus:

“One branch of poetry and legend-writing consists wholly of imitation, that is, as you say, tragedy and comedy; another branch employs the simple recital of the poet in his own person, and is chiefly to be found, I imagine, in dithyrambic poetry; while a third employs both recital and imitation, as is seen in the construction of epic poems, and in many other instances, if I make you understand me.” (Republic, bk. iii.)

Marcus Aurelius, in a later age when the great Greek tragedies and comedies were often presented

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but when new creations of equal merit were not produced, thus measured the values of both tragedy and comedy as regards their influence upon life,

“At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to nature for things to happen so, and that, if thou art delighted with what is shown on the stage, thou shouldst not be troubled with that which takes place on the larger stage. . . . After tragedy, the old comedy was introduced which had ‘a magisterial freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in reminding men to beware of insolence.’” (Meditations, xi.)

Socrates took the pains to discuss whether a poet is likely to succeed in more than one of these, thus,

“Does it follow, from our previous admission, that any individual may pursue with success one calling, but not many; or, if he attempts this, by his meddling with many he will fail in all, so far as to gain no distinction in any?’ ‘That would undoubtedly be the case.’ ‘Does not the same principle apply to imitation, or can the same person imitate many things as well as he can imitate one?’ ‘Certainly he cannot.’ ‘It is very improbable, then, that one who is engaged in any important calling, will at the same time know how to imitate a variety of things, and be a successful imitator; for even two branches of imitation, which are thought to be

closely allied, are more, I believe, than can be successfully pursued together by the same person; as, for instance, the writing of comedy and tragedy, which you described just now as imitations, did you not?' 'I did; and you are right in saying that the same persons cannot succeed in both.'" (Republic, bk. iii.)

Incapacity of Poets, Proverbial. In "Phædrus" he relates, with gusto, the following legend of the origin of poets,

"The story goes, that once upon a time these cicalas were men, of a race that lived before the birth of the Muses. But when the Muses were born, and song appeared, it came to pass that some of that race were so transported with pleasure, that as they sang they forgot to eat and drink, till death came upon them unawares. From them it is that the race of the cicalas are sprung, having received the boon from the Muses, that they should need no nourishment after they were come into the world, but should spend their time in singing, without food or drink, from the moment of their birth to the day of their death, when they are to repair to the Muses, and tell, each of them, of their worshippers here below."

Concerning poets and their incapacity both for practical things and even to judge intelligently and discriminatingly of their own art, he says in "The Apology":

"Almost any one of the bystanders could have talked about the words of these poets better than the

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poets themselves. So I soon found that it is not by wisdom that the poets create their works, but by a certain natural power and by inspiration, like sooth-sayers and prophets, who say many fine things, but who understand nothing of what they say. The poets seemed to me to be in a similar case. And at the same time I perceived that, because of their poetry, they thought that they were the wisest of men in other matters too, which they were not."

The behaviour of poets in ascribing misery to good men and joy to the unjust he very especially excoriates in this dialogue,

"I imagine we shall assert that in fact poets and writers of prose are alike in error in the most important particulars, when they speak of men, making out that many are happy, though unjust, and many just, yet miserable, and that injustice is profitable if it be not found out, whereas justice is a gain to your neighbour, but a loss to yourself; and I imagine we shall forbid the use of such language, and lay our commands on all writers to express the very opposite sentiments in their songs and their legends. Do you not think so?" (Republic, bk. iii.)

Were These the Views of Socrates? Plato represents Socrates as saying that

"With the single exception of hymns to the gods and panegyrics on the good, no poetry ought to be admitted into a state; for if you determine to admit

the highly seasoned muse of lyric or epic poetry, pleasure and pain will have sovereign power in your state, instead of law and those principles which, by the general consent of all time, are most conformable to reason." (Republic, bk. x.)

While all the foregoing seems consistent in many respects with what Socrates may have taught, because in putting forward reason as the guide for conduct he must needs discredit the claims of the accepted scripture of that age to be regarded as such a guide and while the argument itself has surely much to commend it and is also such as might account in part for the rage at Socrates on the part of Aristophanes and the other literateurs of the Athens of his day and the nature of the charges against Socrates which resulted in his being condemned to death, yet it is doubtful if much of this be not rather the view of his disciple, Plato, rendered much more unrelenting and even vindictive by the enmity of those who claimed to be orthodox, which had caused the ignominious death of his Master and followed himself throughout his days, inventing the most incredible slanders concerning his own mode of life.

It is the more difficult to believe that the views of Socrates concerning poetry were so extreme, since he taught that, in the form of story and of song, it is most useful as the very earliest means of educating the young and also since, as appears from the following conversation, with Cebes, related in "Phædo," he had himself composed poetry,

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"Cebes interrupted him and said, 'By the bye, Socrates, I am glad that you reminded me. Several people have been inquiring about your poems, the hymn to Apollo, and Æsop's fables which you have put into metre, and only a day or two ago Evenus asked me what was your reason for writing poetry on coming here, when you had never written a line before.'"

Music. Though, as has already been seen, Socrates condemned certain forms of music, as enervating or otherwise demoralizing, he placed it in the very forefront, with fables in prose and verse, as the most valuable means of education for the young.

That, both in composition and in rendering, music is an art, he would of course have instantly recognized; both come squarely within the definition.

But it is not an imitative art, in the same sense as dramatic and, in a less degree, epic poetry or as painting or sculpture; and therefore does not fall within the scope of the discussion reported by Plato.

Painting and Sculpture. Plato, in the "Republic," represents Socrates as denouncing all other imitative arts, to which he thus refers in one passage:

"Painting, or to speak generally, the whole art of imitation, is busy about a work which is far removed from truth; and it associates moreover with that part of us, which is far removed from wisdom, and is its mistress and friend, for no wholesome or true purpose. . . . Thus the art of imitation is the

worthless mistress of a worthless friend, and the parent of a worthless progeny" (Republic, bk. x.);

and again, more particularly, in this:

"The imitative art, then, is, I conceive, completely divorced from truth; and, apparently, it is enabled to effect so much, because it only seizes upon an object in a small part of its extent, and that small part is unsubstantial. For example, we say the painter will paint us a shoemaker, a carpenter, or any other craftsman, without knowing anything about their trades; and, notwithstanding this ignorance on his part, let him be but a good painter, and if he paints a carpenter and displays his pictures at a distance, he will deceive children and silly people by making them think that it really is a carpenter." (Republic, bk. x.)

That Socrates entertained these opinions fully, concerning either painting or sculpture, seems most dubious, however, in view of his having been himself a sculptor and the son of one and of the following conversations between himself and the greatest painter and one of the greatest sculptors of his day, reported by Xenophon in the "Memorabilia":

"Visiting Parrhasius the painter one day, and entering into conversation with him, he said, 'Pray, Parrhasius, is not painting the representation of visible objects? At least you represent substances, imitating them by means of colour, whether they be

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concave, or convex, dark or light, hard or soft, rough or smooth, fresh or old?' 'What you say is true,' said Parrhasius.

"And when you would represent beautiful figures, do you, since it is not easy to find one person with every part perfect select out of many, the most beautiful parts of each, and thus represent figures beautiful in every part?' 'We do so,' said he. . . .

"And do you also,' said Socrates, 'give imitations of the disposition of the mind, as it may be most persuasive, most agreeable, most friendly, most full of regret, or most amiable? Or is this inimitable?' 'How can that be imitated, Socrates,' said he, 'which has neither proportion, nor colour, nor any of the qualities which you just now mentioned, and is not even a visible object?' . . .

"Is it not often observable in a man that he regards others with a friendly or unfriendly look?' 'I think so,' said he. 'Is this then possible to be copied in the eyes?' 'Assuredly.' 'And at the good or ill fortune of people's friends, do those who are affected at it, and those who are not, appear to you to have the same sort of look?' 'No, indeed; for they look cheerful at their good, and sad at their evil, fortune.' 'Is it possible, then, to imitate these looks?' 'Unquestionably.'

"Surely, also, nobleness and generosity of disposition, meanness and illiberality, modesty and intelligence, insolence and stupidity, show themselves both in the looks, and gesture of men, whether they stand or move.' 'What you say is right.' 'Can these peculiarities be imitated?' 'Certainly.' . . .

“Going once, too, into the workshop of Cleito, the sculptor, and beginning to converse with him, he said, ‘I see and understand, Cleito, that you make figures of various kinds, runners and wrestlers, pugilists and pancratiasts, but how do you put into your statutes that which most wins the minds of the beholders through the eye, the lifelike appearance?’

“As Cleito hesitated, and did not immediately answer, Socrates proceeded to ask, ‘Do you make your statues appear more lifelike by assimilating your work to the figures of the living?’ ‘Certainly,’ said he. ‘Do you not then make your figures appear more like reality, and more striking, by imitating the parts of the body, that are drawn up or drawn down, compressed or spread out, stretched or relaxed, by the gesture?’ ‘Undoubtedly,’ said Cleito. ‘And the representation of the passions of men engaged in any act, does it not excite a certain pleasure in the spectators?’ ‘It is natural, at least, that it should be so,’ said he. ‘Must you not, then, copy the menacing looks of combatants? And must you not imitate the countenance of conquerors, as they look joyful?’ ‘Assuredly,’ said he. ‘A statue, therefore,’ concluded Socrates, ‘must express the workings of the mind by the form.’” (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 10.)

Certainly the Sage could hardly have thought ill of arts which could thus “express the workings of the mind by the form,” unless they were prostituted to base uses, *i.e.*, employed as a perfect means, adapted to achieve an ignoble end.

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The Lofty Mission of True Poesy and Art. And even in the "Republic," he is represented, after having administered so severe a castigation of unworthy poets, as speaking thus of the high office which poetry and imitative art generally can perform in society if so be that its aim is neither low nor blundering:

"Then good language and good harmony and grace and good rhythm all depend upon a good nature, by which I do not mean that silliness which by courtesy we call good nature, but a mind that is really well and nobly constituted in its moral character?"

"Precisely so."

"Then must not our young men on all occasions pursue these qualities, if we intend them to perform their proper work?"

"Yes, they must."

"And such qualities, I presume, enter largely into painting and all similar workmanship, into weaving and embroidery, into architecture, as well as the whole manufacture of utensils in general; nay, into the constitution of living bodies, and of all plants, for in all these things gracefulness or ungracefulness finds place. And the absence of grace, and rhythm, and harmony, is closely allied to an evil style, and an evil character; whereas their presence is allied to, and expressive of, the opposite character, which is brave and sober-minded."

"You are entirely right."

"This being the case, ought we to confine ourselves to superintending our poets, and compelling

them to impress on their productions the likeness of a good moral character, on pain of not composing among us; or ought we to extend our superintendence to the professors of every other craft as well, and forbid them to impress those signs of an evil nature, of dissoluteness, of meanness, and of ungracefulness, either on the likenesses of living creatures or on buildings, or any other work of their hands, altogether interdicting such as cannot do otherwise from working in our city, that our guardians may not be reared amongst images of vice, as upon unwholesome pastures, culling much every day by little and little from many places, and feeding upon it, until they insensibly accumulate a large mass of evil in their inmost soul? Ought we not, on the contrary, to seek out artists of another stamp, who by the power of genius can trace out the nature of the fair and the graceful, that our young men, dwelling as it were in a healthful region, may drink in good from every quarter, whence any emanation from noble works may strike upon their eye or their ear, like a gale wafting health from salubrious lands, and win them imperceptibly from their earliest childhood into resemblance, love, and harmony with the true beauty of reason?" (Republic, bk. iii.)

Inspiration. Socrates, likewise, was surely not scornful of the inspiration of the true poet, for in "Ion" he said, "He who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse; for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine"; and again, "For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful

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poems not as works of art, but because they are inspired and possessed."

This inspiration, also, he does not hold lightly but says of it, reverently: "For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him; when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles"; and attributes the inspiration to God, in this eloquent passage:

"God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as His ministers, and He also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not of themselves, who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through them He is conversing with us." (Ion.)

Yet Aristotle, the pupil of Plato and so of Socrates at second hand, did not countenance the view that any poetry is all inspiration and not at all art; for was he not author of the earliest and greatest work of literary criticism, "*Ars Poetica*"?

Longinus, in his essay "On the Sublime," asks himself the question, "But we ought not to advance, before we clear the point, whether or no there be any art in the sublime? For some are entirely of opinion, that they are guilty of a great mistake, who would reduce it to the rules of art"; and answered it, in part, by saying, "Genius may sometimes need the spur, but it stands as frequently in need of the curb."

Yet he affirms, as if inspiration were all, "The sublime is an image reflected from the inward greatness of the soul. Hence it comes to pass, that a naked thought without words challenges admiration, and strikes by its grandeur"; but later says, as if in qualification: "Low and sordid words are terrible blemishes to fine sentiments."

What Longinus says in the following, while expressly referring to oratory, is obviously as profoundly applicable to poetry and seems to sum up both what he thought of the whole matter and what Socrates also must have thought of it, if all his sayings concerning poetry as reported by Plato, are to be accepted and harmonized :

"An orator of the true genius must have no mean and ungenerous way of thinking. For it is impossible for those who have grovelling and servile ideas, or are engaged in the sordid pursuits of life, to produce anything worthy of admiration, and the perusal of all posterity. Grand and sublime expressions must flow from them, and them alone, whose conceptions are stored and big with greatness. And hence it is, that the greatest thoughts are always uttered by the greatest souls." (On the Sublime.)

CHAPTER XII

DUTY TO GOD

SOCRATES emphatically answered in the affirmative the question so despairingly put by Job, "Can man by searching find out God?" Indeed, he regarded this one of the first offices of the human reason, not that a man could know God, but that he might learn that He is and that His beneficence rules the universe.

This the Sage deemed the more important that man should do, in order that he might apprehend surely that which is not the deed of God or of any divine intelligence, such as the fabled behavior of gods and demi-gods which Homer and Hesiod had celebrated, and that he should be able inerrantly to recognize the work of God in the operation of His laws, upon the reliability of which the canons of conduct, as well as of all right thinking, must be founded.

The One God. Shortly before he went calmly, cheerfully and resolutely to his death, Socrates is represented by Plato in "Philebus" to have asked,

"Whether shall we say that the power of an irrational principle governs all things, and that, which is called the universe, at random, and as may happen? Or, on the contrary, as our predecessors asserted, that Mind, and a certain wonderful Intellect, arranges things together, and governs throughout?"

He was no more a polytheist, therefore, than the Hebrew prophet who believed in angels or the Christian who believes in saints; for, while he talked freely of gods and demi-gods, he spoke with bated breath of the one God.

Plato says the same thing when he exclaims in "The Laws" (bk. v., pt. ii.), "Zeus, the God of strangers," *i.e.*, the one universal god. He also demonstrates this at length in the same work. (Bk. x.)

So also Epictetus declared (Dissertations, iii., 24), "He knew that no man is an orphan, but there is an Eternal Father who careth continually for all"; and Marcus Aurelius argued thus, "For there is one universe made up of all things, and one God who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, (one) common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth." (Meditations, c. vii.)

Seneca, in his essay "On Providence," (bk. i., c. i.) reasoned of it in this fashion, "At the present time it is superfluous to point out that it is not without some guardian that so great a work maintains its position."

God's Beneficence. Epictetus (Dissertations, iii., 24) reasons thus, that it is God's duty to make good

men happy, like unto Himself, "Verily, the whole is ill-governed if Zeus taketh no care of his own citizens, that they like Himself may be happy"; and Seneca gives this version of the sentiment, "He causeth the rain to fall upon the just and upon the unjust" in his essay "On Benefits" (bk. i., c. i.), "How many are there who are unworthy of the light of day? And nevertheless the sun rises."

Plato in "The Laws" (bk. x., pt. ii.) enjoins the promulgation of this doctrine, "The Ruler of this universe has ordered all things with a view to the preservation and perfection of the whole."

Marcus Aurelius preaches predestination, like a medieval divine, in this, "Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being and of that which is incident to it." (Meditations, c. x.)

And of the one God and the duty of man to be pure before Him, Epictetus speaks in this (Dissertations, ii., 18), "How, then, may this come to pass? Resolve at last to seek thine own commendation, to appear fair in the eyes of God; desire to become pure with thine own pure self, and with God"; and in this he descants yet more pointedly upon the duty of man before his Maker (Dissertations, ii., 8), "But wert thou a statue of Pheidias, an Athena or a Zeus, then wert thou mindful both of thyself and of the artist; and if thou hadst any consciousness, thou wouldst strive to do nothing unworthy of thy maker nor of thyself, nor even to appear in any unseemly guise."

Socrates by this inquiry in "Euthyphron" identi-

fies the purposes of the lesser gods with those of Zeus, "What is that grand result which the gods use our services to product?" which, indeed, when truthfully answered, supplies the basis for the art of human conduct.

Prayer. That it is no petty or partial purpose that has caused God to create man, Marcus Aurelius asserts, thus, "He would not have brought on any man what He has brought, if it were not useful for the whole"; and that men in their prayers should respect this impartial, universal purpose, he indicates in this, "A prayer of the Athenians: 'Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains:'—in truth we ought not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble fashion. (Meditations, c. v.)

Instead, therefore, of attempting to alter the will of God, it is wise and appropriate rather to inquire concerning His will; for, as Epictetus puts it (Dissertations, ii., 14), "The philosophers say that, before all things, it is needful to learn that God is, and taketh thought for all things; and that nothing can be hid from Him, neither deeds, nor even thoughts or wishes." He also seeks to present Him thus (Dissertations, ii., 14),

"And how is it possible that a state or a house cannot endure, no not for the shortest time, without a governor and overseer, but this so great and fair fabric should be guided thus orderly by chance and accident? There is, then, One who governs. But

what is His nature? And how doth He govern? And we, that were made by Him, what are we, and for what are we? Have we at least some intercourse and link with Him? Or have we none?"

Aristotle epitomizes it in this (Ethics, bk. ix., c. iv.): "God indeed has at each moment all good, but he has it in right of being God."

Socrates, in his personal prayer, (Phædrus), petitioned thus, "Give me beauty in the inward soul, and may the outward and the inward man be at one! May I hold him rich that is wise and grant me such a quantity of gold as none but the temperate can carry!"

The Will of God. In this passage in "Euthyphron" Socrates contrasts true reverence with mere dread,

"I do not think it true to say that where there is fear, there is also reverence. Many people who fear sickness and poverty and other such evils, seem to me to have fear, but no reverence for what they fear. . . . But I think that where there is reverence, there is also fear. Does any man feel reverence and a sense of shame about anything, without at the same time dreading and fearing the character of baseness?"

Seneca, in his essay "On Providence" (bk. i., c. v.) thus discerns the motive that underlies the divine scheme of things, "God has the same purpose as the wise man; that is, to prove that the things which

the herd covets and dreads are neither good nor bad in themselves."

Epictetus (Dissertations, iii., 26) gathers from his observation of mundane events this useful and cheering lesson of the consequence of results upon adequate cause, in human affairs as in the play of material forces,

"To the good soldier there fails not one who gives him pay, nor to the labourer, nor to the shoemaker; and shall such a one fail to the good man? Is God then careless of His instruments, His servants, His witnesses, whom alone He useth to show forth to the untaught what He is, and that He governs all things well, and is not careless of human things?"

The noble resignation of Epictetus that permeates the following (Dissertations, iv., 7) is worthy of the saintliest of human souls, "Always that which happens is what I wish, for I hold what God wills above what I will. I cleave to Him as His servant and follower; my impulses are one with His, my pursuit is one with His; in a word, my will is one with His."

But he did not deem this humility and acquiescence inconsistent with a longing for immortal usefulness and for that sense of the presence of the Almighty which has ever been the guerdon of them who have "walked with God"; for he also says (Dissertations, ii., 19),

"Let one show me a man's soul that longs to be likeminded with God, and to blame neither gods nor

men, and not to fail in any effort or avoidance, and not to be wrathful nor envious nor jealous, but—for why should I make rounds to say it?—that desires to become a god from a man, and in this body of ours, this corpse, is mindful of his fellowship with Zeus. Show me that man!”

And that God has created man to know joy, which is his right and his reason for being and will surely result if he lives up to that which is highest and most exalted in his thought, Epictetus also declares in this (*Dissertations*, iii., 24), “We are well supplied with every excuse for baseness; some through children, some through mothers, some through brothers. But it behooveth no man to be unhappy through any person, but happy through all, and most of all through God, which hath framed us to that end.”

Epictetus again puts this idea into eloquent words, as follows (*Dissertations*, ii., 16),

“Dare you to look up to God and say: ‘Deal with me henceforth as Thou wilt; I am of one mind with Thee: I am Thine. I reject nothing that seems good to Thee; lead me whithersoever thou wilt, clothe me in what dress Thou wilt. Wilt Thou have me govern or live privately, or stay at home, or go into exile, or be a poor man, or a rich? For all these conditions I will be Thy advocate with men—I show the nature of each of them, what it is.’”

Which he also, without shrinking from the duty, at another place presents in realistic detail, thus (*Encheiridion*, xi.),

“‘Is thy child dead? It is returned. Is thy wife dead? She is returned. Art thou deprived of thy estate? Is not this also returned?’ ‘But he is wicked who deprives me of it!’ But what is that to thee, through whom the Giver demands His own? As long, therefore, as He grants it to thee, steward it like another’s property, as travellers use an inn!”

The Presence. Marcus Aurelius thus adjured one to look upon God as the soul of the entire universe, “Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one substance and one soul.” (Meditations, c. iv.) And Epictetus declared (Dissertations, ii., 8) that man’s soul is an influx of the spirit of God and an organic part thereof, in this,

“Unhappy man, thou bearest about with thee God, and knowest it not! Thinkest thou I speak of some god of gold and silver, and external to thee? Nay, but in thyself thou dost bear Him, and seest not that thou defilest Him with thine impure thoughts and filthy deeds. In the presence even of an image of God thou hadst not dared to do one of those things, which thou dost. But in the presence of God Himself within thee, who seeth and heareth all things, thou art not ashamed of the things thou dost both desire and do, O thou, unwitting of thine own nature, and subject to the wrath of God!”

This highest sanction for pure and holy thinking and for rectitude of conduct is perhaps rendered the more convincing by the following declaration of

Socrates himself in Plato's "Republic" (bk. ii.) that God is not the creator of evil, for the Sage adhered to his own rule of life and thought, that reason must be man's guide, and his reason revolted at that distortion of the soul's conception of the Almighty Father,

"Then that which is good is not the cause of all things, but only of what is as it should be, being guiltless of originating evil. . . . If that be so, then God, inasmuch as He is good, cannot be the cause of all things, according to the common doctrine. On the contrary, He is the author of only a small part of human affairs; of the larger part He is not the author, for our evil things far outnumber our good things and the good things we must ascribe to no other than God, while we must seek elsewhere, and not in Him, the cause of the evil things."

Socrates was in no quandary about explaining the existence of evil as consisting of man's ignorance, both as to the object of human life and as to the means appropriate and best adapted to accomplish that purpose; but he also found that the same exercise of reason which laid bare the purpose for which man lives upon the earth, to develop the highest of which he is capable and the race as best he can, also showed that God is, in Himself and His presence everywhere, the most perfect sanction for lofty thought and endeavour.

That such was the conception of Socrates is thus (Dissertations, ii., 12) attested by Epictetus,

“Concerning the gods, there are some who say that a Divine Being does not exist; and others, that it exists indeed, but is idle and uncaring, and hath no forethought for anything; and a third class say that there is such a Being, and He taketh forethought also, but only in respect of great and heavenly things, but of nothing that is on the earth; and a fourth class, that He taketh thought of things both in heaven and earth, but only in general, and not of each thing severally. And there is a fifth class, whereof are Ulysses and Socrates, who say, ‘Nor can I move without thy knowledge.’”

Plato also gives fully and clearly the reasoning supporting this (Laws, bk. x.), concluding, “And so we may say that we have sufficiently demonstrated the three theses proposed by us: that the gods exist, that they are heedful, that they are implacable to the appeals of injustice.”

Witness of the Spirit. From the very outset Socrates laid claim to divine guidance through a spirit which accompanied him always and invariably warned him when he was about to go astray. This claim was part of the indictment against him; that is, that he was “inventing new gods,” as appears from this colloquy taken from “Euthyphron,” relating to the trial of Socrates on the charge of corrupting the Athenian youth:

“‘But how, tell me, does he (the prosecutor) say that you corrupt the youth?’ ‘In a way which sounds strange at first, my friend. He says that I am

a maker of gods; and so he is prosecuting me, he says, for inventing new gods, and for not believing in the old ones.' 'I understand, Socrates. It is because you say that you always have a divine sign.'"

Before his judges, as reported in "The Apology," Socrates thus asserted that he verily possessed this guardian spirit, of which he said, "I have a certain divine sign from God, which is the divinity that Miletus has caricatured in his indictment. I have had it from childhood; it is a kind of voice, which, whenever I hear it, always turns me back from something which I was going to do, but never urges me to act."

And in this passage (Crito) he indicates that communications were not always confined to mere hints of warning: "Know well, my dear friend Crito, that this is what I seem to hear, as the worshippers of Cybele seem, in their frenzy, to hear the music of flutes; and the sound of these words rings loudly in my ears, and drowns all other words."

That his mission also was from, and of, God, Socrates testifies in "The Apology," as follows, "You could easily kill me with a single blow, and then sleep on undisturbed for the rest of your lives, unless God were to care for you enough to send another man to arouse you."

Consulting God's Will. In this conversation, reported by Xenophon in his "Memorabilia" (bk. iv., 3) Socrates expressed his confidence in divination as a means of forecasting the future, and his own divine guidance was declared to be of this character,

“‘And that, since we are unable to foresee what is for our advantage with regard to the future, they (the gods) should assist us in that respect, communicating what will happen to those who inquire of them by divination, and instructing them how their actions may be most for their benefit, what thoughts does that produce in you?’ ‘The gods seem to show you, Socrates,’ rejoined he, ‘more favour than other men, since they indicate to you, without being asked, what you ought to do, and what not to do.’”

Socrates’ practice of divination and the popular belief that he consulted his guardian spirit are set forth in this passage of the same book (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., 1), “For he was seen frequently sacrificing at home, and frequently on the public altars of the city; nor was it unknown that he used divination; as it was a common subject of talk that ‘Socrates used to say that the divinity instructed him.’”

Xenophon also attests that Socrates regarded his familiar spirit as his monitor as well as his guide, saying of this (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., 1),

“Socrates spoke as he thought, for he said it was the divinity that was his monitor. He also told many of his friends to do certain things, and not to do others, intimating that the divinity had forewarned him; and advantage attended those who obeyed his suggestions, but repentance those who disregarded them. Yet who would not acknowledge that Socrates wished not to appear to his friends either a fool or a boaster? But he would have

seemed to be both, if, after saying that intimations were given him by a god, he had then been proved guilty of falsehood."

Xenophon, in his "Memorabilia," relates that Socrates put the inculcation of right sentiments toward the gods first in the training which he prescribed; of this (bk. iv., 3) he says, "In the first place, therefore, he endeavoured to impress his associates with right feelings toward the gods."

Socrates lived at a time when, by reason of the indisposition of the learned to accept the tales concerning gods and demi-gods, there was a strong tendency wholly to disbelieve in them. The sage, however, as has already been seen, was persuaded that all life is spiritual and the unseen far more reliably real than the seen.

Marcus Aurelius affirms his confidence that this is true, thus:

"If indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils." (Meditations, c. ii.)

He based this confidence both upon the possibility of these spiritual beings making themselves visible and also upon human reason concerning them, in this,

“To those who ask, ‘Where hast thou seen the gods or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipping them?’, I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with the eyes; in the second place, neither have I seen even my own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them.” (Meditations, c. xii.)

In Plato’s “Republic” (bk. iv.) the following conversation is reported concerning consulting the Delphic oracle,

“‘What then,’ he asked, ‘still remains for us as legislators to do?’ And I replied, ‘For us, nothing: but for the Delphian Apollo there will remain the most important, the noblest, and the highest acts of legislation.’ ‘What are these?’ ‘The erection of temples and the appointment of sacrifices and other ceremonies in honour of the gods and demi-gods and heroes, and likewise the mode of burning the dead, and all the observances which we must adopt, in order to propitiate the inhabitants of the other world. These are subjects which we do not understand ourselves, and about which in founding a state, we shall, if we are wise, listen to no other advice or exposition, except that of our ancient national expositor. For it is the god, I apprehend, expounding from his seat on the Omphalos, at the earth’s centre, who is the national expositor to all men on such subjects.’”

In "Euthyphron" this dialogue, questioning what service to the gods men can perform, appears, "Then is holiness, which is the care which we bestow on the gods, intended to benefit the gods, or to improve them? Should you allow that you make any of the gods better, when you do a holy action?"; and in the same connection he inquires, "What result will the art which serves the gods serve to produce?"

Obviously not the aggrandizement of the gods but a blessing upon men which would be pleasing to all the heavenly host because, so far as it goes, it is the achievement of the higher things for which they are continually striving.

That the celestial powers are neither without interest in human beings nor without power either to benefit or injure them, Xenophon in the "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 4) thus reports his Master to have said, "Do you suppose, too, that the gods would have engendered a persuasion in men that they are able to benefit or injure them, unless they were really able to do so, and that men, if they had been thus perpetually deluded, would not have become sensible of the delusion?"

Socrates is nowhere reported to have urged mere laudation of the gods. Aristotle thus characterizes it (Ethics, bk. i., 10), "This is illustrated by attempts to praise the gods, for they are presented in a ludicrous aspect by being referred to our standard, and this results from the fact that all praise does, as we have said, imply reference to a standard."

Marcus Aurelius, in the following, also finds that

such cannot by any possibility be pleasing to the gods, themselves,

“In order, however, to the remembrance of these names, *i.e.*, ‘reason,’ ‘equanimity’ and ‘magnanimity,’ it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the gods and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be made like themselves.” (Meditations, c. x.)

Yet Seneca, in his essay “On Benefits,” thus commends gratitude to the gods—gratitude the latest and most perfect of human virtues which becomes and blesses him who harbours it in all humility, far more than him who is its object, “He, therefore, who teaches men to be grateful, pleads the cause not only of men, but even of the gods; for though they, being placed above all desires, cannot be in want of anything, yet we can nevertheless offer them our gratitude.” (Bk. ii., 3.)

Socrates, however, while silent concerning praise, rebukes in Xenophon’s “Memorabilia” (bk. i., 4) his disciple who failed to pay honour to the gods, thus, “‘However, Socrates,’ said Aristodemus, ‘I do not despise the gods, but consider them as too exalted to need my attention.’ ‘But,’ said Socrates, ‘the more exalted they are, while they deign to attend to you, the more ought you to honour them.’”

The proof that though unseen, the heavenly host exists, and the reverence which man should show to them, the Sage thus presented in another passage of the same book, “The soul of man, moreover, which

partakes of the divine nature if anything else in man does, rules, it is evident, within us, but is itself unseen. Meditating on these facts, therefore, it behooves you not to despise the unseen gods, but, estimating their power from what is done by them, to reverence what is divine." (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 3.)

And in the following passage he is shown by Xenophon, illustrating in his own person the resignation of him who prays rightly, "To the gods he simply prayed that they would give him good things, as believing that the gods knew best what things are good." (Memorabilia, bk. i., 3.)

Divine Guidance. Socrates was not merely convinced, however, both of the existence and the powers of unseen beings but also of their wisdom and their willingness, if consulted, to guide men aright. Xenophon reports the following concerning him,

"If anything appeared to be intimated to him from the gods, he could no more have been persuaded to act contrary to such intimation, than anyone could have persuaded him to take for his guide on a journey a blind man, or one who did not know the way, instead of one who could see, and did know it. . . . As for himself, he undervalued everything human, in comparison with counsel from the gods." (Memorabilia, bk. i., 3.)

This also had reference not merely to the god within him who was recognized by him as his guide and guardian, but also to communications from the

unseen by all the means now known as psychic phenomena, among which Xenophon in the "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 1) enumerates the following,

"He however introduced nothing newer than those who, practicing divination, consult auguries, voices, omens, and sacrifices; for they do not imagine that birds, or people who meet them, know what is advantageous for those seeking presages, but that the gods, by their means, signify what will be so, and such was the opinion that Socrates entertained."

As examples of the things about which he expressly taught that the gods should be consulted, Xenophon mentions among others the choice of friends, in this passage, "'Be it so,' said Critobulus; 'but by what means must we make a friend of him who appears to us worthy of our friendship?' 'In the first place,' answered Socrates, 'we must consult the gods, whether they recommend us to make him our friend.'" (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 6.)

And in another passage, (bk. i., 1) he taught that one should consult about the government of one's family or of the state, thus,

"Concerning those of which it was doubtful how they would terminate, he sent them to take auguries whether they should be done or not. Those who would govern families or cities well, he said, had need of divination. . . . He said that the gods reserved to themselves the most important particulars attending such matters, of which nothing was

apparent to men. . . . And those who thought that none of these things depended on the gods, but that all were dependent on the human understanding, he pronounced to be insane; as he also pronounced those to be insane who had recourse to omens respecting matters which the gods had granted to men to discover by the exercise of their faculties; and if, for instance, a man should inquire whether it would be better to take for the driver of his chariot one who knows how to drive, or one who does not know. . . . It was the duty of men to learn whatever the gods had enabled them to do by learning, and to try to ascertain from the gods by augury whatever was obscure to men."

It should be observed in the foregoing that he did not favour surrendering one's judgment to such guidance against his own reason nor even the acceptance of such guidance in cases where reason could and should determine; but as to matters beyond human ken, he is represented by Xenophon's "Memorabilia" (bk. iv., 7) to have advised resort to psychical means of ascertaining the will of the higher powers, thus, "But if anyone desired to attain to what was beyond human wisdom, he advised him to study divination; for he said that he who knew by what signs the gods give indications to men respecting human affairs, would never fail of obtaining counsel from the gods."

Providence. That the purposes of the spiritual rulers of mankind are beneficent, is the other side

presented by Socrates in "Euthyphron" thus, "But tell me, how are the gods benefited by the gifts which they receive from us? What they give us is plain enough. Every good thing that we have is their gift. But how are they benefited by what we give them?"; and this same conception of them as the givers "of every good and perfect gift," is found in this, reported by Xenophon in his "Memorabilia," "Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever occurred to you to consider how carefully the gods have provided for men everything that they require?" (Bk. iv., 3.)

Among the things which the gods provide, the Sage who was ever, as he often declared, himself guided by the god within him, asserted that for every man there is the presence of a guardian soul, unseen but ever watchful and ready at all times to lead to higher, better and nobler things. Such guidance, indeed, he considered, ends only after death when regretfully, this faithful companion turns sadly away as other guidance takes his place. Of this, he says, in "Phædo,"

"For it is said that the genius, who has had charge of each man in his life, proceeds to lead him, when he is dead, to a certain place, where the departed have to assemble and receive judgment, and then go to the world below with the guide who is appointed to conduct them thither."

This view was also accepted by Epictetus, who said concerning it,

"He hath placed at every man's side a guardian, the genius of each man, who is charged to watch over him, a genius that cannot sleep, nor be deceived. . . . So, when ye have shut the doors, and made darkness in the house, remember never to say that ye are alone; for ye are not alone, but God is there, and your genius is there; and what need have these of light to mark what ye are doing?" (Dis-sertations, i., 14.)

It was with this in mind that Socrates made known to his disciple that which Xenophon relates in the "Memorabilia" in the following wonderful passage,

"For he thought that the gods paid regard to men, not in the way in which some people suppose, who imagine that the gods know some things and do not know others, but he considered that the gods know all things, both what is said, what is done, and what is meditated in silence, and are present everywhere, and give admonitions to men concerning everything human." (Bk. i., 1);

and also in this,

"By delivering such sentiments, Socrates seems to me to have led his associates to refrain from what was impious, or unjust, or dishonourable, not merely when they were seen by men, but when they were in the solitude, since they would conceive that nothing that they did would escape the knowledge of the gods." (Bk. i., 4.)

Epictetus, as indeed all the Stoics, taught as follows,

“Of religion towards the gods, know that the chief element is to have right opinions concerning them, as existing and governing the whole in fair order and justice, and then to set thyself to obey them, and to yield to them in each event, and submit to it willingly, as accomplished under the highest counsels.” (Encheiridion, xxxi.)

In “The Laws,” Plato thus emphasized the moral value of belief in the gods and of right notions about them,

“No one ever intentionally did an unholy act or uttered an unlawful word, retaining a belief in the existence of the gods; but he must have supposed one of three things, either that they did not exist, or, secondly, if they did, they took no care of man, or, thirdly, that they were easily appeased by sacrifices or turned from their course by prayers.” (Bk. x., pt. ii.)

In the “Republic” (bk. ii.) Adeimantus is represented in his conversation with Socrates thus to have characterized the notion that, by praising the gods and sacrificing unto them, one may obtain absolution from wrong-doing,

“Nay but, it is urged, neither evasion nor violence can succeed with the gods. Well, but if they either do not exist, or do not concern themselves with

the affairs of men, why need we concern ourselves to evade their observation? But if they do exist, and do pay attention to us, we know nothing and have heard nothing of them from any other quarter than the current traditions and the genealogies of poets; and these very authorities state that the gods are beings who may be wrought upon and diverted from their purpose by sacrifices and supplications and votive offerings. Therefore we must believe them in both statements or in neither. If we are to believe them, we shall act unjustly, and offer sacrifices from the proceeds of our crimes; for, if we are just, we shall, it is true, escape punishment at the hands of the gods, provided we renounce the profits which accrue from injustice, but if we are unjust, we shall not only make these gains, but also by putting up prayers when we transgress and sin, we shall prevail upon the gods to let us go unscathed.'” (Republic, bk. ii.)

Plato expresses in “The Laws” a like opinion, saying, “And from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God is right in receiving gifts; and therefore the unholy waste their much service upon the gods which, when offered by any holy man, is always accepted of them.” (Bk. iv., pt. ii.)

In “Phædo” Socrates, as has already been seen, describes absolution as the office of the injured, thus, “And when they have been carried to the Acherusian lake they cry out and call on those whom they slew or outraged, and beseech and pray that they be allowed to come out into the lake and be

received as comrades; and if they prevail, they come out."

God is Good. Socrates himself thus denounced, in the same book, the arch impiety of attributing to God anything which is not good,

"But if a poet writes about the sufferings of Niobe, as Æschylus does in the play from which I have taken these lines, or the calamities of the house of Pelops, or the disasters at Troy, or any other similar occurrences, either we must not allow him to call them the work of a god, or if they are to be so called, he must discover a theory to account for them such as that for which we are now searching, and must say, that what the god did was righteous and good, and the sufferers were chastened for their profit; but we cannot allow the poet to say, that a god was the author of a punishment which made the objects of it miserable. No; if he should say that because the wicked are miserable, these men needed chastisement, and the infliction of it by the god was a benefit to them, we shall make no objection; but as to asserting that God, who is good, becomes the author of evil to any, we must do battle uncompromisingly for the principle, that fictions conveying such a doctrine as this, whether in verse or in prose, shall neither be recited nor heard in the city, by any member of it, young or old, if it is to be a well-regulated city." (Republic, bk. ii.)

And in the same connection he says this, which epitomizes his entire contention: "It is right, I pre-

sume, always to represent God as He really is, whether the poet describe Him in an epic or in a lyrical or a dramatic poem. . . . Then surely God is good in reality, and is to be so represented." (Republic, bk. ii.)

And in "Thætetus," Plato represents his Master as saying: "In God is no unrighteousness at all. He is altogether righteous and there is nothing more like Him than he of us who is the most righteous."

Socrates' Service of God. That the Delphic oracle pronounced Socrátēs the wisest man of his time must, in view of the concurrence of all mankind since that day in that verdict, be recognized to constitute a ground for thinking of that ancient shrine of prophecy with respect. Socrates, however, said of this judgment:

"I have gained this name, Athenians, simply by reason of a certain wisdom. But by what kind of wisdom? It is by just that wisdom which is, I believe, possible to men. . . . You remember Chærephon. From youth upwards he was my comrade; and he went into exile with the people and with the people he returned. And you remember, too, Chærephon's character, how vehement he was in carrying through whatever he took in hand. Once he went to Delphi and ventured to put this question to the oracle—I entreat you again, my friends, not to cry out—he asked if there was any man who was wiser than I; and the priestess answered that there was no

man. Chærephon himself is dead, but his brother here will confirm what I say. . . . When I heard of the oracle I began to reflect: 'What can God mean by this dark saying? I know very well that I am not wise, even in the smallest degree. Then what can He mean by saying that I am the wisest of men?' . . . So when I went away, I thought to myself, 'I am wiser than this man; neither of us probably knows anything that is really good, but he thinks that he has knowledge, when he has not, while I, having no knowledge, do not think that I have. I seem, at any rate, to be a little wiser than he is on this point; I do not think that I know what I do not know.'" (The Apology.)

The absolute need that every student should approach his inquiry in this spirit, the humility of Socrates and his appreciation of the compelling sacredness of his mission and that he was "a man sent of God," are all expressed in this passage from the same book,

"But, my friends, I believe that only God is really wise, and that by this oracle He meant that men's wisdom is worth little or nothing. I do not think that he meant that Socrates was wise. He only made use of my name, and took me as an example, as though He would say to men, 'He among you is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that in very truth his wisdom is worth nothing at all.' And therefore I go about testing and examining every man whom I think wise, whether he be a citizen or a stranger, as

God has commanded me; and whenever I find that he is not wise, I point out to him on the part of God that he is not wise. And I am so busy in this pursuit that I have never had leisure to take any part worth mentioning in public matters, nor to look after my private affairs. I am in very great poverty by reason of my service to God." (The Apology.)

CHAPTER XIII

DUTIES TOWARD MANKIND

PERHAPS nothing that Plato has put upon the lips of Socrates seems more unlike him and out of keeping with other sentiments attributed to him than this, "I affirm that all the members of the Greek race are brethren and kinsmen to one another, but aliens and foreigners to the barbarian world." (Republic, bk. v.)

Far more harmonious with all the teaching of Socrates, reported by Plato himself, is this saying of Epictetus,

"Whoso, therefore, hath watched the governance of the universe, and hath learned that the greatest, mightiest and amplest of all societies is that which is composed of mankind and of God and that from Him have descended the seeds, not only to my father alone nor to my grandfather, but to all creatures that are conceived and born upon the earth (but especially to reasoning beings, since to these alone hath nature given it to have communion and intercourse with God, being linked with Him through reason)—wherefore should such a one not name himself a citizen of the

universe? Wherefore not a son of God?" (Dissertations, i., 9.)

It was Epictetus, also, who said,

"Me hath God set free; or think you that he would let his own son be enslaved?" (Dissertations, i., 19); and Seneca, of the Stoic opinion in general, "What virtue do we admire more than benevolence? Which do we encourage more? Who ought to applaud it more than we Stoics, who preach the brotherhood of the human race?" ("On Benefits," bk. i., c. xv.)

Mutual Dependence. That Socrates too was convinced that men should be brothers in thought and deed, is seen from this,

"Tell me, Chærecrates, you surely are not one of those men, are you, who think wealth more valuable than brothers, when wealth is but a senseless thing and a brother endowed with reason; when wealth needs protection, while a brother can afford protection; and when wealth, besides, is plentiful, and a brother but one?" (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 3.)

Marcus Aurelius in the following saying gives point to this lesson,

"For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then is contrary to nature." (Meditations, c. ii.) He also said of the wise and good man, "And he remembers also

that every rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all men is according to man's nature." (C. iii.)

To emphasize that to recognize all as kin is not to ignore that not all are good, he also says,

"The gods who are immortal, are not vexed because during so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of them bad." (Meditations, c. vii.); and this to point out that the fraternity of man is not inconsistent with order and the rule of the inferior by the superior, "The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior to one another." (C. v.)

These gems from Marcus Aurelius also both illuminate and adorn this righteous creed of human brotherhood: "Love mankind. Follow God." "It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong." (Meditations, c. vii.)

Epictetus thus preaches the gospel of human service, "And, on the whole, He hath so formed the nature of the reasoning creature that he may never win aught of his own good without he furnishes something of service to the common good." (Dissertations, i., 19); and Marcus Aurelius, reasoning from the essential unity of the universe, declares his loyal allegiance to humanity as a whole, thus,

"For remembering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things which

are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. . . . The nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. . . . And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial; but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to the common interest, and divert them from the contrary." (Meditations, c. x.)

In many enthusiastic passages, such as the following, Marcus Aurelius further enjoins the duty of ministering to the common good:

"There are three relations: the one to the body which encases thee; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with thee." (Meditations, c. viii.)

"Have I done something for the general interest? Well, then, I have had my reward." (Meditations, c. xi.)

"For whatsoever, either by myself or with another, I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society." (Meditations, c. vii.)

He thus described the condition of the man who separates himself from his fellows:

"If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything unsocial." (Meditations, c. viii.)

The Golden Rule. Epictetus in the following epitomizes the essential element of true brotherhood,

"If a fig fall into thy bosom, take and eat it, for so far even a fig is to be valued. But if I must stoop down for it, and throw down another man, or another throw me down . . . then neither is a fig worth so much, nor is any other of the things that are not good." (Dissertations, iv., 7.)

Marcus Aurelius in this crisp sentence incorporates one of the most valuable lessons in the brotherhood of man, "Does any one do wrong? It is to himself that he does the wrong." (Meditations, c. iv.)

Epictetus thus enunciates the golden rule, "That which thou wouldst not suffer thyself, seek not to lay upon others." (Fragments, xliii.)

This principle of reciprocity, long known also among the Chinese and other Orientals, has been discussed learnedly by Aristotle, thus, "There are people who have a notion that reciprocation is simply just, as the Pythagoreans said, for they defined the just simply and without qualifications as 'That which reciprocates with another.'" (Ethics, bk. v., c. viii.)

Recompense Not Evil with Evil. Epictetus rebukes those who deem it the mark of a poor-spirited man tamely to suffer antagonism, in this fashion, "To suppose that we shall become contemptible in the eyes of others unless in some way we inflict an injury on those who first showed hostility to us, is the character of most ignoble and thoughtless men." (Fragments, lxx.)

Aristotle asserts the superiority of affirmatively beneficial conduct in these words, "Doing well by others is more characteristic of virtue than being done well by, and doing things positively honourable than forbearing to do things dishonourable." (Ethics, bk. iv., i.); and Socrates, in the following three passages from "Crito," denies and refutes the doctrine that man may rightly repay injury with injury:

"Neither, if we ought never to do wrong at all, ought we to repay wrong with wrong, as the world thinks we may?"

"And is it right to repay evil with evil, as the world thinks, or not right?" "Certainly it is not right."

"We ought not to repay wrong with wrong or do harm to any man, no matter what we may have suffered from him."

Marcus Aurelius states this astutely in this manner, "The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrongdoer." (Meditations, c. vi.)

That the fact that men are brothers must not lead one to lean upon others, instead of relying upon him-

self, Marcus Aurelius thus affirms. (*Meditations*, c. iii.), "A man, then, must stand erect, not be kept erect by others." Yet against the contrary excess he issues this warning (c. vii.), "Be not ashamed to be helped."

Epictetus thus enunciates the divine law which should be acquiesced in by all men, with good will and, if need be, resignation,

"And what is the divine law? To hold fast that which is his own, and to claim nothing that is another's; to use what is given him, and not to covet what is not given; to yield up easily and willingly what is taken away, giving thanks for the time that he has had it at his service." (*Dissertations*, ii., 16.)

Aristotle thus puts the often repeated question, whether one may love himself above duty to his fellows, and implies the answer,

"A question is also raised as to whether it is right to love one's self best, or some one else, because men find fault with those who love themselves best, and call them in a disparaging way lovers of self; and the bad man is thought to do everything he does for his own sake merely, and the more so, the more depraved he is." (*Ethics*, bk. ix., c. viii.)

Universal Brotherhood. Epictetus commends the heroic virtues which flow from disregard of self in the cause of humanity, in this eloquent passage:

“Look at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is according to nature to live to old age, to grow rich, to keep good health. But if thou look at thyself as a man, and as a part of a certain whole, for the sake of that whole it may become thee now to have sickness, now to sail the seas and run in peril, now to suffer need, and perchance to die before thy time.” (Dissertations, ii., 5.)

Epictetus also reports this saying of Socrates (also recorded by Aristotle) which makes it improbable that it was he who proscribed as aliens all who were not Greeks,

“If those things are true which are said by philosophers concerning the kinship of God and men, what else remains for men to do than after Socrates’ way, who, when men inquired of him what was his native country, never replied, ‘Athens’ or ‘Corinth,’ but ‘The Universe’?” (Dissertations, i., 9.)

CHAPTER XIV

DUTIES AS A CITIZEN

SOCRATES who placed so high a value upon obedience to the laws that he identified this with justice and that he preferred complying with them to the preservation of his own life, was not likely to under-rate the obligations of the citizen.

Xenophon reports him to have spoken of this as follows, "Have you ever heard it said of Lycurgus, the Lacedæmonian, then, that he would not have made Sparta at all different from other states, if he had not established in it, beyond others, a spirit of obedience to the laws?" (*Memorabilia*, bk. iv., 4.)

The very foundation of the greatness of Athens, Xenophon in the same book (bk. iii., 3) represents Socrates to have ascribed, thus, "But it is not so much in sweetness of voice, or in size and strength of body, that the Athenians excel other people, as in ambition, which is the greatest incitement to whatever is honourable and noble."

Efficiency the First Duty. Socrates is reported by Plato, in his "*Republic*," (bk. iv.) to have inculcated as the first duty of a citizen to be useful in that for

which his talents fit him, inquiring "whether the virtue of the state may not be chiefly traced to the presence of that fourth principle in every child and woman, in every slave, freeman, and artisan, in the ruler and in the subject, requiring each to do his own work, and not meddle with many things."

In another passage of the same book, he identifies this with justice, saying, "Adherence to their own business on the part of the industrial, the military, and the guardian classes, each of these doing its own work in the state, is justice, and will render the state just" (Republic, bk. iv.); and also in this,

"What at the commencement we laid down as a universal rule of action, when we were founding our state, this, if I mistake not, or some modification of it, is justice. I think we affirmed, if you recollect, and frequently repeated, that every individual ought to have some one occupation in the state, which should be that to which his natural capacity was best adapted. . . . To do one's own business, in some shape or other, is justice." (Republic, bk. iv.)

In yet another passage, he puts it thus, "All things will be produced in superior quantity, and quality, and with greater ease, when each man works at a single occupation, in accordance with his natural gifts, and at the right amount, without meddling with anything else" (Republic, bk. ii.); and in the same connection pertinently asks, "When is a man likely to succeed best? When he divides his exertions among many trades, or when he devotes himself exclusively to one?" (Republic, bk. ii.)

That it is a matter of special aptitude and not the mere accident of birth and position, of which Socrates was thinking, is indicated by this, also spoken in the same connection: "No two persons are born exactly alike, but each differs from each in natural endowments, one being suited for one occupation, and another for another" (*Republic*, bk. ii.); and Xenophon relates that Socrates thus inculcated careful attention to one's own work.

"Be not ignorant of yourself, my friend, and do not commit the error which the majority of men commit; for most persons, though they are eager to look into the affairs of others, give no thought to the examination of their own. Do not you, then, neglect this duty but strive more and more to cultivate your own powers." (*Memorabilia*, bk. iii., 1.)

Xenophon also records the following:

"But when Socrates maintained that to be busy was useful and beneficial for a man, and that to be unemployed was noxious and ill for him, that to work was a good, and to be idle an evil, he at the same time observed that those only who do something good, really work and are useful workmen, but those who gamble or do anything bad and pernicious, he called idle." (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., 2.)

Socrates also elsewhere urged that gambling and buffoonery are not industry and therefore not worthy, viz.:

"Concerning what idleness was, he said that he found most men did something, for that dice-players and buffoons did something; but he said that all such persons were idle, for it was in their power to go and do something better." (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 9.)

Seneca in his essay "On Providence," expresses a like opinion in these words,

"Labour calls for the best men; the senate often passes the whole day in debate, while at the same time, every scoundrel either amuses his leisure in the Campus Martius, or lurks in a tavern, or passes his time in some pleasant society." (Bk. i., c. v.)

Law and Order. The great variety and complexity of the city—and yet more of the larger state—and the necessity for preserving order by recognizing the claims of different classes, Socrates thus discusses:

"The others [*i.e.*, cities without unity] ought to be called by some grander name; for each of them is very many cities, and not a city, as they say in the game. In any case, there are two, hostile one to the other, the city of the poor, and the city of the rich; and each of these contains very many cities." (Republic, bk. iv.)

The necessity for preserving order by suppressing the insolent, whether merely truculent or in fact

rich and powerful, Xenophon's "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 2) represents the Sage to have enjoined in these words,

"Those who benefited others neither by word nor deed, and who were incapable of serving the army, or the state, or the common people, if they should ever be called upon to serve, should, especially if, in addition to their incapacity, they were of an insolent spirit, be curbed in every way, even though they might be ever so rich."

Aristotle went much further, putting the relatively modern adage "Ignorance of the law excuses no man" into these words: "Those also who are ignorant of legal regulations which they are bound to know, and which are not hard to know, they chastise." (Ethics, bk. iii., c. vii.); which he thus illustrated,

"They chastise for the very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self caused, to the drunken, for instance, penalties are double, because the origination in such cases lies in a man's own self, for he might have helped getting drunk, and this is the cause of his ignorance." (Bk. iii., c. vii.)

But Socrates, according to the "Memorabilia," (bk. i., 2) was much more in accord with the spirit of our own times, which views the man who errs through ignorance, as a peculiarly helpless victim; for he is reported as saying, "that he thought he

who confined another for ignorance, might justly be himself confined by those who knew what he did not know."

Great Wealth and Dire Poverty Both Evils. The worst evils of the state Socrates finds to be dire poverty on one hand and great riches on the other, of which he spoke convincingly in this dialogue, taken from the "Republic":

"Consider whether the other craftsmen are similarly injured and spoiled by these agencies.' 'What agencies do you mean?' 'Wealth,' I said, 'and poverty.' 'How so?' 'Thus: Do you think that a potter after he has grown rich will care to attend to his trade longer?' 'Certainly not.' 'But he will become more idle and careless than he was before?' 'Yes, much more.' 'Then does he not become a worse potter?' 'Yes, a much worse potter too.' 'On the other hand, if he is prevented by poverty from providing himself with tools or any other requisite of his trade, he will produce inferior articles and his sons or apprentices will not be taught their trade so well?' 'Inevitably.' 'Then both these conditions riches and poverty, deteriorates productions of the artisans, and the artisans themselves?' 'So it appears.' 'Then apparently we have found some other objects for the vigilance of our guardians, who must take every precaution that they may never evade their watch and steal into the city?' 'What are these?' 'Wealth,' I replied, 'and poverty; because the former produce luxury and idleness and in-

novation, and the latter, meanness and bad workmanship as well as innovation.'” (Republic, bk. iv.)

The remedy for this he finds, according to Plato in his “Republic,” in community of goods, saying: “That city then is best conducted in which the largest proportion of citizens apply the words ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’ similarly to the same objects.” (Republic, bk. v.)

This was certainly strongly Plato’s view; for in “The Laws” (bk. v., pt. ii.) he declares, “The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails the most widely the ancient saying that ‘friends have all things in common.’”

Socrates is quoted in the “Memorabilia,” as educating, with apparent approval, from Hippias this tribute to the laws handed down by immemorial custom:

“‘But are you aware, Hippias,’ continued Socrates, ‘that there are unwritten laws?’ ‘You mean those,’ said Hippias, ‘that are in force about the same points, everywhere.’ ‘Can you affirm, then, that men made those laws?’ ‘How could they,’ said Hippias, ‘when they could not all meet together, and do not all speak the same language?’ ‘Whom, then, do you suppose to have made these laws?’ ‘I believe,’ said he, ‘that it was the gods who made these laws for men, for among all men the first law is to venerate the gods.’” (Bk. iv., c. iv.)

In the same book, he is recorded to have put the spirit of concord above all others in importance in the state, thus: "The greatest blessing to states, moreover, is concord . . . without such unanimity, no state can be well governed, nor any family well regulated." (*Memorabilia*, bk. iv., 4.)

Obedience to the Laws. The paramount duty of the citizens, Socrates is reported by Plato, in "*Crito*" to have identified with loyal submission to the will of the state, even unto death itself; for he is represented as refusing to flee and thus to escape the unjust sentence which the judges had imposed upon him, on the ground that he owed allegiance to his city and her laws, even when, by an abuse of them, both the city and himself were so outrageously wronged, and as saying:

"Suppose the laws and the commonwealth were to come and appear to me as I was preparing to run away (if that is the right phrase to describe my escape) and were to ask: 'Tell us, Socrates, what have you in your mind to do? What do you mean by trying to escape, but to destroy us the laws, and the whole city, so far as in you lies? Do you think that a state can exist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law are of no force, and are disregarded and set at nought by private individuals?'" . . . Shall I reply: "But the state has injured me; it has decided my cause wrongly?" Shall we say that?' 'Certainly we will, Socrates.' 'And suppose the laws were to reply: "Was that our agreement? Or

was it that you would submit to whatever judgments the state should pronounce? . . . Or, are you too wise to see that your country is worthier, and more august, and more sacred, and holier, and held in higher honour both by the gods and by all men of understanding, than your father and your mother and all your other ancestors, and that it is your bounden duty to reverence it, and to submit to it, and to approach it more humbly than you would approach your father, when it is angry with you; and either to do whatever it bids you to do or to persuade it to excuse you; and to obey in silence if it orders you to endure stripes or imprisonment, or if it send you to battle to be wounded or to die? That is what is your duty. You must not give way, nor retreat, nor desert your post. In war, and in the court of justice, and everywhere, you must do whatever your city and your country bid you do, or you must convince them that their commands are unjust."''' (Crito.)

Military Service. "Both sexes will take the field together, and they will also carry with them to the wars such of their children as are strong enough, in order that, like the children of all other craftsmen, they may be spectators of those occupations in which, when grown up, they will themselves be engaged; and they will require them, besides looking on, to act as servants and attendants in all the duties of war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers." (Republic, bk. v.)

The foregoing declaration of Socrates indicates

that he was far from a "peace at any price" advocate. This is shown yet more emphatically by the following dialogue in the same connection:

"'If one of the soldiers deserts his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any such act of cowardice, must we not degrade him to the rank of an artisan, or an agricultural labourer?' 'Decidedly.' 'And if a soldier falls alive into the hands of the enemy, ought we not to make a present of him to any one that will have him, to do what he pleases with his booty?' 'Yes, by all means.' 'But if a soldier highly distinguishes himself and gains himself credit, ought he not, think you, in the first place, while the army is still in the field, to be crowned with a garland by each of the youths and children in turn, among his comrades in arms?'" (Republic, bk. v.)

Military Training. Xenophon records the following conversation between Pericles and Socrates, in which the Sage urged that there should be thorough military training of those who were to command:

"'Yet in military affairs,' observed Pericles, 'in which it is most requisite to act with prudence, and order, and obedience, they pay no regard to such duties.' 'It may be so,' returned Socrates, 'for perhaps in military affairs men who are greatly deficient in knowledge have the command of them. Do you not observe that of harp-players, choristers, dancers, wrestlers, or pancratiasts, no one ventures to assume the direction who has not requisite knowledge for it,

but that all who take the lead in such matters are able to show from whom they learned, the arts in which they are masters; whereas the most of our generals undertake to command without previous study.'” (*Memorabilia*, bk. iii., 6.)

Elsewhere in the “*Memorabilia*” he shows how imperatively requisite for the safety of the state such training is, in this passage:

“It is indeed unbecoming, young man, that he who wishes to be commander of an army in his country should neglect to learn the duties of that office when he has an opportunity of learning them; and such a person would be far more justly punished by his country than one who should contract to make statues for it, when he had not learned to make them.” (*Bk. iii., 1.*)

By such training, also, he did not mean merely instruction in military tactics, for in the following conversation in the same book, he calls for much more than this:

“‘He began,’ replied the youth, ‘with the same thing with which he ended; for he taught me tactics, and nothing else.’ ‘But,’ said Socrates, ‘how small a part of the qualifications of a general is this! For a general must be skillful in preparing what is necessary for war, able in securing provisions for his troops, a man of great contrivance and activity, careful, persevering, and sagacious; kind, and yet severe; open,

yet crafty; careful of his own, yet ready to steal from others; profuse, yet rapacious; lavish of presents, yet eager to acquire money; cautious, yet enterprising; and many other qualities there are, both natural and acquired, which he, who would fill the office of general with ability, must possess.'" (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 1.)

That one of the things in which he must be instructed is how to avoid wasting the lives of those whom he leads, the Sage affirms in this dialogue, also from the "Memorabilia" (bk. iii., 2.)

"Having met, on one occasion, a person who had been elected general, Socrates said to him, 'Why is it, do you think, that Homer has styled Agamemnon "shepherd of the people"? Is it not for this reason, that as a shepherd must be careful that his sheep be safe, and have food, and the object may be effected for which they are kept, so a general must take care that his soldiers be safe, and have provisions, and that the object be effected for which they serve?'"

The following is also given as an illustration of the results of applying reason to the solution of military problems:

"'What you have said, Socrates,' rejoined the youth, 'is an exact illustration of our practice; for in the field of battle we must place the bravest troops in the front and rear, and the cowardly in the middle, that they may be led on by those before them, and

pushed forward by those behind.' 'If indeed he has taught you to distinguish the brave and cowardly,' rejoined Socrates, 'that rule may be of use; but if not, what profit is there in what you have learned? For if he ordered you, in arranging a number of coins, to lay the best first and last, and the worst in the middle, and gave you no instructions how to distinguish the good and bad, his orders to you would be to no purpose. . . . If then we had to capture a sum of money, and were to place the most covetous men in front, should we not arrange them properly?' 'It appears so to me.' 'And what must generals do when entering on a perilous enterprise? Must they not place the most ambitious in front?' 'They at least,' said the man, 'are those who are ready to brave danger for the sake of praise; and they are by no means difficult to discover, but will be everywhere conspicuous and easy to be selected.'" (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 1.)

CHAPTER XV

DUTIES WITHIN THE FAMILY

SOCRATES found the tradition yet strong in Athens that the most sacred of all ties were those between father and son and the most binding duties those of a son toward his father. He speaks, in "Euthyphron," of this as follows,

"‘And what is this suit of yours, Euthyphron? Are you suing, or being sued?’ ‘I am suing.’ ‘Whom?’ ‘A man whom I am thought a maniac to be suing.’ ‘What? Has he wings to fly away with?’ ‘He is far enough from flying; he is a very old man.’ ‘Who is he?’ ‘He is my father.’ ‘Your father, my good sir?’ ‘He is indeed.’ ‘What are you prosecuting him for? What is the charge?’ ‘It is a charge of murder, Socrates.’ ‘Good heavens, Euthyphron! Surely the multitude are ignorant of what makes right!’”

Filial Piety. What Euthyphron was doing, was the most heinous of all possible offenses in the eyes of the ancients; Confucius condemned it no less than Socrates.

Cicero, in his essay "On Duties," says, "Our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to our country; our third, to parents and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest." (Bk. i., c. lrv.)

This view, also, Plato had adopted for himself in "The Laws," as follows: "Next comes the honour of living parents to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts." (Bk. iv., pt. ii.)

Seneca, in his essay "On Benefits," puts it thus,

"Mankind has assigned a peculiar sanctity to the position of parents, because it was advantageous that children should be reared, and people had to be tempted into undergoing the toil of doing so since the issue of their experiment was doubtful." (Bk. iii., II.)

Aristotle reasoned about it as follows, "In respect of maintenance, it is our duty to assist our parents in preference to all others as being their debtors, and because it is more honourable to succour in these respects the authors of our existence than ourselves." (Ethics, bk. ix., c. ii.)

And, Xenophon relates in his "Memorabilia," Socrates speaks thus concerning it,

"Do you not know that the state takes no account of any other species of ingratitude, nor allows any action at law for it, overlooking such as receive a favour and make no return for it; but that, if a person does not pay due regard to his parents, it imposes

a punishment on him, rejects his services, and does not allow him to hold the archonship, considering that such a person cannot piously perform the sacrifices offered for the country, or discharge any other duty with propriety and justice? Indeed, if any one does not keep up the sepulchers of his dead parents, the state inquires into it in the examinations of candidates for office." (Bk. ii., 2.)

That the father has a stronger claim upon his son than the son upon his father Aristotle asserts as follows,

"It may be judged never to be allowable for a son to disown his father, whereas a father may his son, because he that owes is bound to pay. Now a son can never, by anything he has done, fully requite the benefits first conferred on him by his father, and so is always a debtor. But they to whom anything is owed, may cast off their debtors; therefore the father may his son." (Ethics, bk. viii., c. xiii.)

Socrates was clear and insistent, according to Xenophon, regarding the inestimable blessing which parents confer upon their child, saying,

"Whom, then, can we find receiving greater benefits from any persons than children receive from their parents—children whom their parents have brought from non-existence into existence, to view so many beautiful objects, and to share in so many blessings, as the gods grant to men; blessings which appear to

us so inestimable, that we shrink, in the highest degree, from relinquishing them; and governments have made death the penalty for the most heinous crimes, in the supposition that they could not suppress in justice by the terror of any greater evil?" (*Memorabilia*, bk. ii., 2.)

The earlier and stronger love of a parent for his child, than of the child for its parent, Aristotle thus celebrates in his "Ethics,"

"The parents love their offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring them only after a lapse of time, when they have attained intelligence or instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have greater strength of affection than fathers." (*Bk. viii., c. xii.*)

That the love of a child for his parent once developed, is even loftier and more sublime, he affirms thus, in the same book,

"The affection felt by children towards parents, and men towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them, because these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are the causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been educated after they were brought into being." (*Ethics*, bk. viii., c. xii.)

According to Plato, however, Socrates held that the son, however dutiful, may justly find fault with

his father if negligent regarding his bringing-up; for he is reported, in "Laches," to have said, "We find fault with our fathers because they permitted us to live the life of rakes when we became lads, and they were busily employed about the affairs of others."

Conjugal Duties. Socrates, in describing the just man in the "Republic," (bk. iv.) said of him, "Again he is the last man in the world to be guilty of adultery."

The grave injury which one man does to another, when he destroys the chastity of his wife and thereby renders the paternity of children doubtful or at least questionable, could not well be overlooked by a philosopher who so celebrated the virtues of the just man and of the temperate and continent man.

Xenophon reports the following in a discourse of Socrates upon the traits which a man must possess in order to be fitted to rule,

"Does it not then, appear to you shameful for a man to yield to the same influence as the most senseless of animals, as adulterers, for instance, knowing that the adulterer is in danger of suffering what the law threatens and of being watched and disgraced if caught, yet enter into closets; and, though there are such dangers and dishonours hanging over the intriguer and so many occupations that will free him from the desire for sensual gratification, does it not seem to you the part of one tormented by an evil genius, to run nevertheless into imminent peril?" (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 1.)

The idea that conjugal fidelity is as binding upon a husband as upon a wife seems not to have been put forward by Socrates. Plato, however, in "The Laws," (c. viii.), says,

"And as to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house, duly named by sacred rites, whether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges, and he be deemed to be, as he truly is, a stranger."

Plutarch in his essay on "Conjugal Precepts," endorsed this view as follows:

"But more sacred than all these is the nuptial ploughing and sowing, in order to promote the procreation of children—for which reason it highly imports both the man and the woman, when bound together with the holy tie of wedlock, to abstain from unlawful and forbidden relations." Aristotle (Politics, bk. iv., c. viii., 16, 18) speaks to the same purpose, though more tolerantly.

Socrates, however, seems not to have been impressed with the theory of equality of the sexes in this regard; for in the "Republic" (bk. viii.) in discussing the evils of mob sway, he thus set forth one element of the general demoralization, viz. that women obtained equal liberty with men in sexual relations, "Also I had almost forgotten to mention

to what extent this liberty and equality are carried in the mutual relations subsisting between men and women."

That superior purity of character which, in order that paternity may be certain, must be a wife's most valued possession, is shadowed forth in his condemnation in the "Republic" (bk. iii.) of certain sorts of "plaintive melodies" because "they are useless even to women that [*i.e.*, if they] are to be virtuously bestowed."

Duty to Support Relatives. Among the traits of a simple and happy people, living an ideal life, he includes this, "not begetting children beyond their means, through a prudent fear of poverty or war." (Republic, bk. ii.); while in another place in the same book (bk. viii.) he excoriates those who "spend with a lavish hand on wives or any other object that may please them."

In the "Memorabilia," Xenophon gives a lengthy account of a colloquy of Socrates with Aristarchus concerning his family which was impoverishing him through their dependence upon him for support; from it the following passages are extracted:

"Socrates, on hearing this, replied, 'And how is it that Ceramon yonder, though maintaining a greater number of people, is not only able to procure what is necessary for himself and them, but gains so much more, also, as to be positively rich, while you, having many to support, are afraid lest you should all perish for want of necessities?' 'Because, as-

surely,' replied Aristarchus, 'he maintains slaves, while I have to support free-born persons.' . . . 'And which of the two,' inquired Socrates, 'do you consider to be the better, the free-born persons that are with you, or the slaves that are with Ceramon?' 'I consider the free persons with me as the better.' 'Is it not then a disgrace that he should gain abundance by means of the inferior sort, and that you should be in difficulties while having with you those of the better class?' 'Such certainly is the case; but it is not at all wonderful; for he supports artisans but I, persons of liberal education.'

"Artisans, then,' asked Socrates, 'are persons that know how to make something useful?' 'Unquestionably,' replied Aristarchus. "Is barley-meal then, useful?' 'Very.' 'Is bread?' 'Not less so.' 'And are men's and women's garments, coats, cloaks, and mantles useful?' 'They are all extremely useful.' 'And do those who are residing with you, then, not know how to make any of these things?' 'They know how to make them all, as I believe.' . . . 'And are you not aware that from the manufacture of one of these articles, that of barley-meal, Nausicydes supports not only himself and his household, but a great number of swine and oxen besides, and gains, indeed, so much more than he wants, that he often even assists the government with his money? Are you not aware that Cyrebus, by making bread, maintains his whole household, and lives luxuriously; that Demea, of Collytus, supports himself by making cloaks, Menon by making woolen cloaks, and that most of the Megarians live by making mantles?'

‘Certainly they do,’ said Aristarchus; ‘for they purchase barbarian slaves and keep them, in order to force them to do what they please; but I have with me free-born persons and relatives.’ . . .

“‘Then,’ added Socrates, ‘because they are free and related to you, do you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep? Among other free persons, do you see that those who live thus spend their time more pleasantly, and do you consider them happier, than those who practice the arts which they know, and which are useful to support life? Do you find that idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind, either for learning what it becomes them to know, or for remembering what they have learned, or for maintaining the health and strength of their bodies, or for acquiring and preserving what is useful for the support of life, and that industry and diligence are of no service at all? . . . Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you neither feel attached to your relatives, nor they to you, for you find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed with their company. With such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly inclination may be diminished. But if you take them under your direction, so that they may be employed, you will love them, when you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow attached to you, when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society; and, remembering past services with greater pleasure, you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and consequently grow

more attached and better disposed toward each other.'” (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 7.)

Eugenics. Socrates undoubtedly placed the test of a successful marriage and of the ethical quality of marriage in the sort of progeny that it produces. Thus, in the “Memorabilia,” (bk. ii., 2), he is quoted as saying,

“You do not surely suppose that men beget children merely to gratify their passions, since the streets are full, as well as the brothels, of means to allay desire; but what we evidently consider is, from what sort of women the finest children may be born to us and, uniting with them, we beget children.”

Elsewhere in the same book he shows that the marriage of father and daughter is not to be countenanced, because of the probable effect upon the children:

“‘Is it not also a law everywhere to honour parents?’ ‘It is so.’ ‘Is it not a law, too, that parents shall not intermarry with their children, nor children with their parents?’ ‘This does not as yet, Socrates, appear to me to be a law of the gods?’ ‘Why?’ ‘Because I find that some nations transgress it.’ . . . ‘Many others, too, they transgress,’ said Socrates; ‘but those who violate the laws made by the gods incur punishment which it is by no means possible for man to escape, as many transgressors of the laws made by men escape punishment, some by concealment, others by open violence.’

‘And what sort of punishment, Socrates,’ said he, ‘cannot parents escape who intermarry with their children, and children who intermarry with their parents?’ ‘The greatest of all punishments, by Jupiter,’ replied Socrates, ‘for what greater penalty can those who beget children incur, than to have poor children?’ ‘How then,’ said Hippias, ‘do they necessarily have poor children when nothing hinders but that they may be good themselves, and have children by good partners?’ ‘Because,’ returned Socrates, ‘it is not only necessary that those who have children by each other should be good, but that they should be in full bodily vigour. Or do you suppose that the seed of those who are at the height of maturity is similar to that of those who have not yet reached maturity, or to that of those who are far past it?’” (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 4.)

In the “Republic,” (bk. iii.) a like idea is presented in discussing the reasonable limits which Æsculapius set upon his exercise of the healing art, thus,

“Where the constitution was thoroughly diseased to the core, he would not attempt to protract a miserable existence by a studied regimen, drawing off from the system and again pouring into it a little at a time, and suffer his patients to beget children, in all probability as diseased as themselves.”

Plato has it in the “Republic” that Socrates went so far as to advocate as a feature of the ideal state the

assistance of the guardians of the state in the selection of mates; of this he says (bk. v.),

“It will be your duty, therefore, as their lawgiver, to select the women, just as you selected the men, and to place them together, taking care, as far as possible, that they shall be of similar nature. Now, inasmuch as the dwellings and mess-tables are all common, and no one possesses anything in the shape of private property, both sexes will live together; and in consequence of their indiscriminate association in active exercises, and in the rest of their daily life, they will be led, I imagine, by a constraining instinct to form alliances. . . . The necessity truly will not be that of mathematical demonstration, but that of life, which perhaps is more constraining than the other in its power to persuade and draw after it the mass of men. . . . Manifestly then our next care will be to make marriage-union as sacred a thing as we possibly can; and this sanctity will attach to the marriages which are most for the public good.”

The argument, however, that marriage is sanctified by being “for the public good” and is not a binding contract between individuals but a thing entered into, if rightly, for the production of superior children, Socrates does not exhaust by the mere mention of what would now be called “sexual selection” involved in “a constraining instinct to form alliances”; for subsequently Plato in the same book quotes Socrates further in the following dialogue:

“‘Do you agree with me that the prime of life may be reasonably reckoned at a period of twenty years for a woman, and thirty for a man?’ ‘Where do you place those years?’ ‘I should make it the rule for a woman to bear children to the state from her twentieth to her fortieth year; and for a man, after getting over the sharpest burst in the race of life, thenceforward to beget children to the state until he is fifty-five years old. . . . If then a man who is either above or under this age shall meddle with the business of begetting children for the commonwealth, we shall declare his act to be an offense against religion and justice; inasmuch as he is raising up a child for the state, who, should detection be avoided, instead of having been begotten under the sanction of those sacrifices and prayers, which are to be offered up at every marriage ceremonial, by priests and priestesses, and the whole city, to the effect that the children to be born may ever be more virtuous and more useful than their virtuous and useful parents, will have been conceived under cover of darkness by the aid of dire incontinence.’ ‘You are right.’ ‘The same law will hold, should a man, who is still of an age to be a father, meddle with a woman, who is also of the proper age, without the introduction of the magistrate: for we shall accuse him of raising up to the state an illegitimate, unsponsored, and unhallowed child.’” (Republic, bk. v.)

Socrates was himself the father of children in his old age; for when he drank the hemlock at seventy, it is related of him in “Phædo” that Xanthippe, his

wife, was found weeping beside him "with his child in her arms," and that "he had two sons quite little." Yet Xenophon, as has been seen, supplies statements of Socrates concerning the marriage of a father and his daughter which support the view that the arguments which Plato puts upon his Master's lips, really emanated from him.

Regulated Marriage. The sanctified marriage of which Socrates speaks, attended by ceremonial with sacrifices and prayers, is the union of one man with one woman, with a view to procreation; this is set forth more in detail in the following, which in the "Republic" precedes the foregoing:

"It follows from what has been already granted, that the best of both sexes ought to be brought together as often as possible, and the worst as seldom as possible, and that the issue of the former unions ought to be reared, and that of the latter abandoned, if the flock is to attain the first-rate excellence; and these proceedings ought to be kept a secret from all but the magistrates themselves, if the herd of guardians is also to be as free as possible from internal strife. . . . Then we shall have to ordain certain festivals, at which we shall bring together the brides and the bridegrooms, and we must have sacrifices performed, and hymns composed by our poets in strains appropriate to the occasion; but the number of marriages we shall place under the control of the magistrates, in order that they may, as far as they can, keep the population at the same point, taking into

consideration the effects of war and disease, and all such agents, that our city may, to the best of our power, be prevented from becoming either too great or too small."

The temporary character of these monogamic relationships is plainly indicated by the following, spoken in the same connection:

"And those of your young men who distinguish themselves in the field or elsewhere, will receive, along with other privileges and rewards, more liberal permission to associate with the women, in order that, under colour of this pretext, the greatest number of children may be the issue of such parents." (Republic, bk. v.)

That this union was not to be a permanent bond, but instead a mere "love-match," prompted by the inclinations of those immediately interested but under the guidance of the wisest persons in the community, is plain, also, from the following:

"The last law and those which preceded it involve, as I conceive, another to this effect.' 'What is it?' 'That these women shall be, without exception, the common wives of these men, and that no one shall have a wife of his own; likewise that the children shall be common, and that the parent shall not know his child, nor the child his parent.'" (Republic, bk. v.)

Subsequently, in the same book, Socrates is reported to have described what he meant by individual unions or marriages in the course of the communal marriage. This he did in discussing the reception which should be given to men who distinguish themselves in war; this portion of that dialogue runs thus:

“‘But I suppose you hardly extend your approbation to my next proposition:’ ‘What is that?’ ‘That he should kiss and be kissed by all.’ ‘Most certainly I do; and I would add to the law that, during the continuance of the campaign, no one whom he has a mind to kiss, be permitted to refuse him the satisfaction in order that, if any soldier happens to entertain an admiration for either a male or female comrade, he may be the more stimulated to carry off the meed of valour.’ ‘Good,’ I replied, ‘and we have already said that a brave man will be allowed to enter into marriage relations more frequently than others will, and to exercise more than the usual liberty of choice in such matters, so that as many children as possible may be obtained from a father of this character.’” (Republic, bk. v.)

Socrates understood the difficulties which human nature opposes to such a program but considered that reason should overcome them and replace the instinct of appropriation with the recognition of mankind's higher claim; this is clear from this statement in answer to an inquiry, by what means such a rule of reason could be made effective:

“‘Education,’ I said, ‘and rearing. For if by a good education they be made reasonable men, they will readily see through all these questions, as well as others which we pass by for the present, such as the relations between the sexes, marriage, and the procreation of children; in all which things they will see that the proverb ought, as far as possible, to be followed, which says, “Among friends everything is common property.”’” (Republic, bk. iv.)

The importance of community of wives, along with community of goods, as a means for maintaining peaceful and mutually helpful relations among the citizens, the Sage is represented, also in the “Republic,” to have urged in the following,

“Will not the regulations laid down before, and still more those we are now describing, make men genuine guardians, and prevent them from tearing the city asunder by applying the term ‘mine’ each to a different object, instead of ‘ours’ to the same, and by severally dragging to their several distinct abodes whatever they can acquire independently of the rest, and, amongst other things, separate wives and children, thus creating exclusive pleasures and pains by their exclusive interests; causing them, on the contrary, to tend unitedly to a common centre, by the fact of holding but one opinion concerning what is their own, and thus to be, as far as is possible, simultaneously affected by pleasure and pain?” (Republic, bk. iv.)

In another place in the same book, Socrates is represented to have concluded an argument for the ideal state with this tribute to community marriage, "Then we have discovered that the highest perfection of the state is due to the community of wives and children, which is to prevail among our auxiliaries." (Republic, bk. v.)

The Contrary View. Aristotle formed an opinion opposed to that accredited by his preceptor, Plato, to Socrates, viz.: "Between husband and wife there is thought to be friendship by a law of nature, man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in communities" (Ethics, bk. viii., c. xii.); upon which idea he descants in the same connection, explaining the reasons therefor, as he sees them, in the following,

"And procreation is more common to him and other animals, all the other animals have communion thus far; but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of procreation, but also with a view to life in general, because in this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to the man, others to the woman. Thus they help one the other, putting what is peculiar to each into the common stock." (Ethics, bk. viii., c. xii.)

Something of this notion may perhaps be traced in this saying of Socrates, reported by Xenophon in his "Memorabilia," "Do you not see, too, that to other animals they have so given the pleasure of sexual

intercourse as to limit them to a certain season of the year, but that they allow them to us uninterruptedly till extreme old age?" (Bk. i., 4.)

Socrates, as has been seen, taught that a good man must be amenable to the laws, no matter what his privately-held view; and indeed, imbued with this opinion, he refused proffered means of escape, when unjustly sentenced to death under the laws of Athens, because he deemed it his sacred duty not to disregard those laws.

What he said, therefore, in Plato's "Republic," concerning ideal marriage, is not to be taken, according to his own adjurations, as a rule of action in a society which is not organized upon the principles laid down in the "Republic," but rather to indicate what he believed to be correct principles upon which, by the consent of mankind society should be reformed; and this is, indeed, obvious since no worse fate in a society which visits scorn and shame upon a child born out of wedlock, could attend a man's progeny than the conditions which his disregard of the established law and custom would create.

Filial Piety in the Ideal State. According to Plato, Socrates held that under community marriage, the child should not be permitted to know who is his father or his mother. This is well set forth in the following dialogue:

"And, as fast as the children are born, they will be received by the officers appointed for the purpose,

whether men or women, or both: for I presume that the state-officers also will be held in common both by men and women.'

"'They will.'

"'Well, these officers, I suppose, will take the children of good parents, and place them in the general nursery under the charge of certain nurses, living apart in a particular quarter of the city; while the issue of inferior parents, and all imperfect children that are born to the others, will be concealed as is fitting, in some mysterious and unknown hiding-place.'

"'Yes, if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.'

"'And will not these same officers have to superintend the rearing of the children, bringing the mothers to the nursery when their breasts are full, but taking every precaution that no mother shall know her own child, and providing other women that have milk, if the mothers have not enough; and must they not take care to limit the time during which the mothers are to suckle the children, committing the task of sitting up at night, and the other troubles incident to infancy, to nurses and attendants?'"
(Republic, bk. v.)

It might at first blush be considered that the whole superstructure of filial piety must fall; but the Sage, with his eye upon that veneration for their elders, which the youths of Sparta who were alleged to have been thus reared in ignorance of their paternity, were said to exhibit toward all the elders of the com-

munity, transferred the obligation of the child from the individual father and mother to the entire generation, through whose forethought he had been well-born into a world prepared to welcome him and by whose care and labours he was reared and educated. This view is set forth in the following interesting dialogue:

“‘Well, could any of your guardians regard or describe one of his fellow-guardians as a stranger?’

“‘Certainly not; for they must look upon every one whom they meet as either a brother, or a sister, or a father, or a mother, or a son, or a daughter, or one of the children or parents of these.’

“‘Excellently said; but answer me one more question. Shall you be satisfied with instituting family names, or shall you further require them to act in every instance in accordance with the names,—enjoining in the treatment of the fathers, all that it is usual to enjoin towards fathers, as that a child shall honour, succour, and be subject to his parents, otherwise it will be worse for him both before Heaven and before men; inasmuch as his conduct, if he acts differently, will be an outrage upon religion and justice? Will you have these commandments, or any others, sounded from the first by all the citizens in the ears of the children, with reference to those who are pointed out to them as fathers, and to all other relations?’

“‘These, certainly; for it would be ridiculous if family names were merely uttered with the lips, without actions to correspond.’

““This then is the state, above all others, in which, when good or evil betides an individual, every member will with one accord apply the expression spoken of just now, saying, ‘It is well with mine,’ or ‘It is ill with mine.’”” (Republic, bk. v.)

CHAPTER XVI

RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF WOMEN

SOCRATES affords the first recorded instance of advocacy of precisely equal rights and duties for men and women. Regarding this, he was, according to Plato, most outspoken; and Xenophon also testifies to much that supports the view that this was Socrates' opinion and not merely Plato's.

Thus in the "Republic," (bk. v.), Socrates is represented as inquiring in a manner indicating what he thought about the matter:

"Do you think that the females of watch dogs ought to guard the flock along with the males, and hunt with them, and share in all their other duties, or that the females ought to stay at home, because they are disabled by having to breed and rear the cubs, while the males are to labour and be charged with all the care of the flocks?"; and in the same book (bk. vii.) he says, when talking of those specially trained and fitted for public office, "Say leading women, too, Glaucon; for do not suppose that my remarks were intended to apply at all more to men than to women, so long as we can find women whose talents are equal to the situation."

To be Educated like Men. Socrates also inculcated the principle that women should receive the same education as men, saying, "If the question is how to render a woman fit for the office of guardian, we shall not have one education for men, and another for women, especially as the nature to be wrought upon is the same in both cases." (Republic, bk. v.)

He did not shrink even from applying this to military education as well as to all other branches, as appears from the following colloquy:

"If then we are to employ the women in the same duties as the men, we must give them the same instructions,' 'Yes.' 'To the men we gave music and gymnastics.' 'Yes.' 'Then we must train the women also in the same two arts, giving them besides a military education, and treating them in the same way as the men.'" (Republic, bk. v.)

Socrates is also represented by Plato in the "Republic" to have held that no occupation is exclusively masculine or feminine, saying of this (bk. v.):

"None of the occupations which comprehend the ordering of a state belong to woman as woman, nor yet to man as man; but natural gifts are to be found here and there, in both sexes alike; and, so far as her nature is concerned, the woman is admissible to all pursuits as well as the man; though in all of them the woman is weaker than the man."

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This also is not a mere chance saying, but the result of a careful inquiry from which he set out by premising,

“If, then, the male and the female sex appear to differ in reference to any art, or other occupation, we shall say that such occupation must be appropriated to the one or the other; but if we find the difference between the sexes to consist simply in the parts they respectively bear in the propagation of the species, we shall assert that it has not yet been by any means demonstrated that the difference between man and woman touches our purpose.” (Republic, bk. v.)

This is certainly a fairer picture, from our modern point of view, of tests of qualities of a maiden worth while, than the things that Epictetus in the following asserted to exist with a view to attractiveness for marriage only:

“From the age of fourteen years women are flattered and worshipped by men. Seeing thus that there is nothing else for them but to serve the pleasure of men, they begin to beautify themselves, and to place all their hopes in this.” (Encheiridion, xl.)

Both as regards the variety of things which a woman should be taught, according to her talents and application, and, as regards her part in the activities of life and particularly her fellowship and co-oper-

ation with men in all the offices of society and government, the following colloquy of the Sage with one of his disciples, reported by Plato in the "Republic," is most illuminating:

"We shall hold, I imagine, that one woman may have talents for medicine, and another be without them; and that one may be musical, and another unmusical.' 'Undoubtedly.' 'And shall we not also say, that one woman may have qualifications for gymnastic exercises, and for war, and another be unwarlike, and without a taste for gymnastics?' 'I think we shall.' 'Again; may there not be a love of knowledge in one and distaste for it in another? And may not one be spirited, and another spiritless?' 'True again.' 'If that be so, there are some women who are fit, and others who are unfit, for the office of guardian. For were not those the qualities that we selected, in the case of the men, as marking their fitness for that office?' 'Yes, they were.' 'Then as far as the guardianship of a state is concerned, there is no difference between the natures of the man and of the woman, but only various degrees of weakness and strength.' 'Apparently there is none.' 'Then we shall have to select duly qualified women also, to share in the life and official labours of the duly qualified men; since we find that they are competent to the work, and of kindred nature with the man.'" (Republic, bk. v.)

That this equality of the sexes is also wisest and best, not as an occasional exception but in all cases,

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and in no sense a violation of the relations that should subsist between the sexes, Socrates attests in the following:

“Then you concede the principle, that the women are to be put upon the same footing as the men, according to our description, in education, in producing children and in watching over the other citizens, and that, whether they remain at home or are sent into the field, they are to share the duties of guardianship with the men, and join with them in the chase like dogs, and have everything in common with them so far as is at all possible, and that in so doing they will be following the most desirable course, and not violating the natural relation which ought to govern the mutual fellowship of sexes?” (Republic, bk. v.)

Duties in Free Relations. Though Socrates was, as has been seen, far from teaching that, except when the ideal state should be established, promiscuity in sexual intercourse is tolerable in woman, yet he was not blind to the actual facts as they then were in Athens, regarding this matter.

But out of even the freest relations, according to his view, arise duties and obligations which must on no account be neglected; to this extent, though he elsewhere taught that certain virtues are absolute, he urged the relativity of obligations.

He sets forth this principle in general terms in this dialogue, reported by Xenophon:

“‘Shall we thus, too, Euthydemus,’ said he, ‘inquire what is good?’ ‘How?’ asked Euthydemus. ‘Does the same thing appear to you to be beneficial to everybody?’ ‘No.’ ‘And does not that which is beneficial to one person appear to you to be something hurtful to another?’ ‘Assuredly.’ ‘Would you say, then, that anything is good that is not beneficial?’ ‘I would not.’ ‘What is beneficial, therefore, is good, to whomsoever it is beneficial?’” (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 6.)

In Athens at the time of Socrates, there were but three positions possible to a woman: first, if a Greek of good family, in a cloistered home, confined to the narrow duties of the household; second, if taken in war or born of a slave mother, as a slave, the absolute property of her master and subject to his will, sexually as otherwise; or, if a freedwoman or a freewoman because not Greek, performing the function of mistress or courtesan if she would, and as such, at liberty to associate without restraint with those who were attracted to her society, not infrequently the greatest minds of that resplendent age.

Socrates was not intolerant of these conditions, although he by no means gave them his approval, for his own principles were austere and his own life spotless. But he saw, and appreciated, that, in the words of an American poet, “new occasions teach new duties” and that meretricious, as well as meritorious, relations import obligations. Moreover, he was far from condemning, because they were such,

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the "Hetairai." Aspasia, for instance, was a woman whose friendship he cherished, as that of Pericles, himself; and, once a human relation was established, whether or not he deemed it right to establish it, he was concerned only as to the duties that attend it, as witnesses the following conversation with Theodota, afterward the mistress of Alcibiades, who performed for him the pious ceremony of reducing his remains to ashes:

"And do you advise me, too,' said she, 'to weave a net?' 'Yes,' said he, 'for you ought not to think that you will catch friends, the most valuable prey that can be taken, without art. Do you not see how many arts hunters use to catch hares, an animal of but little worth?' . . .

"By what art of this kind, then,' said she, 'can I catch friends?' 'If,' said he, 'instead of a dog, you got somebody to track and discover the lovers of beauty, and the wealthy, and who, when he has found them, will contrive to drive them into your nets.' 'And what nets have I?' said she.

"You have one at least,' he replied, 'and one that closely embraces its prey, your person; and in it you have a mind, by which you understand how you may gratify a person by looking at him, and what you may say to cheer him, and learn that you ought to receive with transport him who shows concern for you, and to shut out him who is insolent, to attend carefully on a friend when he is ill, to rejoice greatly with him when he has succeeded in anything honourable, and to cherish affection in your whole soul

for the man who sincerely cares for you." (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 2.)

Thus he was far from adopting the "outcast" theory that such relations absolve one from every ethical obligation.

The universal testimony of all who knew Socrates, is that his own life was free not only from any breach of the law of Athens, which would not have proscribed intimacy with slave, mistress or courtesan, but from any departure from those standards of thought and conduct, void of all sensuality, which he repeatedly set for himself and others.

The Love of Woman. In "The Symposium" Socrates relates with appreciation and approval, what another woman, Diotima of Mantinea, revealed to him concerning the true nature of the love of woman:

"When a man loves the beautiful, what does he love?" I answered her, "That the beautiful may be his." "Still," she said, "the answer suggests a further question, which is this: What is given by the possession of beauty?" "That," I replied, "is a question to which I have no answer ready." "Then," she said, "Let me put the word "good" in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question: What does he who loves the good, desire?" "The possession of the good," I said. "And what does he gain who possesses the good?" "Happiness", I replied, "there is no difficulty in answering that." Diotima continued, "You hear people say that lovers are seeking for the half of themselves; but I say that they are seeking neither for the half, nor for the whole, unless the

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half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love them not because they are their own, but because they are good, and dislike them not because they are another's, but because they are evil. There is nothing which men love but the good. Do you think that there is?" (The Symposium.)

The discussion proceeded, as follows:

"‘Then,’ she said, ‘the conclusion of the whole matter is, that men love the good.’ ‘Yes,’ I said. ‘To which may be added that they love the possession of the good?’ ‘Yes, that may be added.’ ‘And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?’ ‘That may be added, too.’ ‘Then, love,’ she said, ‘may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?’ ‘That is most true,’ I said.” (The Symposium.)

The wondrous power of sexual selection (always more powerful in the female than in the male; for, even among human beings where male selection of beauty is at its highest, the hybrids almost always spring from mothers of the lower caste whose aspirations, as well as the relative indifference of males of the higher caste, are thereby manifested), Diotima, as related by Socrates, discovered and celebrated more than two thousand years before Darwin, in the following:

“There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation; and this procreation must be in beauty and not in deformity. And this is the mystery of man and woman, which is a divine thing, for conception and generation are a principle of immortality in the mortal creature. And in the inharmonical they can never be. But the deformed is always inharmonical with the divine, and the beautiful, harmonious. Beauty then is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore, when approaching beauty, the conceiving power is propitious, diffuse and benign, and begets and bears fruit; on the appearance of foulness, she frowns and contracts in pain, and is averted and morose, and shrinks up, and not without a pang refrains from conception.” (The Symposium.)

The philosopher, Epicurus, adopted this view, which is part of the reason, no doubt, why, on the authority of Lucretius, the Latin poet, in whose poem is found the only fairly complete extant statement of the ancients regarding what the Epicurean doctrine really was, the credit of anticipating Darwin as regards the principles of evolution is given to Epicurus, though Socrates enunciated it several generations earlier.

The tribute to the power and meaning of feminine love, also, which is found in Lucretius, is not truer or better deserved than that of Diotima nor does it so fully interpret the significance of that love. It is contained in the following invocation addressed to Venus:

“For lo, no sooner come the soft and glowing
Days of the spring and all the air is stirred
With amorous breaths of zephyrs freshly blowing,
Than the first prelude of Thy power is heard
On all sides in aerial music flowing
Out of the throat of every pairing bird;
And every songster feels, on every tree,
Its small heart pulsing with the power of Thee.

“Next the herds feel Thee; and the wild fleet races
Bound o’er the fields, that smile in the bright weather,
And swim the streaming floods in fordless places,
Led by Thy chain and captive in Thy tether.
At last through seas and hills Thine influence passes,
Through field and flood and all the world together
And the birds’ leafy homes; and Thou dost fire
Each to renew his kind with sweet desire.

“Wherefore since Thou, Oh Lady, only Thou
Art she who guides the world upon its way
Nor can aught rise without Thee anyhow
Up into the clear borders of the day,
Neither can aught without Thee ever grow
Lovely and sweet—to Thee, to Thee I pray—
Aid and be near Thy suppliant as he sings
Of nature and the secret ways of things!”

(Lucretius “Upon the Nature of Things.”)

Love Yearns for Immortality. That this conatus, moving toward the perpetuation and improvement of excellence, is not confined to human beings who possess reason, but is found everywhere in nature and truly constitutes what Darwin rediscovered as

“sexual selection,” Diotima is reported by Socrates to have shown in these words:

“‘What is the reason, Socrates, of this love, and the attendant desire? See you now how all animals, birds as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love;—this begins with the desire of union, to which is added the care of offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their offspring. Man may be supposed to do this from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?’ Again I replied, that I did not know. She said to me, ‘And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?’ ‘But that,’ I said ‘Diotima, is the reason why I come to you, because, as I have told you already, I am aware that I want a teacher; and I wish that you would explain to me this and the other mysteries of love.’ ‘Marvel not at this,’ she said, ‘if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have already admitted; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal; and this is only to be attained by generation, because the new is always left in the place of the old. And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body or mortal anything partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of

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their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.’” (The Symposium.)

In her conversation with the Sage, also, she proceeds to show that it is not the love of beauty only but also the love of generating or creating beauty and rendering it immortal, thus:

“‘For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only.’ ‘What then?’ ‘The love of generation and birth in beauty.’ ‘Yes,’ I said. ‘Yes, indeed,’ she replied. ‘But why of birth?’ I said. ‘Because to the mortal, birth is a sort of eternity and immortality,’ she replied; ‘and as has been already admitted, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good, if love is of the everlasting possession of the good.’” (The Symposium.)

It Leads to the Heights. The kinship of this love to the love of beauty which perpetuates itself by kindling that love in the bosoms of others, Diotima affirms in these burning sentences:

“He who, under the influence of true love rising upward from these, begins to see that beauty is not far from the end. And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps, along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and from fair actions to

fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is." (The Symposium.)

And the uppermost reaches of this elevation of soul which takes hold, through sexual selection, upon all living creatures and directs them by evolution along the path to beauty, this woman-instructor of the greatest of all human intellects describes thus:

"But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colours and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty, divine and simple, and bringing into being and educating true creations of virtue and not idols only? Do you not see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eyes of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, no images of beauty, but realities; for he has hold, not of an image but of a reality, and bringing forth and educating true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may." (The Symposium.)

CHAPTER XVII

DUTIES TOWARD FRIENDS

SOCRATES taught that no name is higher than of friend. Xenophon represents him to have spoken thus of one's obligations to friends and the joy that should attend their performance,

“Such information, then, I may communicate regarding you to such as you may wish to make your friends; but if you enable me also to say concerning you, that you are attentive to your friends, that you delight in nothing so much as in the possession of good friends, that you pride yourself on the honourable conduct of your friends not less than at your own, that you rejoice at the good fortune of your friends not less than at your own, that you are never weary of contriving means by which good fortune may come to your friends and that you think it the great virtue of a man to surpass his friends in doing them good and his enemies in doing them harm, I think that I shall be a very useful assistant to you in gaining the affections of worthy friends.” (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 6.)

This, of course, does not mean that one has done another a kindness merely in order to secure a return,

for such is its own reward, as Marcus Aurelius well says in this, "When thou hast done a good act and another has received, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return?" (Meditations, c. vii.)

Aristotle puts it thus in his "Ethics," "No one would choose to live without friends, though he should have all the other good things in the world" (bk. viii., c. i.); and Cicero, in his essay "On Friendship," in these words: "Who, in heaven's name, would choose a life of the greatest wealth and abundance on condition of neither loving nor being beloved by any creature?"

Securing a Friend. Seneca thus points out the pre-requisite to securing a friend, "If you wish those whom you lay under an obligation to be grateful to you, you must not merely confer benefits upon them, but you must also love them" (On Benefits, bk. ii., c. xi.); and the value of a friend, enormously higher than all other earthly possessions, Socrates thus extols:

"What the hands do, what the eyes foresee, what the ears hear, what the feet accomplish, for each individual, his friend, of all such services, fails to perform no one; and often-times, what a person has not effected for himself, or has not seen, or has not heard, or has not accomplished, a friend has succeeded in executing for his friend; and yet, while people try to foster trees for the sake of their fruit, the greater portion of mankind are heedless and neglect-

ful of that most productive possession which is called a friend." (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 4.)

What one must not do to obtain a friend is indicated aptly by Socrates in this passage from the same book:

"‘But why,’ said Critobulus, ‘do you say this to me, as if you were not at liberty to say of me anything you please?’ ‘No, by Jupiter,’ replied Socrates, ‘I have no such liberty, according to a remark that I once heard from Aspasia; for she said that skilful matchmakers, by reporting with truth good points of character, had great influence in leading people to form unions, but that those who said what was false, did no good by their praises, for that such as were deceived hated each other and the match maker alike; and as I am persuaded that this opinion is correct, I think that I ought not to say, when I praise you, anything that I cannot utter with truth.’ . . . ‘And whether, Critobulus,’ said Socrates, ‘should I appear to serve you more by extolling you with false praises, or by persuading you to endeavour to become a truly deserving man?’” (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 6.)

What Constitutes Friendship? Aristotle thus trenchantly characterizes that which constitutes friendship, “Friendship is thought properly to consist in loving rather than in being loved” (Ethics, bk. viii., c. viii.); and defines a friend as follows, “People define a friend to be ‘one who intends, and does, what is good (or what he believes to be good) to

another for that other's sake.'" (Ethics, bk. ix., c. iv.)

In "The Laws" (bk. v., pt. ii.), Plato puts it thus:

"And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do him greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their good will in the intercourse of life."

Marcus Aurelius thus urges that a man should not be dependent upon his friends, but should be self-reliant, "He is poor, who has need of another, and has not from himself all things which are useful for life." (Meditations, iv.) The following from the "Ethics" of Aristotle (bk. ix., c. xi.) urges great caution and forbearance in calling upon friends for aid, "We ought to call in friends readily on occasion of good fortune, because it is noble to be ready to do good to others; but on occasion of bad fortune we should do so with reluctance."

Cicero asks significantly, in his essay "On Friendship," "Is it weakness and want of means that make friendship desired? I mean, is its object an interchange of good offices, so that each may give that in which he is strong, and receive that in which he is weak?" Aristotle, in his "Ethics," remarks respecting this, "They who are friends because of advantage commonly part when the advantage ceases; for, in reality, they never were friends of one another, but of the advantage" (bk. vii., c. v.); and the true character of friendship he thus describes:

“But to the friend they say, one should wish all good for his sake. And when men do thus wish good to another (he not reciprocating the feeling), people call them ‘kindly,’ because friendship they describe as being ‘Kindliness between persons who reciprocate it.’” (Bk. viii., c. iii.)

How one should behave respecting his own ingratitude and that of another, Seneca thus depicts:

“Worse than all these is the ungrateful man, except we consider that all these crimes flow from ingratitude, without which hardly any great wickedness has ever grown to full stature. Be sure that you guard against this as the greatest of crimes in yourself, but pardon it as the least of crimes in another.” (On Benefits, bk. i., c. x.)

Cicero, in his essay “On Friendship,” declares, “There can be nothing more utterly subversive of friendship than flattery, adulation, and base compli-ance;” and again, “It is not then properly friendship at all when the one will not listen to the truth, and the other is prepared to lie.”

Aristotle contrasts worthy and unworthy friendship, thus, “He is the basest of men who practices vice not only in his own person, but toward his friends also; but he, the best who practices virtue not merely in his own person, but toward his neighbor.” (Ethics, bk. v., c. ii.) Cicero affirms of this, “Without virtue we can obtain neither friendship nor anything else desirable.” (On Friendship.)

The friendship which should flow from a heart full

of gratitude, which only the highest souls may know, and the result of conferring a great boon upon the egotistic, are contrasted in these two passages from Seneca's essay "On Benefits": "Receive a benefit, embrace it, rejoice, not that you have received it, but that you are under obligations for it, and must return it." (Bk. ii., xxxv.) "Even ungrateful men complain of ingratitude, some of them become our bitterest enemies, not merely after receiving benefits from us, but because they have received them." (Bk. iii., i.)

That envy, as well as ingratitude, is the vain thought of the proud and selfish and will be directed toward their friends, Xenophon reports Socrates as asserting, thus,

"Considering what envy was, he decided it to be a certain uneasiness, not such as arises, however, at the ill success of friends, nor such as is felt at the good success of enemies, but those only, he said, were envious who were annoyed at the good success of their friends." (Memorabilia, bk. iii., 9.)

Here are pearls from Cicero's essay "On Friendship," illustrating the limits of the favours which may rightly be conferred upon a friend:

"We may then lay down this rule of friendship—neither ask nor consent to do what is wrong."

"We should ask from friends, and do for friends, only what is good."

"Nature has given us friendship as the handmaid of virtue, not as a partner in guilt."

"The real limit to be observed in friendship is this: the characters of two friends must be stainless."

Friendship Impossible to Evil Men. Aristotle in his "Ethics" (bk. ix., c. xii.) thus reverts to the same topic, "Friendship of the wicked comes to be depraved; for, being unstable, they share in what is bad, and become depraved in being made like to one another." Socrates is reported by Plato in "Phædrus" to have put it even stronger, thus, "It was never destined for the bad to be friends of the bad, or the good aught but friendly to the good."

In Aristotle's "Ethics" is found this sentiment:

"There is no obligation to be a bad man's friend, nor in fact ought one to be such, for one ought not to be a lover of evil, nor to be assimilated to what is base, which would be implied, because as we have said before, like is friendly to like." (Bk. ix., c. iii.)

and also this:

"It is plain then that the wicked man cannot be in the position of a friend even towards himself, because he has in himself nothing which can excite the sentiment of friendship. If, then, to be thus is exceedingly wretched, it is a man's duty to flee from wickedness with all his might and to strive to be good, because thus may he be friends with

himself and may come to be a friend to another.”
(Bk. ix., c. iv.)

Yet he inculcates the duty of seeking to reclaim the fallen friend, thus:

“Are we then to break with him instantly? Perhaps not in all cases—only where our friends are incurably depraved; but when there is a chance of amendment, we are bound to aid in repairing the moral character of our friends, even more than their substance, in proportion as it is better and more closely related to friendship.” (Ethics, bk. ix., c. iii.)

Aristotle says further of this matter, “Disinterestedly, for the sake of one another, plainly the good alone can be friends.” (Ethics, bk. viii., c. v.)

Cicero, in his essay, “On Friendship” is as clear and unequivocal as Socrates, affirming: “Friendship can exist only between good men.”

The whole subject, Xenophon has Critobulus discuss thus in a conversation with Socrates:

“‘When I reflect on these differences,’ continued Critobulus, ‘I am quite in despair about the acquisition of friends, for I see that the bad cannot be friends with one another; for how can the ungrateful, or careless, or avaricious, or faithless, or intemperate, be friends to each other? Indeed the bad appear to me to be altogether disposed by nature to be mutual enemies rather than friends. . . . Again, the bad, as you observe, can never harmonize in friendship

with the good; for how can those who commit bad actions be friends with those who abhor such actions? And yet, if those also who practice virtue fall into dissensions with one another about preëminence in their respective communities, and even hate each other through envy, who will ever be friends, or among what class of mankind shall affection and attachment be found?" (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 6.)

To which Socrates replied, in part, as follows:

"But, nevertheless, friendship insinuating itself through all these hindrances unites together the honourable and good; for such characters, through affection for virtue, prefer the enjoyment of a moderate competency without strife, to the attainment of unlimited power by means of war; they can endure hunger and thirst without discontent, and take only a fair share of meat and drink, and, though delighted with the attractions of youthful beauty, they can control themselves, so as to forbear from offending those whom they ought not to offend. . . . By laying aside all avaricious feelings too, they can not only be satisfied with their lawful share of the common property, but can even assist one another. They can settle their differences, not only without mutual offence, but even to their mutual benefit. They can prevent their anger from going so far as to cause them repentance; and envy they entirely banish, by sharing their own property with their friends, and considering that of their friends as their own." (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 6.)

Cicero, in his essay "On Friendship," thus denounces doing wrong for a friend's sake, as wholly unjustifiable, "The plea of having acted in the interests of a friend is not a valid excuse for a wrong action. For, seeing that a belief in a man's virtue is the original cause of friendship, friendship can hardly remain if virtue be abandoned."

Xenophon records this injunction of Socrates:

"It would be well for each of us to examine himself to consider of what value he is in the estimation of his friends; and to try to be of as much value to them as possible, in order that his friends may be less likely to desert him; for I often hear one man saying that his friend has abandoned him and another, that a person whom he thought to be his friend has preferred a mina to him." (*Memorabilia*, bk. ii., 5.)

Socrates' own attitude toward them who, by reason of their honour and virtue, were valued by him as friends, he thus set forth in the same book:

"But strive with good courage, Cristobulus, to be good yourself, and, having become so, endeavour to gain the friendship of men of honour and virtue. Perhaps I myself also may be able to assist you in this pursuit of the honourable and virtuous, from being naturally disposed to love; since, for whatever persons I conceive a liking, I devote myself with ardour, and with my whole mind, to love them, and

be loved in return by them, regretting their absence to have mine regretted by them, and longing for their society while they on the other hand long for mine.” (Memorabilia, bk. ii., 6.)

CHAPTER XVIII

DUTY TO SELF

SOCRATES, as has been seen, showed in "Phædo" that abstract conceptions of right are innate in all reasoning beings. He first demonstrated it as regards the conception of abstract equality and then proceeded to say, "Our present reasoning does not refer only to equality. It refers just as much to absolute good, and absolute beauty, and absolute justice, and absolute holiness." (Phædo.)

The Absolutes. In the same conversation, Cebes, one of those with whom Socrates was talking, is reported as saying: "If you question men about anything in the right way, they will answer you correctly of themselves. But they would not have been able to do that, unless they had had within themselves knowledge and right reason." (Phædo.)

Socrates was clear that the qualities of the human soul are due to experience in previous existences. This, he is represented by Plato in "Philebus," as arguing, thus:

"What then, is it possible that the person, who is empty for the first time, should apprehend, from any quarter, either from sense or memory, a filling

of that, by which he neither is at the present time affected, nor ever was affected heretofore?"

In "Phædrus," he ascribes it to the memory of noble associations in the infinity of the past,

"And this is nothing more nor less than a recollection of those things which in time past our soul beheld when it travelled with a god, and, looking high over what we now call real, lifted up its head into the region of eternal essence."

Epictetus considered that man has an inborn notion of right and wrong, saying,

"For we come into the world having by nature no idea of a right-angled triangle, or a quarter-tone, or a semi-tone, but by a certain tradition of arts we learn each of these things. And thus those who know them not, do not suppose that they know them. But good and evil, and nobleness and baseness, and the seemly and the unseemly, and happiness and misfortune and what is our concern and what is not, and what ought to be done and what not—who hath come into the world without an implanted notion of these things? Thus we all use these terms, and endeavour to fit our natural conceptions to every several thing. He did well, rightly, not rightly, he failed, he succeeded, he is unrighteous, he is righteous—which of us spareth to use terms like these? Which of us will defer the use of them till he hath learned

them, even as ignorant men do not use terms of geometry or music?" (Dissertations, ii., 11.)

In consequence, it is necessary to consider what Socrates taught concerning the virtues which he called absolute, such as Fortitude, Temperance, Prudence and Justice.

Fortitude. The teachings of Socrates are so replete with courage that he did not need often to refer to it; but the following, prophetic of his own brave and unperturbed attitude when confronting ignominious death, sufficiently illustrates his point of view:

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"Do you think that a spirit full of lofty thoughts, and privileged to contemplate all time, and all existence, can possibly attach any great importance to this life?" "No, it is impossible." "Then such a person will not regard death as a formidable thing, will he?" (Republic, bk. vi.)

Cicero in his essay "On Duties" says of this, "No one can be just who fears death or pain or exile or poverty, or who values their opposites above justice." (Bk. ii., c. xi.)

Aristotle speaks of courage in this fashion, "Nobleness is the motive from which the brave man withstands things fearful;" and again, "The brave man chooses his line, and withstands danger, either because to do so is noble, or because not to do so is base." (Ethics, bk. iii., c. x.)

Cicero exalts the good man's sense of duty above every fear, saying in his essay "On Friendship,"

"Nor do I think that anything that can happen, will cause a man of principle to intermit a duty."

That a man should put dread away from him as a delusion, Marcus Aurelius urges thus,

"Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured, that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus, then, always abide by the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing happens to thee." (*Meditations*, c. viii.)

And Epictetus, addressing himself to the same subject, enjoins one to be disturbed by nothing from without, "Straightway, then, practice saying to every harsh appearance: 'Thou art an appearance and not at all the thing thou appearest to be.'" (*Encheiridion*, i.)

Epictetus also maintains that the only injury a man can suffer is that to which he himself consents, saying,

"The first difference between the vulgar man and the philosopher: The one saith, 'Woe is me for my child, my brother, woe for my father!' but the other, if ever he shall be compelled to say, 'Woe is me!' checks himself and saith, 'for myself!' For nothing that the will willeth not, can hinder or hurt the will, but it only can hurt itself." (*Dissertations*, iii., 19.)

Marcus Aurelius asserts the duty of resignation, thus,

"Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O universe! Nothing for me is too early or too late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O nature!" (Meditations, c. iv.)

Seneca, in his essay "On Providence," thus interprets the meaning of the ills that befall a man, "Let those who are bidden to suffer what makes the weak and cowardly weep, say likewise, 'God has thought us worthy subjects on whom to try how much suffering human nature can endure'" (Bk. i., 4); and the spirit of calm fortitude and noble resignation which flows from a truly philosophical mode of thought and of living, Marcus Aurelius thus describes,

"Wilt thou then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures?" (Meditations, c. x.)

But Aristotle, more prosaic than these, thus indicates that there is that of which the good man also

will be afraid, "There are things which to fear is right and noble, and not to fear is base—disgrace, for example, since he who fears this, is a good man and has a sense of honour, and he who does not fear it, is shameless" (Ethics, bk. iii., c. vii.); and in the same book he recognizes that boldness and utter absence of fear may even be an evil under some conditions, thus, "He again, who exceeds in confidence in respect of things fearful, is rash." (Bk. iii., c. x.)

Seneca also, in his essay "On Providence," points out that it is a matter of the spirit which a man evinces and not of what he endures, saying of this, "It does not matter what you bear, but how you bear it" (Bk. i., c. ii.); and again in the same book he well says, "No tree which the wind does not often blow against, is firm and strong." (Bk. i., c. iv.)

The ineffable superiority of open-eyed fortitude which understands and fully appreciates that which lies ahead, over the rashness of him who merely does not know the perils or comprehend what awaits him, Socrates celebrates thus,

"Does it appear to you to be useful, with regard to formidable and dangerous things, to be ignorant of their character?' 'By no means.' 'They, therefore, who do not fear such things, because they do not know what they are, are not courageous.' 'Certainly not; for, in that case, many madmen and even cowards would be courageous.' 'And what do you say of those who fear things that are not formidable?' 'Still less, by Jupiter, should they be called courageous.'" (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 6.)

The same important distinction Socrates again sets forth yet more succinctly and powerfully in this dialogue:

“‘You know,’ he replied, ‘that all other men [i.e. except philosophers] regard death as one of the great evils to which mankind are subject?’ ‘Indeed they do,’ he said. ‘And when the brave men of them submit to death, do they not do so from a fear of still greater evils?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Then all men but the philosophers are brave from fear and because they are afraid.’” (Phædo.)

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Prudence. Socrates, viewing virtue as the healthful exercise of the mind, naturally gave prudence a most prominent place among the absolute virtues; of it he is reported by Xenophon to have spoken thus:

“He said, too, that justice, and every other virtue, was prudence, for that everything just, and everything done agreeably to virtue, was honourable and good; that those who could discern those things, would never prefer anything else to them; that those who could not discern them, would never be able to do them, but would even go wrong if they attempted to do them; and that the prudent, accordingly, did what was honourable and good, but that the imprudent could not do it, but went wrong even if they attempted to do it; and that since, therefore, all past actions, and all actions that are honourable

and good, are done in agreement with virtue, it is manifest that justice and every other virtue is prudence." (*Memorabilia*, bk. iii., 9.)

Marcus Aurelius in the following epitomizes what is meant by the term, prudence: "And if thou seest clear, go by this way, content, without turning back; but if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers." (*Meditations*, c. x.)

Epictetus put it concretely thus, "If thou hast assumed a part beyond thy power to play, then thou hast both come to shame in that and missed one thou couldst have well performed." (*Encheiridion*, xxxvii.)

The prudence which is meant, is not what is called "worldly prudence," that is, regard for advantage or gain; for Socrates and all his followers condemned this and identified disregard of these things with true prudence.

Thus Socrates is reported by Plato in "*Phædrus*" to have uttered the following warning against being influenced by the views of men less worthy than ourselves, "It behooves not the reasonable man to study pleasing fellow-bondsmen, save only if he may in passing, but masters good, and of good descent;" upon which topic Marcus Aurelius makes this shrewd remark,

"When another blames or hates thee, or when men say about thee anything injurious, approach their souls, penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no

reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about thee." (Meditations, c. ix.)

And Seneca in his essay "On Benefits" adverts to it thus, "You should be satisfied with the approval of your own conscience; if not, you do not really delight in doing good, but in being seen to do good." (Bk. ii., 10.)

Epictetus urges utter disregard for the misconstruction that others may put upon conduct which one's own conscience approves, saying of this, "In doing aught which thou hast clearly discerned as right to do, seek never to avoid being seen in the doing of it, even though the multitude should be destined to form some wrong opinion concerning it" (Encheiridion, xxxv.); which view Marcus Aurelius echoes in this,

"How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his neighbour says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that it may be just and pure; or as Agathon says, look not around at the depraved morals of others." (Meditations, c. iv.)

The self-sufficiency of the true philosopher, Epictetus thus descants upon,

"The position and token of the vulgar, he looks never to himself for benefit or hurt, but always to outward things. The position and character

of the philosopher, he looks for benefit or hurt only to himself." (Encheiridion, xlvii.)

Temperance. Aristotle thus describes the source of the folly of most men,

"The multitude of men seem to be deceived by reason of pleasure, because even when it is not really a good, it impresses their minds with the notion of goodness. So they choose what is pleasant as a good and avoid pain as an evil." (Ethics, bk. iii., c. vi.)

Socrates, who, very naturally since the moral quality of every act is to be measured by reason, taught that prudence is the first of all the virtues and the very epitome of their excellence, considered temperance the flower of prudence and intemperance the greatest folly. Concerning this, he is reported by Xenophon in his "Memorabilia" to have conversed with his disciples at length, as follows:

"Do you consider him, then, who is held under control by the pleasures of the body, and is rendered unable, by their influence, to do what is best for him, to be free?' 'By no means,' replied Euthydemus. 'Perhaps, then, to have the power of doing what is best seems to you to be freedom, but to be under influences which will hinder you from doing it, you consider to be want of freedom?' 'Assuredly,' said he. 'Do not the intemperate appear to you, then, to be so? . . . And whether do the intemperate

appear to you to be merely prevented from doing what is best or to be forced, also, to do what is most dishonourable?' 'They appear to me,' replied Euthydemus, 'to be not less forced to do the one than they are hindered from doing the other.' . . . 'And what sort of masters do you consider those to be, who hinder men from doing what is best, and force them to do what is worst?' 'The very worst possible, by Jupiter,' he replied. 'And what sort of slavery do you consider to be the worst?' 'That,' said he, 'under the worst masters.' 'Do not then the intemperate,' said Socrates, 'endure the very worst of slavery?' 'It appears so to me,' answered Euthydemus. . . .

"And does not intemperance seem to you, by banishing from men prudence, the greatest good, to drive them into the very opposite evil? Does it not appear to you to hinder them from attending to useful things, and learning them, by drawing them away to pleasure, and frequently, by captivating those who have a perception of good and evil, to make them choose the worse instead of the better?' 'Such is the case,' said he. 'And whom can we suppose, Euthydemus, to have less participation in self-control than the intemperate man? For assuredly the acts of self-control and of intemperance are the very opposite to each other.' 'I assent to this also,' said he. 'And do you think that anything is a greater hindrance to attention to what is becoming, than intemperance?' 'I do not.' 'And do you imagine that there is any greater evil to man, than that which makes him prefer the noxious to

the beneficial, which prompts him to pursue the one and neglect the other, and which forces him to pursue a contrary course of conduct to that of the wise?' 'There is none,' said Euthydemus. 'Is it not natural, then,' said Socrates, 'that temperance should be the cause of producing in men effects contrary to those which intemperance produce?' 'Undoubtedly,' said Euthydemus. 'Is it not natural, therefore, also, that what produces those contrary effects should be best for man?' 'It is natural,' said he. 'Is it not consequently natural, then, Euthydemus, that temperance should be best for man?' 'It is so, Socrates,' said he. . . .

"'And have you ever reflected upon this, Euthydemus?' 'What?' 'That even to those pleasures, to which alone intemperance seems to lead men, it cannot lead them, but that temperance produces greater pleasures than any thing else?' 'How?' said he. 'Because intemperance, by not allowing men to withstand hunger, thirst, or the desire of sensual gratification, or want of sleep (through which privations alone is it possible for them to eat, and drink, and gratify other natural appetites, and go to rest and sleep, with pleasure, waiting and restraining themselves until the inclinations may be most happily indulged), hinders them from having any due enjoyment in acts most necessary and most habitual; but temperance, which alone enables men to endure the privations which I have mentioned, alone enables them to find delight in the gratifications to which I have alluded?' 'What you say,' observed Euthydemus, 'is indisputably true.' . . .

“‘You seem to me, Socrates,’ said Euthydemus, ‘to say that the man who is under the influence of bodily pleasures, has no participation in any one virtue.’ ‘For what difference is there, Euthydemus,’ said he, ‘between an intemperate man and the most ignorant brute? How will he, who has no regard to what is best, but seeks only to enjoy what is most seductive by any means in his power, differ from the most senseless cattle? To the temperate alone it belongs to consider what is best in human pursuits, to distinguish those pursuits, according to experience and reason, into their several classes, and then to choose the good and refrain from the evil.’” (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 5.)

And in another place in the same book he is also reported to have spoken these words upon the same topic:

“‘The intemperate man is not injurious to his neighbour and profitable to himself (like the avaricious, who, by despoiling others of their property, seem to enrich themselves), but while he is mischievous to others, he is still more mischievous to himself, for it is indeed mischievous in the highest degree, to ruin not only his family, but his body and mind. . . . Is it not the duty of every man to consider that temperance is the foundation of every virtue, and to establish the observance of it in his mind before all things? For who, without it, can either learn anything good, or sufficiently practice it? Who,

that is a slave to pleasure, is not in an evil condition both as to his body and his mind?" (Memorabilia, bk. i., 5.)

Concerning Socrates himself, Xenophon remarks, "He was not only superior to all corporeal pleasures, but also to those attendant on the acquisition of money." (Memorabilia, bk. i., 5); and also in another place, "So frugal was he, that I do not know whether any one could earn so little by the labour of his hands, as not to procure sufficient to have satisfied Socrates." (Memorabilia, bk. i., 3.)

Continnence, a Part of Temperance. "'Do you think that a philosopher will care very much about what are called pleasures, such as the pleasures of eating and drinking?' 'Certainly not, Socrates,' said Simmias. 'Or about the pleasures of sexual passion?' 'Indeed, no.'" (Phædo.)

Socrates was by no means content to deal with the necessity for rendering one's soul superior to passion and desire, in mere generalities. The corrupting consequences of want of sexual restraint he rebuked, not merely on the ground of its injustice to others, but also very particularly because it is ruinous to the man himself. Xenophon says in the "Memorabilia": "As to love, his counsel was to abstain rigidly from familiarity with beautiful persons; for he observed that it was not easy to be in communication with such persons and maintain continence." (Bk. i., 3.)

Xenophon also records the following counsel, given to himself by his revered Master,

“Do you not know that the animal, which they call a handsome and beautiful object, is very much more formidable than the tarantula, as those insects instil something when they touch the body, but this creature, without even touching, but if a person only looks at it, though from a very great distance, instils something of such potency as to drive people mad? Perhaps indeed cupids are called archers for no other reason but because the beautiful wound from a distance. But I advise you, Xenophon, whenever you see any handsome person, to flee without looking behind you.” (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., 3.)

Continuing, the “*Memorabilia*” records this concerning Socrates’ own conduct,

“For himself, he was evidently so disciplined with respect to such matters, that he could more easily keep aloof from the fairest and most blooming objects than others from the most deformed and unattractive.” (*Bk. i., 3.*)

It was an age when, together with a remarkable development of learning, vices now regarded utterly bestial and unnatural were openly prevalent and scarcely rebuked; so that it was much for a man to keep himself to nature’s own processes and, even at a much later date when Roman views in part prevailed and gradually purer notions came uppermost, Epictetus could say, deprecatingly, “Concerning intercourse of the sexes, it is right to be pure before marriage, to the best of thy power. But, using it,

let a man have to do only with what is lawful.” (Encheiridion, xxxiii.)

That neither he nor Marcus Aurelius, however, underrated the importance of keeping free from irregular and inordinate sexual desire, is seen from these passages: “One man prays thus, ‘How shall I be able to lie with that woman?’ Do you pray thus, ‘How shall I not desire to lie with her?’ (Meditations, c. ix.)

“Today, when I saw a fair woman, I did not say to myself ‘Would that one could possess her!’ nor ‘Happy is her husband!’ for he who saith this, saith also ‘Happy is her paramour!’; nor do I picture in my mind what should follow. . . . But if she were also willing and consenting and sent to me, and if she also laid hold of me and drew near to me and I should yet restrain myself and conquer, this were indeed, then, a wisdom above the quiescent.” (Dissertations, ii., 18.)

But it must not be supposed that their view was really that one’s own sexual misconduct is a trivial thing; instead it was Epictetus who remarked,

“When was the fall of Achilles? When Patroclus died? God forbid; but when he was wrathful, when he bewept the loss of his girl, when he forgot that he was there not to win mistresses but to make war.” (Dissertations, i., 28.)

The indifference of Epictetus, also, both to the allurements and jealousies of sexual intrigue and to

the discovery of her true nature by one's faithless wife or mistress, is shown by this sage statement,

"The thing that appeared good to Paris was the carrying off of the wife of Menelaus; the thing that appeared good to Helen was to accompany him. Had it, then, appeared good to Menelaus to be sensible that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only had there been no Iliad, but no Odyssey." (Dissertations, i., 28.)

Socrates rebuked the licentiousness of his age continually and sought to shield his disciples from its contamination. Xenophon relates of him in the "Memorabilia" (bk. i., 2), the following:

"When he perceived, however, that Critias was enamoured of Euthydemus, and was seeking to have the enjoyment of his society, like those who abuse the persons of others for licentious purposes, he dissuaded him from his intention, by saying that it was illiberal and unbecoming a man of honour and proper feeling, to offer supplication to the object of his affections, by whom he wished to be held in high esteem, beseeching and entreating him, like a beggar, to grant a favour, especially when such favour was for no good end."

He also set before their minds this forbidding picture of a life given up to sensuality,

"You, who do not even wait for the natural desire of gratification, but fill yourself with all manner of dainties before you have an appetite for them, eating before you are hungry, drinking before you are thirsty, procuring cooks that you may eat with pleasure, buying costly wines that you may drink with pleasure, and running about seeking for snow in summer, while, in order to sleep with pleasure, you prepare not only soft beds, but couches, and rockers under your couches, for you do not desire sleep in consequence of labour, but in consequence of having nothing to do; you force the sensual inclinations before they require gratification, using every species of contrivance for the purpose, and abusing male and female, for thus it is that you treat your friends, insulting their modesty at night, and making them sleep away the most useful part of their day." (*Memorabilia*, bk. ii., 1.)

Xenophon also relates the manner in which in order to provide means of continuing their debauches, such men sooner or later resort to the most dishonourable practices to obtain money,

"Many who can be frugal in their expenses before they fall in love, are, after falling in love, unable to continue so; and, when they have exhausted their resources, they no longer abstain from means of gain from which they previously shrunk as thinking them dishonourable." (*Memorabilia*, bk. i., 2.)

Socrates' conception of the purity of thought and conduct which should mark the relations of two

persons of the same sex, who love one another, is set forth in this admirable colloquy in the "Republic":

"Can you mention any pleasure that is greater and more violent than that which accompanies the indulgence of the passion of love?' 'I cannot; nor yet one that is more akin to madness.' 'But is it not the nature of legitimate love to desire an orderly and beautiful object in a sober and harmonious temper?' 'Certainly it is.' 'Then nothing akin to madness or licentiousness must approach legitimate love.'" (Republic, bk. iii.)

In the "Republic" (bk. i.) also, Cephalus mentions with marked approval this statement of Sophocles, the poet, when rallied upon the waning of desire in old age,

"Sophocles the poet was once asked: 'How do you feel about love, Sophocles? Are you still capable of it?' To which he replied, 'Hush! If you please, to my great delight I have escaped from it, and feel as if I had escaped from a frantic and savage master.'"

Epictetus also put this idea of the wisdom of refraining from all desire in this form, "Nor must a girl appear to thee fair" (Dissertations, iii., 22); and Marcus Aurelius in this, "And the attractive loveliness of young persons, he will be able to look on with chaste eyes." (C. iii.)

Socrates was far, however, from prudery; the custom of baring the human body found an earnest apologist and defender in the Sage, who said of this:

“Not long since it was thought discreditable and ridiculous, among the Greeks, as it is now among most barbarian nations, for men to be seen naked. . . . But when experience has shown that it was better to strip than to cover up the body, and when the ridiculous effect, which this plan had to the eye, had given way before the arguments establishing its superiority, it was at the same time, as I imagine, demonstrated, that he is a fool who thinks anything ridiculous but that which is evil, and who attempts to raise a laugh by assuming any object to be ridiculous but that which is unwise and evil, or who chooses for the aim of his serious admiration any other mark save that which is good.” (Republic, bk. v.)

In Xenophon’s “Memorabilia” (bk. ii., 6), Socrates rallies Critobolus upon his answer that his lips would salute only the beautiful, warning him thus of the un wisdom of that course,

“‘But will you never,’ said Socrates, ‘apply your lips to theirs?’ ‘Be of good courage, Socrates,’ said Critobolus, ‘for I will never apply my lips to those of any person, unless that person be beautiful.’ ‘You have now said,’ rejoined Socrates, ‘the exact contrary to what will promote your object; for the beautiful will not allow such liberties, though the deformed receive them with pleasure, thinking

that they are accounted beautiful for their mental qualities.'"

With this chaste counsel, in the same conversation went also the skillful inquiry which drew from Critobolus this estimate of the qualities of him who can be a good and valuable friend,

"Tell me, Critobolus," said he, "if we were in need of a good friend, how should we proceed to look for one? Should we not, in the first place, seek for a person who can govern his appetite, his inclination to wine or sensuality, and abstain from immoderate sleep and idleness?" (*Memorabilia*, bk. ii., 6.)

Justice. In Plato's "*Republic*" which is chiefly devoted to a discussion of justice, Socrates is represented to have set forth the fundamental requisites for an inquiry into its nature in this manner:

"'But, if we find out what justice is, shall we expect the character of a just man not to differ in any point from that of justice itself, but to be its perfect counterpart? Or shall we be content provided he comes as near it as is possible, and partakes more largely of it than the rest of the world?' 'The latter—we shall be content.' 'Then the design of our investigation into the nature of justice in itself, and the character of the perfectly just man, as well as the possibility of his existence, and likewise into the nature of injustice, and the character of the

perfectly unjust man, was to use them as patterns, so that by looking upon the two men, and observing how they stand in reference to happiness and its opposite, we might be compelled to admit in our own case, that he who resembles them most closely in character, will also have a lot most closely resembling theirs.” (Republic, bk. v.)

That is to say, one must study the conduct of men in their relations with one another and its necessary effect both upon him who acts and him who is acted upon. Yet what he has elsewhere said about the “absolute,” meaning thereby a pure conception, renders it clear that he does not mean to imply that the principles of justice are not eternal and unchanging but merely that their application is relative.

Marcus Aurelius identifies injustice with impiety in these eloquent words,

“He who acts unjustly, acts impiously; for since the universal nature had made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity.” (Meditations, c. ix.)

But that there is great difficulty about demonstrating the principles of justice and yet greater about their application, Socrates says in “Euthyphron,” thus,

"Is it not the question of right and wrong, of the honourable and the base, of the good and the bad—is it not questions about these matters which make you and me, and every one else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them, and can reach no satisfactory settlement?"

That one should pursue this difficult inquiry, not by the easy but invidious task of attempting to rectify the conduct of others, but by earnestly seeking to set himself right, Marcus Aurelius implies by this pregnant admonition: "Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep, whether it will make any difference to thee, if another does what is just and right." (Meditations, c. x.)

Socrates, pursuing the inquiry in the "Republic," in the following dialogue seeks to show what are some of the qualifications of a just man:

"For example, if in speaking of our ideal state, and of an individual who in nature and training resembles it, we were required to declare whether we think that such an individual would repudiate a deposit of gold or silver committed to his charge, do you suppose that anyone would think him more likely to do such a deed than other men who are not such as he is?"

"No one would think so."

"And will he not also be clear of suspicion of sacrilege, and of theft, and of being either false to his friends, or a traitor of his country?"

"He will."

“Moreover, he will be wholly incapable of bad faith, in the case of an oath or of any other kind of compact?”

“‘Clearly he will.’

“‘Again, he is the last person in the world to be guilty of adultery, or neglect of parents, or indifference to the worship of the gods?’

“‘Certainly he is.’

“‘And is not all this attributable to the fact that each of his inward principles keeps to its own work, in regard to the relations of ruler and subject?’

“‘Yes, it may be entirely attributed to this.’

“‘Do you still seek then for any other account of justice than that it is the power which creates such men and such states?’” (Republic, bk. iv.)

Socrates is reported by Xenophon in his “Memorabilia” to have said that the very basis of just conduct is to be law-abiding, in the following:

“‘Do you say, Socrates, that to be conformable to the laws, and to be just, is the same thing?’ ‘I do, indeed.’ ‘I am puzzled; for I do not understand what you call conformable to law, or what you call just.’ ‘Do you know the laws of the state?’ said Socrates. ‘I do,’ said the other. ‘And what do you consider them to be?’ ‘What the citizens in concert have enacted as to what we ought to do, and what we ought to avoid doing.’ ‘Would he not, therefore,’ asked Socrates, ‘be an observer of the laws who should conduct himself in the community agreeably to those enactments, and he be a violator of the laws who transgresses them?’ ‘Undoubtedly,’ said

Hippias. 'Would not he then do what is just who obeys the laws, and he do what is unjust who disobeys them?' 'Certainly.' 'Is not he, then, just who does what is just, and he unjust who does what is unjust?' 'How can it be otherwise?' 'He, therefore, that conforms to the laws is just,' said Socrates, 'and he who violates the laws unjust.'" (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 4.)

The following from the same book (bk. iv., 4) is, perhaps, more persuasive,

"To whom would anyone believe that he could more safely confide his money or his sons or daughters? Whom would the whole community deem more trustworthy than him who respects the laws? From whom would parents, or relatives, or domestics, or friends, or citizens, or strangers, more certainly obtain their rights? To whom would the enemy sooner trust in cessation of arms, or in making a truce, or articles of peace? To whom would people more willingly become allies than to the observer of the laws, and to whom would the allies more willingly trust the leadership, or command of a fortress, or of a city? From whom would any one expect to meet with gratitude, or doing him a kindness, sooner than from the observer of the laws? . . . I, therefore, Hippias, pronounce that to obey the laws and to be just is the same; if you hold an opinion to the contrary, tell me." (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 4.)

This view, also, Socrates sealed with the sacrifice of his very life when he refused to escape from prison

and from the sentence of death which had been imposed upon him, because it was his duty to conform to the laws of his country.

In Plato's "Republic," (bk. vi.) Socrates thus sets forth the eternal verities concerning the character of him who under all circumstances proves to be just, "Can the man whose mind is well-regulated, and free from covetousness, meanness, pretentiousness, and cowardice, be by any possibility hard to deal with or unjust?"

Aristotle asks ("Ethics," bk. v., c. xii.); "Is it really possible for a person to be unjustly dealt with, with his own consent?"; and answers, "A man may be hurt and suffer what is in itself unjust voluntarily, but unjustly dealt with voluntarily no man can be" (Idem.); but Marcus Aurelius affirmed what is certainly the more common view nowadays, thus, "He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad." (Meditations, c. ix.)

That there is "none just, no, not one," but only men differing in degrees of injustice, Socrates more than once asserts in "Phædo," as in these passages: "Good men and bad men are very few indeed, and the majority of men are neither one nor the other." "If there were competition in wickedness don't you think that the leading sinners would be found to be a few?" "What is rarer than to find a man, or a dog, or anything else which is either extremely large or extremely small? Or again, what is rarer than to find a man who is extremely swift or slow,

or extremely base or honourable, or extremely black or white?"

Aristotle warns against acts of injustice which will surely make a man's disposition unjust, saying in his "Ethics,"

"It is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts unjustly or dissolutely, does not wish to attain the habits of these vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become unjust, he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily." (Bk. iii., c. vii.)

He also sharply defines the just and the equitable in a manner which is today, as in the best days of Athens and of Rome, the recognized distinction between the jurisdiction of courts of law and of equity, as in this passage,

"When, then, the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case of exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the law-giver omits the case, and, by reason of his universality of statement, is wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the law-giver himself would rule, were he there present, and would have provided by law, had he foreseen the case would arise. And so the equitable is just, and better than one form of just; I do not mean the abstract just, but the error which arises out of the universality of statement; and this is the nature of the equitable, 'a correction of law, where law is defective by reason of its universality.'" (Ethics, bk. v., c. xv.)

The foregoing is, of course, only a particular case of Socrates' proposition, as related by Xenophon that, as regards justice, "circumstances alter cases;" which Aristotle also reiterates in this, "Just and equitable then are generically of the same kind and, both being good, the equitable is the better of the two." (*Ethics*, bk. v., c. xv.)

Socrates in discussing the shame of wrongdoing, even though evil be rewarded and righteousness be punished by death, said in "*Crito*," "Is not wrongdoing an evil and a shame to the wrong-doer in every case, whether we incur a heavier or a lighter punishment than death, as the consequence of doing right?" This is the more telling, as he was then facing an ignominious death as a reward for a life of self-sacrifice and well-doing.

In the "*Republic*" (bk. i.,) Plato records this fundamental characteristic of a just man, taken from the lips of Socrates, "It is the property, not of the just man, but of his opposite, the unjust man, to hurt either friend or any other creature." Aristotle thus states it in his "*Ethics*," "It is a characteristic of the equitable man to take less than his due" (Bk. v., 13); but Socrates even more admirably, also in the "*Republic*" (bk. i.), "In no instance, is it just to injure anybody."

Love of Truth. "The genuine lover of knowledge must, from his youth up, strive intensely after all truth." (*Republic*, bk. vi.) Thus Socrates enunciated the prime essential to the exercise of reason. In another place in the same book (bk. v.), he is represented as distinguishing by this alone the lover

of wisdom from others, "'And whom,' he asked, 'do you call genuine lovers of wisdom?' 'They who love to perceive truth,' I answered."

In "Phædrus," also, Plato has his Master return again and again to this topic, first, to indicate that every soul, in order to be intelligent, must see truth, as in this passage,

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"For the soul which has never seen the truth at all, can never enter into the human form;" again to say that the men of simpler and more innocent times were devout lovers of truth, thus, "The men of those days . . . were content . . . to listen to an oak or a stone, if only it spake the truth;" and once more to show how indifferent he who has the truth, can afford to be toward what others think of the matter, "If haply we could find the truth, could we possibly, think you, pay heed any longer to the opinions of men?"

Aristotle in his "Ethics" (bk. iii., c. vi.) speaks thus of him who has the faculty of swift apprehension of truth, "The most distinguishing characteristic of the good man is his seeing the truth in every instance."

And Socrates is represented in Plato's "Republic" (bk. vii.) to have described the state of him who is content to be self-deceived, in this manner, calculated to excite disgust,

"May we not affirm that a soul is crippled with reference to truth, if, while it hates voluntary falsehood, and cannot endure it in itself, and is exceed-

ingly indignant when other people are guilty of an untruth, it nevertheless calmly accepts involuntary falsehood, and instead of being distressed when its lack of knowledge is detected, is fain to wallow in ignorance with the complacency of a brutish hog?" •

to which may be added this characterization of the attitude of the lover of truth toward falsehood, by Aristotle in his "Ethics," "He that has a love for truth as such, and is guided by it in matters indifferent, will be so likewise, even more in such as are not indifferent." (Bk. iv., c. ix.)

Socrates, Plato records in his "Republic" (bk. vi.), argued that all the vital force of a genuine lover of wisdom is directed to learn the truths about real existence, saying of this,

"With regard to the philosophic nature let us take for granted that its possessors are ever enamoured of all learning, that will reveal to them somewhat of that real and permanent existence, which is exempt from the vicissitudes of generation and decay."

And also, a little later in the same book he asserts,

"The natural tendency of the real lover of knowledge is to strain every nerve to reach real existence; and, far from resting at those multitudinous particular phenomena whose existence falls within the region of opinion, he presses on, undiscouraged, and desists not from his passion, till he has apprehended

the nature of each thing as it really is, with that part of his soul whose property it is to lay hold of such objects, in virtue of its affinity to them—and, having, by means of this, verily approached and held intercourse with that which verily exists, he begets wisdom and truth, so that then, and not till then, he knows, enjoys true life, and receives true nourishment, and is at length released from his travail-pangs.” (Republic, bk. vi.)

Aristotle declares that the apprehension of fundamental principles is intuitive, saying in his “Ethics,”

“Wisdom must mean the most accurate of all knowledge; but if so, then the wise man must not merely know the deductions from the first principles, but be in possession of truth respecting the first principles. So that wisdom must be equivalent to intuitive apprehension and science; it is, so to speak, science of the most precious objects.” (Ethics, bk. vi., c. vii.)

Epictetus adds his voice, declaring that this intuitive apprehension is such that one has no choice but to see the truth of first principles,

“Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true, are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it, are compelled to make use of it.” (Dissertations, ii., 20.)

That self-deception about concrete things and their significance is involuntary, Epictetus also declares in this passage:

“What is the cause of assenting to anything? The appearance that it is so. But if it appear to be not so, it is impossible to assent to it. Wherefore? For that this is the nature of the mind, to receive the true with favour, the false with disfavour, and the uncertain with indifference. The proof of this? Be sure, if you can, at this moment, that it is night. You cannot. Cease to be sure that it is day. You cannot. Be sure that the stars are odd in number, or that they are even. You cannot. When, therefore, any man shall assent to what is false, know that he had no will to consent to falsehood; for, as saith Plato, no soul is willingly deprived of the truth, but the false appeared to it to be true.” (Dissertations, i., 28);

and that this compulsion is from within, not from without, nor indeed can be, he also asserts, as follows, “And who can compel you to assent to an appearance that is false? No man. And who can compel you not to assent to an appearance that is true? No man.” (Dissertations, iii., 22.)

In “The Apology,” Plato represents his Master, deprecating praise of himself as a speaker, as saying of this: “I am not a clever speaker in any way at all; unless, indeed, by a clever speaker they mean a man who speaks the truth.”

In "Phædo," Socrates voices this caution against being persuaded by delusive argument, by whomsoever advanced,

"And you, if you take my advice, will think, not of Socrates, but of the truth; and you will agree with me, if you think that what I say is true, otherwise you will oppose me with every argument that you have."

In order that one should not be so deceived, Marcus Aurelius admonishes thus, "Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker's mind" (*Meditations*, c. vi.); and against permitting himself to be diverted from that which is before him (c. viii.), "Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is a view or an act or a word;" and (c. vi.), to hearken unto any sincere man who thinks he possesses the truth about anything, "If any is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth by which no man was ever injured." (C. vi.)

Yet further does Epictetus counsel every man to be modest concerning what he knows, in these words of practical wisdom, "And when some one shall say to thee, 'Thou knowest naught' and it bites thee not, then know what thou hadst begun the work" (*Encheiridion*, xlv.); for surely no peril is greater for him who would know the truth, than to be carried away with the notion, that, as a matter of pride, he must hold to his mere opinion as certainly

true and consider himself disgraced, should it prove not so.

Love of Wisdom. "Nature . . . has implanted a love of wisdom in the mind of man." Thus Socrates speaks in Plato's "Phædrus." The word which is there translated "love of wisdom" is "philosophia," usually rendered "philosophy" and signifying to most who see or hear it, something quite other than what Socrates intended. He opposed the title "sophist," *i.e.*, learned or wise man; the humble title which he himself assumed was, "philosophos," *i.e.*, "lover of wisdom." From this word came the word "philosophia," which is "love of wisdom," to signify what he sought to inculcate in men's minds and hearts.

In the "Republic" (bk. ix.), Socrates thus explains carefully and in detail, concerning the respective "loves," by means of which men are bound, one to his body, another to his ambition and the third to the development of his reason, and also which of the three chooses his love aright,

"As there are three parts, so there appears to me to be three pleasures, one appropriate to each part; and similarly three appetites, and governing principles. . . . According to us, one part was the organ whereby a man learns, and another that whereby he shows spirit. The third was so multi-form that we were unable to address it by a single appropriate name; so we named it after that which is its most important and strongest characteristic. We called it appetitive, on account of the violence

of the appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, and all their accompaniments; and we called it peculiarly money-loving, because money is the chief agent in the gratification of such appetites."

He determines which of these devotions yields the best returns, giving the palm to the love of wisdom, thus,

"Now are you aware that, if you choose to ask three such men each in his turn, which of these lives is pleasantest, each will extol his own beyond the other? . . . Then whenever a dispute is raised as to the pleasures of each kind and the life itself of each class, not in reference to degrees of beauty and deformity, of morality and immorality, but in reference merely to their position in the scale of pleasure, and freedom from pain,—how can we know which of the three men speaks most truly? . . . Of the three men, which is the best acquainted by experience with all the pleasures which we have mentioned? Does the lover of gain study the nature of real truth to such an extent as to be, in your opinion, acquainted with the pleasures of knowledge better than the lover of wisdom is acquainted with the pleasure of gain? . . . The lover of wisdom is far superior to the lover of gain in practical acquaintance with both the pleasures. . . . Honour waits upon them all, if each works out the objects of his pursuit, for the rich man is honoured by many people, as well as the courageous and the wise; so that all are acquainted with the

nature of the pleasure to be derived from the fact of being honoured. But the nature of the pleasure to be found in the contemplation of truth, none can have tasted, except the lover of wisdom. Then, as far as practical acquaintance goes, the lover of wisdom is the best judge of the three." (*Republic*, Bk. ix.)

Philosophy, the Art of Living. Epictetus affirms that philosophy is the art of living, saying, "A child in music is he who hath not learned music, and in letters, one who hath not learned letters, and in life, one undisciplined in philosophy" (*Dissertations*, iii., 19); but it must be admitted that he may have had in mind more what later moralists understood by philosophy, than the humble love of wisdom, of which Socrates spoke, for before his time the disease which afterward developed into formal scholasticism, had already rendered the compound word a thing signifying something far different from the combination of words from which it was derived.

Undoubtedly Socrates considered this humble, unpretentious "love of wisdom" and the schooling in the realities of the universe which it should cause one to acquire, the best preparation for real usefulness, both public and private. To this view several passages in Plato's "*Republic*" advert, among others, this (bk. vi.),

"A state ought to deal with the pursuit of philosophy on the plan the very reverse of that now in vogue. . . . At present, those who pursue philos-

ophy at all are mere striplings just emerged from boyhood, who take it up in the intervals of house-keeping and business; and, after just dipping into the most abstruse part of the study, (by which I mean dialectics), abandon the pursuit altogether.

. . . In youth and boyhood they ought to be put through a course of training in philosophy, suited to their years; and while their bodies are growing up to manhood, especial attention should be paid to them, as a serviceable acquisition in the cause of philosophy. At the approach of that period, during which the mind begins to attain its maturity, the mental exercises ought to be rendered more severe.

“Finally, when their bodily powers begin to fail, and they are released from public duties and military service, from that time forward they ought to lead a dedicated life and consecrate themselves to this one pursuit, if they are to live happily on earth, and after death to crown the life they have led with a corresponding destiny in another world.”

Xenophon in his “*Memorabilia*” (bk. iv., 6), gives the following account of a conversation in which Socrates identifies wisdom with the ripe and just conclusions of one who really has sound and reliable knowledge of a subject, thus:

“‘And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, whether do men seem to you to be wise, in things which they know, or in things which they do not know?’ ‘In what they know, certainly; for how can a man be wise in things of which he knows

nothing?' 'Those, then, who are wise, are wise by their knowledge?' 'By what else can a man be wise, if not by his knowledge?' 'Do you think wisdom, then, to be anything else than that by which men are wise?' 'I do not.' 'Is knowledge, then, wisdom?' 'It appears so to me.' 'Does it appear to you, however, that it is possible for a man to know all things that are?' 'No, by Jupiter; not even, as I think, a comparatively small portion of them.' 'It is not therefore possible for a man to be wise in all things?' 'No, indeed.' 'Every man is wise, therefore, in that only of which he has knowledge?' 'So it seems to me.'"

In "Euthydemus" he puts it pointedly thus,

"Then wisdom always makes men fortunate; for, by wisdom, no man could ever err and therefore he must act rightly and succeed or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer;" and in the same book also asks, "Is not this the result, that other things are indifferent and that wisdom is the only good and ignorance the only evil?"

CHAPTER XIX

DEATH

THE ancient philosophers were in nothing more distinguished than for their attitude toward death. This was true of every school, of the Epicurean as of the Stoic; and it is directly traceable to the teachings of Socrates. Thus, in "The Apology," Plato reports him as saying,

"To fear death, my friends, is only to think ourselves wise, without being wise; for it is to think that we know what we do not know. For everything that men can tell, death may be the greatest good that can happen to them; but they fear it as if they knew quite well that it was the greatest of evils. And what is this but that shameful ignorance of thinking that we know what we do not know?";

and, again, "Whether life or death is better, is known to God and to God alone."

In "Gorgias," he remarks about it, "He who is truly a man, ought not to care about living a certain time; . . . he leaves all that to God and considers in what way he can spend his appointed term."

Recalling that he had shown that the highest and clearest functionings of reason occur when one is freest from the obdurate interferences of the body, Socrates elsewhere boldly asserts that the lover of wisdom has all along desired to be as free from his body as possible, in other words to die out of it, and accordingly cannot possibly fear death; of which, in "Phædo," he says:

"The world, perhaps, does not see that those who rightly engage in philosophy, study only dying and death. And, if this be true, it would surely be strange for a man all through his life to desire only death, and then, when death comes to him, to be vexed at it, when it has been his study and his desire for so long."

From quite another viewpoint, but to much the same effect, Marcus Aurelius sagely remarks,

"If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neglecting everything else, thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have begun to live according to nature—then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe which has produced thee." (C. xii.)

Futility of Fear of Death. The utter futility of looking upon death with dread, as if it really could be avoided, Socrates illustrates in "The Apology," thus, "I have often seen men with a reputation

behaving in a strange way at their trial, as if they thought it a terrible fate to be killed, and as though they expected to live forever, if you did not put them to death;" and Epictetus in fewer words, even more impressively in this, "And if the Trojans slay them not, will they not still die?" (Dissertations, iii., 22.)

Cicero, in his essay "On Old Age," makes positive declaration regarding the attitude about his demise that becomes a noble man, in this fashion, "Nor do I regret having lived, for I have done so in a way that lets me think that I was not born in vain; but I quit life as I would an inn, not as I would a home."

Marcus Aurelius, however, in the following passage, warns against exultation and enjoins serenity in the face of death as throughout life, as the poise of soul truly worthy of a man,

"Do not despise death, but be well content with it since this too is one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with the character of a reflecting man to be neither careless nor impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope." (Meditations, c. ix.)

Seneca, in his treatise "On Providence," bids one take comfort that the struggle which terminates man's life is at least of brief duration, saying of this,

"That very act which is called dying, by which the breath of life leaves the body, is too short for you to be able to estimate its quickness; whether a knot crushes the windpipe, or water stops your breathing, whether you fall headlong from a height and perish upon the hard ground below, or a mouthful of fire checks the drawing of your breath—whatever it is, it acts swiftly. Do you not blush to spend so long a time in dreading what takes so short a time to do?" (Bk. i., 6.)

Death, within Nature's Design. Marcus Aurelius draws comfort from the fact that death comes to all, arguing therefrom that death is neither a good nor an evil, thus,

"But death certainly, and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil." (Meditations, c. ii.)

Epictetus thus characterizes it as merely a change, not to nothing but to something which is different from the present, "Here is parting for foreign lands, and a little change. Here is death—a greater change, not from that which now is to that which is not, but to that which is not now." (Dissertations, iii., 24.)

Cicero, in this passage taken from his essay "On Old Age," affirms that throughout one's entire life, he must be preparing for his departure, if he would be ready when the summons comes,

"But to disregard death is a lesson which must be studied from our youth up; for unless that is learnt, no one can have a quiet mind. For die we certainly must, and that too without being certain whether it may not be this very day. As death, therefore, is hanging over our heads every hour, how can a man ever be unshaken in soul if he fears it?"

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This certainly accords well with Socrates' often-expressed view that the exercise of pure reason causes one to despise the body as an interference and to look to death for final and complete release; concerning which in "Phædo" he is quoted by Plato as saying,

"And does not the purification consist, as we have said, in separating the soul from the body, as far as is possible, and in accustoming her to collect and rally herself together from the body on every side, and to dwell alone by herself as much as she can, both now and hereafter, released from the bondage of the body?"

Epictetus considered that one should ever have the fact of death distinctly before his eyes, to the end that he may not be terrified at its approach, concerning which he speaks thus,

"Death and exile, and all things that appear dreadful, let these be every day before thine eyes. But death most of all; for so thou wilt neither despise nor too greatly desire any condition of life." (Encheiridion, xxi.)

The manner in which he may achieve this, that is, face death constantly without terror, Socrates, again recurring to his lesson drawn from the processes of abstract reasoning, develops in the following dialogue,

"And the true philosopher, we hold, is alone in his constant desire to set his soul from the body, is he not?" "Clearly." "Would it not be absurd then, as I began by saying, for a man to complain at death coming to him, when in his life he has been preparing himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could?" (Phædo.)

Marcus Aurelius thus presents the alternative solutions of the great enigma, "About death, whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change" (Meditations, c. vii.); but Socrates in "Phædo" dismisses the silly superstitions about dispersion, with a smile, in this fashion, "Like children, you are afraid that the wind will really blow the soul away and disperse her when she leaves the body, especially if a man happens to die in a storm and not in a calm."

Epictetus thus argues that when death shall come is truly to him who departs, a matter of indifference,

"What is death? A bugbear. Turn it around; examine it; see, it does not bite! Now or later that which is body must be parted from that which is spirit, as formerly it was parted. Why, then, hast thou indignation if it be now? For if it be not now, it will be later" (Dissertations, ii., 1);

and Marcus Aurelius warns the heedless^f thus, "Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good." (Meditations, c. iv.)

Epictetus thus adjures men to flee, not from death, but from the fear of death,

"It is right, then, that we should turn our boldness against death, and our fearfulness against the fear of death. But now we do the contrary; death we flee from, but as to the state of our opinion about death we are negligent, heedless, indifferent." (Dissertations, ii., 1.)

This cheerful, determined and even eloquent view of the attitude toward death, worthy of a real man, is also from the writings of Epictetus,

"But let us do as in setting out on a voyage. What is it possible for me to do? This—to choose the captain, crew, the day, the opportunity. Then a tempest has burst upon us; but what doth it concern me? I have left nothing undone that was mine to do; the problem is now another's, to-wit,

the captain's. But now the ship is sinking! And what have I to do? I do only what I am able—drown without terror and screaming and accusing God, but knowing that that which has come into being must also perish. For I am no immortal, but a man, a part of the sum of things as an hour is of the day. Like the hour I must arrive, and, like the hour, pass away. What, then, can it matter to me how I pass away—whether by drowning or by a fever? For pass I must, even by some such thing.” (Dissertations, ii., 5.)

This view of things, not so much in extenso but with no less philosophical an ending, is also found in this saying of Marcus Aurelius,

“Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly!” (Meditations, c. iv.)

Epictetus in the following holds that the ways of dying are different, indeed that those which are most dreaded are often, when rightly considered, seen to be the most merciful,

“What matters it by what road thou goest down into Hades? They are all equal. But if thou wilt hear the truth, the way the tyrant sends thee is the shortest. Never did any tyrant cut a man's throat in six months, but a fever will often be a year killing him.” (Dissertations, iii., 6.)

Socrates, when near death, declared to his disciples, in "Phædo,"

"You seem to think me inferior in prophetic power to the swans, which, when they find that they have to die, sing more loudly than they ever sang before, for joy that they are about to depart into the presence of God, whose servants they are. The fear which men have of death makes them speak falsely of the swans, and they say that the swan is wailing at its death, and that it sings loud for grief. They forgot that no bird sings when it is hungry, or cold, or in any pain; not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the hoopoe, which, they assert, wail and sing for grief. But I think that neither these birds nor the swans sing for grief. I believe that they have prophetic power and foreknowledge of the good things in the next world, for they are Apollo's birds; and so they sing and rejoice on the day of their death, more than in all their life. And I believe that I myself am a fellow slave with the swans, and consecrated to the service of the same God, and that I have prophetic power from my master no less than they; and that I am not more despondent than they are at leaving this life."

Epictetus speaks to like purpose and effect in this,

"Death? Let it come when it will, either death of the whole or of a part! Flee it? And whither? Can any man cast me out of the universe? He cannot; but whithersoever I may go there will be the

sun, and the moon, and there the stars, and visions, and omens, and communion with the gods." (Dissertations, iii., 22.)

Death is Not an Evil. Socrates, never departing from the text of the soul's love of wisdom and his discovery that, only apart from, and undisturbed by, the body, can pure reason hold sway, declares in "Phædo,"

"In everything he is at enmity with his body, and he longs to possess his soul alone. Would it not then be most unreasonable, if he were to fear and complain when he has his desire, instead of rejoicing to go to the place where he hopes to gain the wisdom that he has passionately longed for all his life, and to be released from the company of his enemy?"

This view of death of course also implies, as a corollary, that one will bemoan his own fate that he is deprived of the earthly presence of his friend, but will not deplore that friend's death as if it were, also, to him a misfortune, concerning which Cicero says in his treatise "On Friendship," "To Scipio I am convinced no evil has befallen; mine is the disaster, if disaster there be."

The Stoic philosophy never had a better exponent, perhaps, than Epictetus and he never said a more Stoical thing than this, "What harm is it, while kissing thy child to whisper, 'Tomorrow thou shalt die,' and likewise with thy friend, 'Tomorrow thou shalt depart, either thou or I, and we shall see each

other no more?'" (Dissertations, iii., 24.) Yet, save in the manner of expression, which is distinctly more forbidding, this does not much differ from what Socrates himself inculcates in this dialogue with his disciple, Adeimantus:

"What we maintain is, that a good man will not look upon death as a dreadful thing^a for another good man, whose friend he also is, to undergo.' 'We do maintain it.' 'Then if so, he will not lament over such a person as if some dreadful disaster had befallen him.'" (Republic, bk. iii.)

Marcus Aurelius makes this sage comment, "This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death, that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have despised it" (C. xii.); and also enjoins, "And thou wilt give thyself relief if thou doest every act of thy life as if it were the last." (C. ii.)

Epictetus returns again and again to the necessity that one purge his soul of the fear of death, saying among other things, of this:

"If one should transfer his fearfulness to the realm of the will, and the works thereof, straightway, together with the intention of fearing to do wrong, he shall have it in his power to avoid doing it; but if he use it in things out of our own power and beyond the will, then, striving to avoid things that are in others' power, he shall of necessity be terrified and unsettled and troubled. For death is not fearful,

nor pain, but the fear of pain or death. And thus we praise him who said, 'Fear not to die, but fear a coward's death!'" (Dissertations, ii., 1.)

Socrates is represented by Plato in his "Republic" (bk. iii.), also to urge this, not merely upon the wise but upon all men, to the end that there may be true courage, in that they should know that death is not an evil of this he says,

"If we intend our citizens to be brave, must we not add to this such lessons as are likely to preserve them most effectually from being afraid of death? Or do you think a man can ever become brave who is haunted by the fear of death? . . . Do you imagine that a believer in Hades and its terrors will be free from all fear of death, and in the day of battle will prefer it to defeat and slavery?"

Cicero, in his essay "On Friendship," pertinently remarks, "If, however, the truth rather is that the body and soul perish together and that no sensation remains, then, though there is nothing good in death, at least there is nothing bad;" and in his treatise "On Old Age," discusses this matter more at length as follows,

"There remains the fourth reason, which more than anything else appears to torment men of my age and keep them in a flutter, the nearness of death, which, it must be allowed, cannot be far from an old man. But what a poor dotard must he

be who has not learnt in the course of so long a life that death is not a thing to be feared—death, that is either to be totally disregarded, if it entirely extinguishes the soul, or is even to be desired, if it bring him where he is to exist forever? A third alternative, at any rate, cannot possibly be discovered. Why, then, should I be afraid if I am destined either not to be miserable after death or even to be happy? After all, who is such a fool as to feel certain—however young he may be—that he will be alive in the evening?”

Concerning which matter, Marcus Aurelius (*Meditations*, c. iii.) contributes this,

“Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves it is superior; for the one is intelligence and deity, the other is earth and corruption;”

and, in another place, also this, “What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or continue to exist!” (C. xi.)

Epictetus presents this argument that death cannot be an evil, “Whenever death may appear to be an evil, have ready the thought that it is right to

avoid evils, and that death is unavoidable" (Dissertations, i., 27); and adjures men to look upon it steadfastly and without exaggeration, thus,

"Now is it time for my substance to be resolved again into the things wherefrom it came together. And what is dreadful in this? What of the things in the universe is about to perish? What new or what unaccountable thing is about to come to pass?" (Dissertations, iv., 7.)

The imperial sage, in like manner, urges that in no sense can death be deemed an evil, saying,

"And everything which is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable and profitable to, and congruent with, the universal." (Meditations, c. xii.)

Self-Destruction Condemned. "But perhaps you will be surprised if I say that this law, unlike every other law to which mankind are subject, is absolute and without exception; and that it is not true that death is better than life only for some persons and at some times. And perhaps you will be surprised if I tell you that these men for whom it would be better to die, may not do themselves that service, but that they must await a benefactor from without." (Phædo.)

Socrates, earlier in this conversation, had asserted in the following passage that suicide is *per se* wrong:

“‘What?,’ he said, ‘Is not Evenus a philosopher?’ ‘Yes, I suppose so,’ replied Simmias. ‘Then Evenus will wish to die,’ he said, ‘and so will every man who is worthy of having any part in this study. But he will not lay violent hands on himself; for that, they say, is wrong.’” (Phædo.)

It was, therefore, in this sense that he sent word to an absent friend, thus, “Tell him to follow me as quickly as he can, if he is wise.” (Phædo), and not as an adjuration to make away with himself.

It is significant of the fact that Socrates, as an ethical teacher, did not enjoin as an essential, that his pupils and followers should accept his dictum, but instead that they should use their reason, that the most famous of his successors, almost without exception, justified suicide under certain conditions as a righteous and even a noble act and it became among the Stoics the most honourable mode of departing this life. Thus Marcus Aurelius, depicting a man's control over his fate, declares, “Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying and hast discharged thy duty” (Meditations, c. x.); and Seneca thus rejoices in the power and the right of a man to quit this world, esteeming it a noble and a glorious privilege,

“Despise pain; either it will cease or you will cease. Despise death; it either ends you or takes you else-

where. Despise fortune; I have given her no weapon that can reach the mind. Above all, I have taken care that no one should hold you captive against your will: the way of escape lies open before you; if you do not choose to fight, you may fly." (On Providence, bk. i., 6.)

The manner in which the conscious possession of this right and power emancipates a man from the fear of less serious evils, Epictetus thus celebrates,

"For how shouldst thou have aught in common with Socrates, who died as he died, who lived as he lived—or with Diogenes? Dost thou think that any of these men lamented or was indignant because he should see such a man or such a woman no more? Or because he should not dwell in Athens or in Corinth, but, as it might chance, in Susa or Ecbatana? When a man can leave the banquet or the game when he pleases, shall such a one grieve if he remains?" (Dissertations, ii., 16);

and again he says,

"What is pain? A bugbear. Turn it about and examine it. This poor body is moved harshly, then again softly. If thou hast no advantage thereof, the door is open; if thou hast, then bear it." (Dissertations, ii., 1.)

Seneca speaks of it with triumph, instancing the suicide of Cato, in the following passage,

"I do not know what nobler spectacle Jupiter could find on earth, should he turn his eyes thither, than that of Cato, after his party had more than once been defeated, still standing upright amid the ruins of the commonwealth. Quoth he, 'What though all be fallen into one man's power, though the land be guarded by his legions, the sea by his fleets, though Cæsar's soldiers beset the city gate? Cato has a way out of it; with one hand he will open a wide path to freedom; his sword, which he has borne unstained by disgrace and innocent of crime even in a civil war, will still perform good and noble deeds; it will give to Cato that freedom which it could not give to his country?'" (On Providence, bk. i., 2.)

"The open door" was a favourite expression upon the lips of the Stoics; but no other of them spoke of it with so much exuberant enthusiasm as Epictetus—for instance, in the following passages: "I will depart whither no man shall hinder me to dwell—for that dwelling stands ever open to all." (Dissertations, i., 25.)

"And do thou compare the gain on both sides—only do naught in heaviness or affliction, or as supposing that thou art in evil case. For to this can no man compel thee. Doth it smoke in the chamber? If it is not very much, I still stay: If too much, . . . I will go out; for remember this always, and hold fast to it, that the door is open."* (Dissertations, i., 25.)

"I have been set free by God, I know His commandments. Henceforth no man can lead me captive. I have a liberator such as I need, and judges such as I need. Are you not the master of my body? What is that to me? Of my property? What is that to me? Of exile or captivity? Again, I say, from all these things, and the poor body itself I will depart when you will. Try your power, and you shall know how far it reaches." (Dissertations, iv., 7.)

Marcus Aurelius, however, indicates by these words that there must be a sufficient cause ere it can be a man's right upon his own volition to lay down his life,

"As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out . . . so it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it." (Meditations, c. v.)

This, also Epictetus enjoins in this passage:

"And to this it should be my part to say, 'My friends, wait upon God. When He himself shall give the signal and release you from this service, then are ye released unto Him. But for the present, bear to dwell in this place, wherein He has set you. Short, indeed, is this time of your sojourn, and easy to bear for those that are so minded. For what tyrant or what thief is there any longer, or what court of law is terrible to one who thus makes nothing

of the body and the possessions of it? Remain, then, and depart not without reason.'” (Dissertations, i., 9.)

Aristotle, already in the second generation after Socrates, acknowledged the right of a man to take his own life, but was clear that to do so upon a mere whim is wrong; of this he says in his “Ethics”: “Now he that from rage kills himself voluntarily, does this in contravention of right reason, which the law does not permit.” (Bk. v., 16.)

Epictetus, with a view, doubtless, of specially justifying self-destruction by referring to the heroic death of Socrates, sought thus to identify the summons which the man, bent upon suicide, thus alleges that fate has by its blows served upon him, with the inexorable sentence of the law which rested upon Socrates,

“Only do it not unreasonably, nor cowardly, nor make common chance an excuse. For again, it is not God’s will, for He hath need of such an order of things, and of such a race upon the earth. But if He give the signal for retreat, as He did to Socrates, we must obey Him as our commander.” (Dissertations, i., 29.)

But Socrates thus condemns suicide in “Phædo” in a conversation with Cebes, as follows:

“‘But I do think, Cebes, that it is true that the gods are our guardians, and that we men are a part of their property. Do you not think so?’ ‘I do,’

said Cebes. 'Well, then,' said he, 'if one of your possessions were to kill itself, though you had not signified that you wished it to die, should you not be angry with it? Should you not punish it, if punishment were possible?' 'Certainly,' he replied. 'Then in this way perhaps it is not unreasonable to hold that no man has a right to take his own life, but that he must wait until God sends some necessity upon him, as has now been sent upon me.'"

The Death of Socrates. Of the Greek Sage it could be truly said that nothing in all his life in this world became him more than the manner of his leaving it. While before his judges, he pleaded not for himself but for truth. His later disciple, Epicetetus, thus condensed one account of his discussion, aimed not at saving his life but at showing clearly the truth about every matter:

"Thus Socrates knew how to play ball. How? When he jested in the court of justice. 'Tell me, Anytus,' he said, 'How say you that I believe there is no God? The dæmons, who are they, think you? Are they not sons of God, or a mixed nature between gods and men?' And when this was admitted—'Who, do you think, can hold that mules exist, but not asses?' And thus he played with the ball. And what was the ball that was there thrown about among them? Life, chains, exile, a draught of poison, to be torn from a wife, to leave children orphans. These were the things among them that they played withal; yet none the less did he play, and flung the

ball with proper grace and measure. And so should we do also, having the carefulness of the most zealous players and yet indifference, as were it merely about a ball." (Dissertations, ii., 5.)

Plato reports him, in "The Apology," to have reminded the Athenians, not of his loss, but of theirs, as follows,

"You have not gained very much time, Athenians, and, as the price of it, you will have an evil name from all who wish to revile the city, and they will cast in your teeth that you put Socrates, a wise man, to death. . . . But when I was defending myself, I thought that I ought not to do anything unmanly because of the danger which I ran, and I have not changed my mind now. I would very much rather defend myself as I did, and die, than as you would have had me do, and live. . . . I think that it is a much harder thing to escape from wickedness than from death; for wickedness is swifter than death."

Xenophon records this portion of his conversation with his disciples concerning the same subject,

"If I shall live a longer period, perhaps I shall be destined to sustain the evils of old age, to find my sight and hearing weakened, to feel my intellect impaired, to become less apt to learn, and more forgetful, and, in fine, to grow inferior to others in all those qualities in which I was once superior to

them. If I should be insensible to this deterioration, life would not be worth retaining; and, if I should feel it, how could I live otherwise than with less profit, and with less comfort? If I am to die unjustly, my death will be a disgrace to those who unjustly kill me; for if injustice is a disgrace, must it not be a disgrace to do anything unjustly? But what disgrace will it be to me, that others could not decide, or act, justly with regard to me? Of the men who have lived before me, I see that the estimation left among posterity with regard to such as have done wrong, and such as have suffered wrong, is by no means similar; and I know that I also, if now I die, shall obtain from mankind far different consideration from that which they will pay to those who take my life; for I know that they will always bear witness to me that I have never wronged any man, or rendered any man less virtuous, but that I have always endeavoured to make those better who conversed with me.''' (Memorabilia, bk. iv., 8.)

In "Phædo," that disciple tells Echecrates of this conversation,

"I have often, Echecrates, wondered at Socrates; but I never admired him more than I admired him then. There was nothing very strange in his having an answer; what I chiefly wondered at was, first, the kindness and good-nature and respect with which he listened to the young men's objections; and, secondly, the quickness with which he perceived their effect upon us; and, lastly, how well he healed

our wounds, and rallied us as if we were beaten and flying troops, and encouraged us to follow him, and to examine the reasoning with him."

Socrates consigned his sons to the care of his disciples, urging them to make of these if possible, simple-minded, earnest, modest seekers after truth, saying to his assembled followers as reported in "The Apology,"

"When my sons grow up, visit them with punishment, my friends, and vex them in the same way that I have vexed you, if they seem to you to care for riches, or for any other thing, before virtue; and, if they think that they are something when they are nothing at all, reproach them, as I have reproached you, for not caring for what they should and for thinking that they are great men, when in fact they are worthless."

To his disciples who found it hard in view of the great deprivation which they were about to suffer, to restrain their tears, Plato, in "Phædo," represents him to have spoken these words, "I sent away the women chiefly in order that they might not offend in this way; for I have heard that a man should die in silence. So calm yourselves and bear up."

The following statement of Phædo from the same book affords a brief glimpse of his serene and noble departure, "I did not pity him, for he seemed to me happy, Echecrates, both in his bearing and in his words, so fearlessly and nobly did he die."

Phædo adds this estimate of the character of Socrates: "Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, a man, I think, who was the wisest and justest, and the best man that I have ever known."

Socrates, however, in the closing hours of his life, with the humility that was inseparable from his character, merely expressed his longing that he might be found among those who have truly and devotedly sought wisdom for the very love of it, in these words,

"I fear that virtue is not really to be bought in this way, by bartering pleasure for pleasure, and pain for pain, and fear for fear, and the greater for the less, like coins. There is only one sterling coin for which all these things ought to be exchanged, and that is wisdom. All that is bought and sold for this and with this, whether courage, or temperance, or justice, is real; in one word true virtue cannot be without wisdom, and it matters nothing whether pleasure, and fear, and all other such things, are present or absent. But I think that the virtue which is composed of pleasures and fears bartered with one another, and severed from wisdom, is only a shadow of true virtue, and that it has no freedom, nor health, nor truth. True virtue in reality is a kind of purifying from all these things; and temperance, justice, courage and wisdom itself are the purification.

"And I fancy that the men who established our mysteries had a very real meaning; in truth they have been telling us in parables all the time that whosoever comes to Hades uninitiated and profane,

will lie in the mire, while he that has been purified and initiated, shall dwell with the gods. For 'The thyrsus-bearers are many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'but the inspired few.' And by these last, I believe, are meant only the true philosophers.

"And I in my life have striven as hard as I was able, and have left nothing undone that I might become one of them. Whether I have striven in the right way, and whether I have succeeded or not, I suppose that I shall learn in a little while when I reach the other world, if it be the will of God."
(Phædo.)

Referring to the attitudes of Socrates, when face to face with death, Epictetus says,

"It is not things, but the opinions about the things, that trouble mankind. Thus death is nothing terrible; if it were so, it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the opinion we have about death, that it is terrible, it is that wherein the terror lieth."
(Encheiridion v.)

Socrates, in addition to the reasoning with which he has supported his proposition that death is a good and not an evil, in his closing hours adduced the evidence of the divine guidance which had attended him throughout life, warning him of impending evils, but which was now silent, leaving him without any intimation that what was about to befall, was to him a misfortune or in any way hurtful; concerning which Plato, in "The Apology," represents his Master to say,

“The prophetic sign, which I am wont to receive from the divine voice, has been constantly with me all through my life till now, opposing me in quite small matters if I were not going to act rightly. And now you yourselves see what has happened to me, a thing which might be thought, and which is sometimes actually reckoned, the supreme evil. But the sign of God did not withstand me when I was leaving my house in the morning, nor when I was coming up hither to the court, nor at any point in my speech, when I was going to say anything, though at other times it has often stopped me in the very act of speaking. But now, in this matter, it has never once withstood me, either in my works or my actions. I will tell you what I believe to be the reason of that. This thing that has come upon me must be a good and those of us who think that death is an evil, must needs be mistaken. I have a clear proof that that is so; for my accustomed sign would certainly have opposed me, if I had not been going to fare well.”